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 Pope John Paul II’s Encyclical Veritatis Splendor is the first and only magisterial 
document that systematically articulates a moral methodology for Catholic moral theology. This 
dissertation makes explicit the methodological connection between Vatican teaching and the 
United States Bishops’ Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. The 
thesis of the dissertation explains the systematic connection between Natural Law, the Moral 
Object of the Act, and the Principle of Double Effect and by extension the ethical Principle of 
Cooperation. Second, the thesis applies this complex moral method of official teaching to health 
care ethics. 
Following the introduction, chapter two discusses the moral method of Natural Law and 
the Moral Object. Chapter 3 relates this explanation to the Principle of Double Effect. The 
subsequent chapters apply this moral method of official Catholic teaching to Catholic health care 
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ethics, focusing on several emerging topics to emphasize the relevance of the theoretical 
approach. Chapter 4 discusses Health Care Ethics Consultations, especially engaging the 
Principle of Cooperation (enlightened by the Principle of Double Effect) with regard to 
prohibited health care services in Catholic health care. Chapter 5 considers the use of the 
Principle of Double Effect to justify bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation 
carriers and the uses of contraception for victims of sexual assault. Chapter 6 discusses the use of 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
      There is longstanding discourse in Catholic moral theology regarding the relation 
between Natural Law, the Moral Object of an act, and the Principle of Double Effect and 
Cooperation. Thomas Aquinas produces the first comprehensive and systematic account of 
Natural Law and the Moral Object of the act in his Summa Theologica.1 In accord with Aquinas, 
official Catholic teaching holds that certain Moral Objects are intrinsically evil.2 In addition, 
Aquinas also introduces the first formulation of the Principle of Double Effect, which combines 
discourse on Natural Law and the Moral Object of an act to explain the legitimacy of an action 
with a good and bad effect.3 Similar to the Principle of Double Effect, the Catholic moral 
tradition uses the Principle of Cooperation to determine when and to what extent one’s actions 
may contribute to the immoral action of another. Not surprisingly, robust debate continues over 
the meaning and relevance for morality of each of these concepts.      
      The most comprehensive account in Catholic official teaching of Natural Law, the Moral 
Object of an act, and their relevance for the Principle of Double Effect and the Principle of 
Cooperation can be found in Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis Splendor. This is the first 
and only Papal encyclical that explores moral theology from a systematic perspective. As a 
result, Pope John Paul II reaffirms the existence of intrinsically evil acts,4 yet continues to 
approve the complex ethical principles of double effect and of cooperation.  
      The Catholic Church in the United States adopts this stance of Pope John Paul II to 
articulate its official teaching on health care ethics in the Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Care Services.5 Surprisingly, however, the United States Bishops do not adopt 
the moral method Pope John Paul II articulates in Veritatis Splendor. This dissertation discusses 
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the connection between the method of Veritatis Splendor and the United States bishops’ Ethical 
and Religious Directives.   
      The thesis of the dissertation has two related goals. First, the thesis explains the 
systematic connection between Natural Law, the Moral Object of the Act, and the Principle of 
Double Effect and by extension the ethical Principle of Cooperation. Insofar as cooperation 
effectively adopts the standards of double effect reasoning, the thesis title only lists the Principle 
of Double Effect. Second, the thesis applies this complex moral method of official teaching to 
health care ethics.   
Insofar as the Ethical and Religious Directives apply this approach to many well-known 
issues, a consideration of the relevance of the Church’s moral method for emerging issues 
(referred to in the analysis), in health care is undertaken. A major emerging issue deals with 
ethics consultations that, although commonly undertaken in Catholic health systems, is not 
addressed at length in the Ethical and Religious Directives. The dissertation relates this topic 
with the ethical Principle of Cooperation that is adopted to resolve disputes in ethics 
consultations regarding the provision (or not) of particular commonly accessible health services. 
Another two major emerging issues are becoming increasingly problematic for Catholic health 
systems, yet are not addressed explicitly in Ethical and Religious Directives: oophorectomies and 
sex reassignment surgeries, each related to issues regarding contraception. Each of these 
emerging issues are discussed in the applied chapters of the dissertation.   
      The sequence of the analysis in the chapters of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 1 
provides an Introduction. Chapter 2 discusses the moral method of Natural Law and the Moral 
Object of the Act. Chapter 3 relates this explanation to the Principle of Double Effect. The 
subsequent chapters apply this moral method of official Catholic teaching to Catholic health care 
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ethics, focusing on several emerging topics to emphasize the relevance of the theoretical 
approach. Chapter 4 discusses Health Care Ethics Consultations, especially engaging the 
Principle of Cooperation (enlightened by the Principle of Double Effect) with regard to 
prohibited health care services in Catholic health care. Chapter 5 considers the use of the 
Principle of Double Effect to justify bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation 
carriers and the uses of contraception for victims of sexual assault. Chapter 6 discusses the use of 
sex reassignment therapies for gender dysphoria and the use of contraceptive methods for non-
contraceptive benefits.   
CHAPTER TWO – NATURAL LAW AND THE MORAL OBJECT 
      Chapter two explains the role of Natural Law and the Moral Object of the Act in the 
moral method of Catholic teaching. Each section focuses on the scholarship of two contemporary 
ethicists—John Finnis and Martin Rhonheimer—who have made a pivotal contribution to the 
debate on this approach.   
2A. Natural Law 
      The first section addresses the role of Natural Law in Catholic moral theology including 
divergent formulations. 
i. Natural Law 
a. Law 
      In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas discusses Natural Law in the context of law.6 This 
subsubsection analyzes Aquinas’s understanding of law, from the perspective of Martin 
Rhonheimer’s Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomistic View of Moral Autonomy.7 Most 
importantly, for Rhonheimer, the precept of reason is an act of the will expressed not in word, 
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but action.8 One derives the normative principles of Natural Law, which are speculative in 
nature, by reflecting on the process of practical reason in action.9 
b. Eternal Law and Natural Law 
      Natural law is the eternal law of God written on the heart of each human person.10 All 
creatures participate in the law which God promulgates, but humans participate in the law 
uniquely insofar as they also providentially govern.11 John Finnis explains Aquinas’s 
understanding of participatio in his Natural Law and Natural Rights. 12 
c. Self-Evidence of Practical Reason 
      Just as the first principle of metaphysics is self-evident, so the first principle of practical 
reason is self-evident.13 R. A. Armstrong in Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic 
Natural Law Teaching identifies what Aquinas means by self-evident.14 Using Kevin L. 
Flannery’s Acts Amid Precepts, I highlight a parallel between the ordering of theoretical knowing 
and practical knowing in Aquinas.15 For Grisez, in “The First Principles of Practical Reason: A 
Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2,” self-evident principles are 
not mere tautologies, that is, restatements of what is already given.16 Finnis relates the concept of 
the self-evidence of principles or precepts of Natural Law to the rationality of the notion that any 
state of affairs may exist without further explanation.17   
d. Happiness, Natural Inclinations and Reason 
      In The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics, 
Rhonheimer highlights the difference between an authentic eudemonistic ethic and one that only 
seems oriented toward happiness, but really constitutes hedonism.18 For Rhonheimer, action 
concerns appetition, that is, striving for a good that corresponds to the substantive form of the 
human person, which is both body and soul.19 The inclinations for the good correspond to each 
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aspect of the human condition—inanimate, animate, and rational.20 Insofar as the soul consists of 
both intellect and will, happiness is that which one rationally wills for its own sake.21  
e. Principles of Natural Law and Basic Human Goods 
     Each principle of Natural Law corresponds to the natural inclinations in humans, which 
corresponds to all three of the above-mentioned classes of inclinations.22 Armstrong relates the 
principles of practical reason to human inclinations,23 while Finnis relates it to basic human 
values.24 Perspectives diverge on the above depending on one’s perspective regarding the 
Naturalistic Fallacy.   
ii. Naturalistic Fallacy and Natural Law 
      The Naturalistic Fallacy originates in G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, where, building on 
David Hume’s assertion that “ought statements” do not derive from “is statements,”25 he argues 
that moral good is not physical good.26   
a. Ergon Argument 
      In Fundamentals of Ethics, Finnis takes issue with Aristotle’s “ergon argument,” in the 
Nicomachean Ethics that is, where he argues that insofar as the human person’s function is to 
reason, they ought to act in accord with reason.27 Finnis insists that since this argument is 
theoretical, not practical in nature it contributes nothing substantial to Aristotle’s ethics.28 Ralph 
McInerny29 and Martin Rhonheimer30 both take issue with Finnis’s dismissal of Aristotle’s 
function argument, which I further elucidate here. 
b. Essentialist Understanding of Morality 
      Rhonheimer rejects what he calls an essentialist understanding of morality, of which 
Heinrich Rommen,31 Joseph Pieper,32 Ralph McInerny,33 Steven Jensen,34 R. Hittinger,35 and 
Steven A. Long36 are leading proponents.37 They conflate metaphysics with morality, contending 
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that morality perfects being. Their methodology is no different than that of the proportionalists 
they reject including: Peter Knauer,38 Josef Fuchs,39 Louis Janssens,40 Bruno Schuller,41 and 
Richard McCormick.42 Avoiding the Naturalistic Fallacy places moral decision making in the 
first-person perspective.   
iii. Natural Law and the Perspective of the Acting Person 
a. The Primacy of the First-Person Perspective 
      Rhonheimer, in “The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of 
Subjectivity,” upholds the subjective primacy of the Natural Law.43 Rhonheimer rebuts critics 
such as Jean Porter who assert that he falls into spiritualism, 44 rooting actions in the human 
person that is a substantial union of body and soul.45   
b. First-Person Perspective in Veritatis Splendor 
     John Paul II, following Aquinas, understands Natural Law to be a divine light of reason, 
which God imprints on humanity in creation.46 This subsubsection follows John Paul II’s 
articulation of the subjective nature of the Natural Law in Veritatis Splendor. A first-person 
perspective on the Natural Law best explains the Catholic Church’s argument concerning the 
immorality of contraception.   
iv. Contraception and Natural Law 
a. Inseparability Principle 
      Paul VI, in Humanae Vitae establishes the inseparable connection between the unitive 
and procreative significance of the marital act in Natural Law.47 Rhonheimer, in Ethics of 
Procreation and the Defense of Human Life: Contraception, Artificial Fertilization and Abortion  
establishes this connection between the Natural Law and the Inseparability Principle.48 
b. Responsible Parenthood and Chastity 
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      Following Paul VI’s lead,49 Rhonheimer connects the Church’s prohibition against 
contraception to the virtue of chastity, insisting that periodic continence, a substantive part of 
responsible parenthood, is the inherent means for growth in it.50 This line of reasoning concurs 
with John Paul II in Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body.51   
      The Natural Law is foundational to how the practical intellect formulates the good in the 
Object of the Act, which the following section elucidates. 
2B. Moral Object 
      This section addresses the role of the Object of the Act for Catholic Morality.   
i. Aquinas’s Action Theory 
a. Intrinsically Evil Acts 
     This subsubsection follows the development of the concept of intrinsically evil acts, 
which Servais Pinckaers, in “A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts,” traces 
beginning with Augustine and continuing through Peter Abelard, Peter Lombard, and 
culminating in Aquinas.52 
b. Intention to Action  
      This subsubsection follows Finnis’s interpretation of Aquinas’s action theory in Question 
11-20 of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae, in his Aquinas: Moral, Political and 
Legal Theory.53 Above all, Finnis highlights the distinction between choosing (electio) and 
intending (intentio), which correspond to distinct aspects of willing, the proximate end and the 
ultimate end, respectively.54 In concert with the will, Rhonheimer observes that the intellect acts 
in extension when engaging in practical reason.55 The proximate end corresponds to the Object 
of the Act.  
c. External Act: Materia Circa Quam and Proximate End 
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      Joseph Pilsner, in The Specification of Human Actions in Saint Thomas Aquinas holds 
that Aquinas uses the relationship between form and matter in a substantial being to illustrate the 
analogous relationship that ends have for action.56 Once again, the identification of the Object of 
the Act with the proximate end and the materia circa quam, which Sousa-Lara illustrates is 
helpful for understanding the distinct properties of the external act.57 Just as one’s position on the 
Naturalistic Fallacy affects the formulation of the Natural Law, so it affects the formulation of 
the Object of the Act. 
ii. Naturalistic Fallacy 
a. Genus Moris Versus Genus Naturae 
       According to Rhonheimer, the greatest mistake of consequentialists is the presumption 
that morality is reducible to technical decision making,58 which, for Finnis, amounts to reducing 
doing to making.59 In this regard, many Thomistic ethicists mistakenly presume that morality 
derives from metaphysics, which constitutes the Naturalistic Fallacy.60 
b. Manualism and Proportionalism 
      Precisely insofar as the manualists and proportionalists subscribe to the Naturalistic 
Fallacy—presuming that ethics derives from nature—they constitute two sides of the same 
consequentialist coin. Servais Pinckaers, in The Sources of Christian Ethics demonstrates that 
Ockham’s nominalism is the source of the Naturalistic Fallacy, rather than authentic Thomism.61  
Proportionalists, such as, Peter Knauer reduce moral evil to causing evil in the world,62 which 
constitutes eventism for Rhonheimer63 and Finnis.64 Failing to avoid the Naturalistic Fallacy 
precludes a first-person perspective for morality. The following subsection addresses these 
deficiencies.    
iii. Moral Object and the Perspective of the Acting Person 
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a. Avoiding Eventism 
      Rhonheimer, in “‘Intrinsically Evil Acts’ and the Moral Viewpoint: Clarifying a  
Central Teaching of Veritatis Splendor,” argues that eventistic morality reduces the Object of the 
Act to intention, rendering choice insignificant.65   
b. The Socratic Principle 
      The Socratic Principle contends that it is better to suffer evil than to do.66 Insofar as 
proportionalism does not pass the test of the Socratic Principle, Finnis and Rhonheimer reject 
it.67    
c. Personalism in Veritatis Splendor 
      This subsubsection follows the personalistic approach to morality in John Paul II’s 
Veritatis Splendor.68 John Paul II rejects the proportionalistic approach precisely because it 
denies a personalistic approach.69 Accordingly, he reaffirms the existence of intrinsically evil 
acts.70 Only a first-person account of the Object of the Act provides an adequate perspective for 
defining the Object of the Act of contraception.   
iv.  Object of Contraception 
a. Manualism 
      John T. Noonan Jr., in Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic 
Theologians and Canonists demonstrates that the manualists reject contraception on the 
physicalistic objection that the Object of the Act constitutes onanism.71 Pius XI’s rejection of 
contraception follows similar lines of reasoning.72  
b. Proportionalism 
      Proportionalists such as Peter Knauer have no problem with contraception so long as a 
commensurate reason exists for intending it in the physical world.73 
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c. Rhonheimer  
      Rhonheimer contends that Humanae Vitae only makes sense according to a personalistic 
approach to morality, that is, one that grounds morality in the human person, a composite of 
body and soul.74 Accordingly, Rhonheimer defines the Object of the Act of marital union as 
loving bodily union.75 With reference to chastity, he defines the Object of the Act of 
contraception as a choice against the natural means for growth in chastity, which periodic 
continence, a constitutive part of responsible parenthood affords.76 The Object of the Act is an 
important criteria of the Principle of Double Effect, which the following chapter examines.   
CHAPTER THREE – PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT 
      This chapter analyzes the Principle of the Double Effect in light of the preceding 
articulation of the Natural Law and the Object of the Act.   
3A. Double Effect from Aquinas to Knauer 
      This section traces the historical development of the Principle of Double Effect beginning 
with Thomas Aquinas and concluding with the proportionalist Peter Knauer.    
i. Aquinas and Double-Effect Reasoning  
      The first subsection explicates Thomas Aquinas’s use of Double-Effect Reasoning in the 
Summa Theologiae where he uses it to explain killing in self-defense.77 In accord with 
Augustine, Aquinas objects to one intending to kill another person, for any reason, since this 
violates an exceptionless moral norm.78 For Aquinas, the death of an assailant is praeter 
intentionem, that is, beside the intention of the agent, which in this case is self-defense.79 
Aquinas’s formulation concerns proportionality, which reflects one’s intention both in terms of 
the proximate end and ultimate end. In addition, Aquinas uses Double-Effect Reasoning in his 
 
 11 
discussion of scandal80 and adorning dress.81 Commentators on Aquinas develop divergent 
interpretations of the Principle of Double Effect.  
ii. Antoninus to Gury 
      The second subsection of this paper follows the development of the Principle of Double 
Effect through the commentaries of theologians that follow Aquinas up to Jean Pierre Gury. The 
analysis begins with Antoninus’s development of Double-Effect Reasoning concerning scandal 
and alluring dress in his Summa Theologica Moralis.82 Following Joseph T. Mangan’s influential 
analysis of the Principle of Double Effect, “An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double 
Effect,”83 I consider Cajetan’s contribution.84 The Dominican Vitoria restricts Aquinas’s 
understanding of intention in the passage pertaining to killing in self-defense, contradicting the 
broad interpretation of intention that includes the proximate end—Object of the Act—as well as 
the ultimate end.85 Suarez neglects any discussion of the proximate end altogether.86 J. Ghoos, in 
“L’Act a Double Effet Ètude de Théologie Positive,” holds that John of Saint Thomas is the first 
to put the Principle of Double Effect into its modern form.87 Many of the adaptations in the 
Principle of Double Effect from the Thomistic commentators influence Gury’s formulation.  
iii. Jean Pierre Gury 
      Jean Pierre Gury, in his Compendium theologiae moralis is the first to apply the Principle 
of Double Effect to the rest of moral theology.88 Christopher Kaczor observes that for Aquinas 
the proportionality criterion consists of weighing acts, while for Gury it involves weighing 
effects.89 This demonstrates the casuistic devolution of the Principle of Double Effect up to 
Gury. Proportionalists such as Peter Knauer adopt Gury’s formulation of the Principle of Double 
Effect. 
iv. Peter Knauer 
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      The final section analyzes Peter Knauer’s use of the Principle of Double Effect in “The 
Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect.”90 In accord with the casuistic 
formulation of Gury, Knauer understands the proportion criteria to involve weighing effects. In 
addition, however, Knauer understands the proximate end to be the effect, that is, the ultimate 
end.91 To justify an action which causes a negative effect, one must have “commensurate 
reason.”92 John Paul II, in Veritatis Splendor rejects the proportionalistic articulation of the 
Object of the Act.93 In part, this motivates ethicists to formulate non-consequentialist versions of 
the Principle of Double Effect, which the following section explores. 
3B. Contemporary Formulations of the Principle of Double Effect  
      This section analyzes the use of the Principle of Double Effect by contemporary ethicists.  
i. Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle: Defending Craniotomy 
a. Eight Cases that Illustrate Intention 
      John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle, in “‘Direct’ and ‘indirect’: A Reply to 
Critics of Our Action Theory,” offer eight cases that illustrate the complexity of the first-person 
perspective of action in their action theory.94 These eight examples highlight the distinct roles of 
intention regarding the first person perspective, notwithstanding the tendency to conflate its role 
in ethics and law, especially under the influence of Jeremy Bentham.95 Moreover, these examples 
highlight errors in the precise formulation of the Object of the Act, the first criteria for the 
Principle of Double Effect. 
b. Perspective of the Acting Person 
      Finnis, in Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, demonstrates the distinction that 
Aquinas highlights in his On Evil between the broad and narrow sense of intention.96 Broadly 
speaking, intention includes the Object of the Act, which one can only know from the 
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perspective of the acting person.97 In accord with Augustine in his Contra mendacium,98 Finnis, 
in Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth contends that exceptionless moral norms do 
exist that one ought never to violate.99 
c. Debunking Unsound Arguments against Craniotomies 
      Finnis et al. reject seven unsound arguments against craniotomies that reduce morality to 
cause-effect reasoning.100 Put another way, these arguments reduce the genus moris to the genus 
naturae.101 In addition, they reaffirm their acceptance of the Church’s prohibition against direct 
killing.102   
d. Defending Craniotomies 
      Finnis et al., reject Kevin F. Flannery’s argument that the means of a craniotomy contains 
the death of a child.103 In addition, they refute Jean Porter’s argument in “‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’ 
in Grisez’s Moral Theory,” that their theory depends on the indivisibility of performance.104 The 
physical circumstances of an act, including its consequences are not negligible to the 
determination of the Object of the Act. The following subsection accounts for this without 
relegating the derivation of the Object of the Act to the physical. 
ii. A Thomistic Response to Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle 
      Cavanaugh argues that Finnis et al.’s argument relegates moral decision making to the 
conceptual.105 For Cavanaugh one communicates intention not only by words, but actions as 
well.106 Duarte Sousa Lara, in “Aquinas on Interior and Exterior Acts: Clarifying a Key Aspect 
of His Action Theory,” articulates a distinction within the exterior act that accounts for the 
connection between the physical act and that which the agent chooses, the latter corresponding to 
the Object of the Act.107 Another way to distinguish the physical from the moral is the distinction 
between intending and foreseeing.   
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iii. Intended and Foreseen in T. A. Cavanaugh 
a. Double-Effect Terminology 
      Although several formulations of the Principle of Double Effect exist to distinguish what 
one intends versus what one does not intend, Cavanaugh contends that the intended and foreseen 
distinction is the best, because it they avoid confusions that others do not.108 
b. Intention/Foreseen Distinction 
      For Cavanaugh, it is impossible to conceive of certain actions without an evil intention, 
for example euthanasia, terror bombing, and craniotomies.109 To determine intent for actions that 
do not necessarily include an evil intent, James Sterba recommends asking if the foreseen 
negative effect helps explain why one is choosing a particular action, thus connecting intention 
to the Object of the Act.110 Following the distinction that G. E. M. Anscombe makes between 
practical and speculative knowledge,111 Cavanaugh holds that intention is practical, while 
foreseen effects are speculative.112 The following subsections apply the intending/foreseeing 
distinction to concrete ethical dilemmas, beginning with the distinction between euthanasia and 
terminal sedation.   
iv. Euthanasia Versus Terminal Sedation 
a. The Catholic Church: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation 
      Ethicists often use the Principle of Double Effect to differentiate in health care ethics 
between euthanasia and terminal sedation. In Declaration on Euthanasia, the Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith condemns intentionally killing another person by an act of omission or 
commission to relieve pain or suffering.113 At the same time, the Church acknowledges that 
circumstances exist where pain relievers that medical clinicians use to treat pain, foreseeably, but 
unintentionally, expedite the dying process by depressing the respiratory system.114 More current 
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research indicates that when done properly, continuous, deep sedation does not shorten life.115 
Insofar as the Church prefers for patients to be awake to spiritually prepare for death, Double 
Effect justifies sedation when the patient experiences great distress.  
b. Joseph Boyle: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation  
      In “On Killing and Letting Die,” Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. formulates an argument defending 
the moral distinction attributable to the Object of the Act and the Principle of Double Effect 
between killing and letting die.116 Boyle rejects claims by Michael Tooley in “A Defense of 
Abortion and Infanticide,” that there is no moral distinction between killing and letting die,117 
insisting that the distinction centers on intention.118 When killing in euthanasia, one intends the 
death of the person to relieve pain, whereas by allowing one to die, one does not necessarily 
intend the person’s death, even if one foresees it.   
c. Intention/Foreseen Distinction: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation  
      Using the intention/foreseen distinction, Cavanaugh emphasizes that in euthanasia, the 
physician chooses the death of the patient as a means to relieving pain.119 Relieving the patient’s 
pain does not suffice—as it does in terminal sedation. Thus, in euthanasia, the Object of the Act 
is murder, whereas in terminal sedation it is relieving pain. The following subsection highlights 
the connection between circumstances (including consequences) for the Object of the Act.  
v. Hysterectomy Versus Craniotomy 
a. Direct Killing in Abortion 
       The Church clearly prohibits direct abortion, that is, killing an unborn child either as a 
means or an end to one’s action.120 At the same time, circumstances arise where, for 
proportionate reasons, a physician may perform an indirect abortion, for example by performing 
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a hysterectomy on a woman with a gravid cancerous uterus.121 This is a classic application of the 
Principle of Double Effect.   
b. Defending Craniotomies 
      According to four criteria, Grisez122 and Boyle123 argue that craniotomies do not 
constitute direct killing. This position, they argue is consistent with that of H. L. A. Hart’s.124 
Cavanaugh asserts that Boyle and Grisez so narrowly define craniotomy that it excludes the 
death of a child, however, R. A. Duff insists that it is impossible to define craniotomy without 
the death of a child.125   
c. Craniotomies and Hysterectomies 
      Using the Intention/Foreseen distinction, Cavanaugh holds that the craniotomy, unlike the 
hysterectomy of a gravid cancerous uterus, inexorably entails the death of the child, which means 
that one cannot avoid intending the death of the child by intentionally performing a 
craniotomy.126 Thus, Cavanaugh objects to their narrow, conceptual definition of the Object of 
the Act for a craniotomy. The distinction between terror bombing provides another opportunity 
to clarify the distinction between intending/foreseeing.   
vi. Terror Bombing Versus Tactical Bombing 
a. Traditional Just War Theory 
      Here, I explicate the criteria for just war theory according to James F. Childress in “Just-
War Theories: The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and Functions of Their Criteria,”127 which 
has recourse to the Principle of Double Effect to justify collateral damage.     
b. Just War, Terrorism and Nuclear Deterrence 
      Finnis et al., in Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism argue that the United States 
ought to abandon the nuclear arms proliferation race for the common good of the people of the 
 
 17 
Soviet Union, even though they are not likely to reciprocate.128 This is because deterrence 
involves the retaliatory killing of innocent civilians, which violates an exceptionless moral norm, 
the Object of the Act of mass murder.129     
c. Terror Bombing and Tactical Bombing 
      Cavanaugh uses the intention/foreseen distinction to further highlight the immorality of 
terror bombing in contrast to discriminate tactical bombing.130 The terror bomber intends to 
maim civilians as a means to achieving the end of victory, whereas the tactical bomber destroys 
an enemy’s ability to wage war by strategically targeting combat installations, foreseeing, but not 
intending to harm non-combatants.131 Thus, the Principle of Double Effect justifies the 
unintended, yet foreseen death of non-combatants.   
      The preceding chapters provide a theoretical foundation in Catholic moral method to 
discuss applied topics emerging in health care ethics, which in turn further elucidate the 
abovementioned theory. The next chapter examines the ethical principles that guide health care 
ethics consultations. Then, it correlates the implications of this chapter’s definition of the 
Principle of Double Effect with the similar Principle of Cooperation.  
CHAPTER FOUR – HEALTH CARE ETHICS CONSULTATIONS AND COOPERATION 
      Chapters five and six of this dissertation apply the normative theory discussed in chapters 
two and three. This chapter provides a procedural bridge between the normative and applied 
chapters. The discussion concerning health care ethics consultations explains the procedure or 
process of decision making that connects theory to application. Although normative, given its 
link to the Principle of Double Effect, the Principle of Cooperation analogously applies theory to 
practice, providing an opportunity for organizations with conflicting missions to work together.   
4A. Health Care Ethics Consultations 
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        This section evaluates the ethical method that guides health care ethics consultations. 
i. Health Care Ethics Consultations  
      In accord with the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities132 and the Veterans 
Health Administration,133 this subsection delineates health care ethics consultations that are case 
based and non-case based. American Society for Bioethics and Humanities advocates a 
facilitation approach to health care ethics consultations, since it empowers people to act on well-
articulated values.134 The size and nature of the health care ethics consultations depends on 
various factors that I further articulate here.135   
a. Proficiencies  
     American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health Administration 
provide proficiencies, which I enunciate here.136 These consist of knowledge, skills, and 
attributes.137   
b. Veterans Health Administration 
      This subsubsection first elucidates practical skills for leading health care ethics 
consultations according to the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities.138 Next, it 
explains the Veterans Health Administration approach for leading ethics consultations.139 I use 
Albert R. Jonsen et al.’s Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical 
Medicine to illuminate the Veterans Health Administration’s approach.140 The next subsection 
explores the moral method of principlism that is foundational for health care ethics consultations 
and its implications for Catholic health care. 
ii. Principles and Topics for Health Care Ethics Consultations 
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      This subsection uses Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress’s book Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics141 and Jonsen et al.’s above mentioned text to explicate the four foundational 
principles of health care ethics: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. 
a. Autonomy 
      For Beauchamp et al., autonomy consists of liberty and agency.142 I discuss three 
concepts that depend on autonomy: competence, informed consent, and confidentiality.143   
b. Non-Maleficence and Beneficence  
      Beauchamp et al., offer four norms that proceed from the two principles of non-
maleficence—do no harm—corresponds to beneficence—act helpfully, which I elucidate in this 
subsection.144 Questions relating to quality of life, associated with non-maleficence, sometimes 
lead to support for euthanasia. Following May, I explain the anthropology that underlies such 
reasoning145 and defend the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s prohibition against 
euthanasia.146 
c. Justice 
      In this subsection, I discuss four rules that Beauchamp et al. correlates with beneficence; 
which inexorably relates to justice.147 Next, I elucidate ten questions pertaining to justice.148 
Having discussed the correlation between principles of health care ethics and the moral method 
of Catholic health care ethics, the following section discusses the principle of cooperation, which 
helps ethicists in establishing health care alliances.   
4B. Principle of Cooperation 
      This section explicates the role of the Principle of Cooperation for Catholic health care 
ethics.   
i. Principle of Cooperation  
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a. Cooperation and Double Effect 
      Ethicists often highlight the similarities between the Principle of Double Effect and the 
Principle of Cooperation.149 Traditional formulations of the Principle of Double Effect have four 
or five conditions that correspond to similar conditions in the Principle of Cooperation.150 
Beginning with Alphonsus Liguori’s articulation, this section outlines the parallels between the 
two principles.151 Just as one’s understanding of the Natural Law and the Object of the Act 
influence one’s construct of the Principle of Double Effect, so they affect how one uses the 
Principle of Cooperation.   
ii. Cooperation and Sterilization 
a. Sterilization 
      In the face of pressure to perform procedures such as sterilizations and abortions, which 
the Church argues violates exceptionless moral norms,152 that is, an immoral Object of the Act, 
they use the Principle of Cooperation to delineate degrees of cooperation.153 This subsection 
traces this history of the Church’s use of the Principle of Cooperation to address cooperation 
with institutions that perform sterilizations.   
b. The United States Bishops’ and Cooperation 
      This subsection explores the development of United States bishops’ use of the Principle 
of Cooperation, in particular, in the various editions of the Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Care Services.154 In particular, I use Kevin O’Rourke’s insightful article to shed 
light on the changes that occur in the Ethical and Religious Directives.155   
c. The Object of the Cooperator 
     O’Rourke contends that the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith finds fault with 
the United States bishops’ formulation of Cooperation.156 I contend that this is because they fail 
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to maintain the distinction between the Object of the Act of the cooperator and that of the 
principal agent. Peter J. Cataldo in “Models of Health Care Collaboration” offers four 
characteristics for licit collaboration between Catholic and non-Catholic health care entities, 
which I also elucidate.157  
d) The United States 2018 Articulation of Cooperation 
      This subsubsection discusses the changes to the Unites States Bishops’ sixth edition of 
the Ethical and Religious Directives in which they articulate a less consequentialist version of 
Cooperation.158 The following subsection demonstrates that a consequentialist definition of the 
Object of the Act makes it difficult to maintain the difference between the Object of the 
cooperator and that of the principal agent. Moreover, the Principle of Appropriation further 
clarifies this difference.    
iii. Contemporary Contributions to Cooperation 
a. Rejecting the ‘No Difference Argument’ 
     Christopher Kutz, in Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age demonstrates how 
consequentialists’ emphasis on outcome results in problematic dilemmas,159 which Luke 
Gormally calls the “‘no difference’ argument.”160 This subsection reveals the connection this has 
to the Principle of Cooperation.   
b. M. Cathleen Kaveny’s Appropriation of Evil 
      In “Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image,” M. Cathleen Kaveny argues for 
a mirror principle to the Principle of Cooperation, appropriation of evil, what I call the Principle 
of Appropriation.161 This subsection unveils the connection between the two principles.   
c. Double Effect and Appropriation 
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      Just as a tenuous parallel exists between the Principle of Double Effect and the Principle 
of Cooperation, so one exists between the Principle of Double Effect and the Principle of 
Appropriation.162 This subsection highlights the connection between the two.  
d. Appropriation and Fetal Tissue Remains of Elective Abortion 
      The United States Bishops forbid material cooperation in abortion.163 In accord with 
Kaveny’s contention, I demonstrate that the Principle of Appropriation proscribes appropriation 
of aborted fetuses for research.164 Having discussed health care ethics consultations and the 
Principle of Cooperation, the next chapter analyzes two other applied topics: oophorectomies and 
emergency contraception.     
CHAPTER FIVE – OOPHORECTOMIES AND EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION 
      This chapter uses Natural Law, the Object of the Act and the Principle of Double Effect 
to justify procedures that physically-defined are sterilizing and contraceptive, respectively.     
5A. Risk Reducing Bilateral Salpingo-oophorectomies 
      This section applies the above-mentioned moral method to a prophylactic procedure to 
prevent cancer in women that foreseeably renders them sterile. 
i. Clinical Explanation 
a. Discovering BRCA1 and BRCA2 
      Both BRCA1 and BRCA2 are tumor suppressor genes, some mutations of which 
significantly increase one’s risk for developing breast, ovarian, or prostate cancer.165 This 
subsection explores the milestones in research that lead to the discovery of these genes, 
especially highlighting the work of Mary-Claire King.166 
b. Cancer Inhibition 
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      Especially using Kiyotsugu Yoshida and Yoshio Miki review article, “Role of BRCA1 
and BRCA2 as Regulators of DNA Repair, Transcription, and Cell Cycle in Response to DNA 
Damage,” I elaborate on the respective roles that BRCA1 and BRCA2 play in DNA repair, 
transcriptional response to DNA damage and cell cycle check pointing.167   
c. Prophylactic Treatments  
      55 to 65 percent of women with a deleterious BRCA1 mutation and 45 percent of women 
with a harmful BRCA2 mutation develop breast cancer by the age of 70,168 39 percent of women 
who inherit the BRCA1 mutation and 11 to 17 percent of women who inherit the BRCA2 
mutation develop ovarian cancer by the age of 70.169 This subsection discusses the risks and 
benefits of risk-reducing bilateral mastectomies and risk-reducing bilateral salpingo-
oophorectomies—the removal of the ovaries and Fallopian tubes.170 Having an accurate 
understanding of the physical circumstances that concern this ethical decision, the discussion 
focuses on the moral method, especially focusing on the Principle of Double Effect and the 
Object of the Act. 
ii. Double-Effect Reasoning 
a. Totality 
      Despite the Church’s teaching against sterilization,171 this subsection demonstrates that 
the Principle of Totality, which Aquinas first articulates in the Summa Theologica,172 and Pius 
XII further develops,173 justifies the use of bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA1 and 2 
mutation carriers.  
b. Double-Effect Reasoning 
      This subsection discusses Aquinas’s use of Double-Effect Reasoning in the Summa 
Theologica,174 with particular focus on the broad meaning of intention that Finnis attributes to 
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his articulation.175 In addition, this subsection further elucidates a non-consequentialist 
understanding of praeter intentionem for the Principle of Double Effect.176 
c. Object of the Act 
      With a clear understanding of the distinction between the proximate end and the ulterior 
end, I delineate the precise Object of the Act of using bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for 
BRCA mutation carriers. In particular, I emphasize the importance of maintaining the distinction 
between the genus moris and the genus naturae, which is important because the latter does not 
differ for an act of sterilization. Keeping the Object of the Act in the genus moris enables one to 
differentiate the foreseen physical act which sterilizes from the intentional moral act that 
prevents cancer. The following subsection raises other ethical issues that concern this topic.  
iii. Health Care Ethics Consultations  
a. Genetic Testing 
     Antonella Surbone, in “Social and Ethical Implications of BRCA Testing,” defines 
genetic testing as “any analysis to detect genotypes, genetic mutations or chromosomal changes, 
not including analysis of proteins or metabolites directly related to a manifest disease,” which 
can lead to genetic exceptionalism, that is, treating patients with genetic disorders differently 
than patients with other diseases.177 This subsection highlights the complexity of identifying 
mutations, but also the implications of those mutations for patients.   
b. Genetic Discrimination 
      Some women are reluctant to get genetic testing, not only because of the ambiguity 
regarding results, but also because of fear of discrimination by insurance companies or health 
care providers.178 This subsection discusses this dilemma in greater detail including the 




      In the United States, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
delimits confidentiality in healthcare.180 This subsection weighs the principles of confidentiality 
against that of non-maleficence, especially concerning implications for family members that may 
share genetic similarities.181 This subsection highlights ethical concerns that genetically-based 
prophylactic procedures raise. The following subsection demonstrates the difference between 
contraception and this risk reducing procedure.  
iv. Catholic Health Care Policy 
a. Prohibiting Sterilization 
      Although bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers renders patients 
sterile, the Object of the Act and the purpose are distinctly different from a contraceptive choice.  
In accord with Rhonheimer’s definition of contraception,182 this subsection defines the Object 
the Act of using bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers as unique. 
b. Non-BRCA Mutation Carriers 
      Although some ethicists advocate for bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for non-BRCA 
mutation carriers,183 I concur with the National Catholic Bioethics Center that the situation does 
not warrant such practice,184 since this is not medically indicated.185 The prophylactic procedure 
discussed in this chapter needs recourse to the Principle of Double Effect, because it must justify 
the negative effect of sterilization; however, the following section discusses the use of 
emergency contraception to prevent conception after sexual assault. A non-consequentialist 
definition of the Object of the Act does not need further recourse to the Principle of Double 
Effect.  
5B. Emergency Contraceptive for Victims of Sexual Assault 
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      The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, in the Ethical and Religious 
Directives assert that women have the right to defend themselves from conception in cases of 
sexual assault.186 Because of the Church’s strict prohibition of abortion,187 which begins from the 
moment of fertilization, the United States Bishops insists that the method must not remove, 
destroy, or interfere with a conceptus.188   
i. Clinical Analysis 
a. Menstrual-Ovulatory Cycle 
      Contraceptives interfere with the menstrual-ovulatory cycle, thereby preventing 
conception from occurring. This subsection explores the complex physiology of this cycle to 
better understand the impact that contraceptives have on it. In particular, it follows the 
articulation that Marc A. Fritz and Leon Speroff provide in Clinical Gynecologic Endocrinology 
and Infertility, 8th edition.189 
b. Physiology of Contraceptives 
      This subsection explicates the mechanism of action for commonly prescribed emergency 
contraceptives, including copper intrauterine device, oral contraceptive pills combining estrogen 
and progestin, ulipristal acetate, and progestin-only levonorgestrel.190 In particular, it highlights 
controversy over the precise mechanism of action for levonorgestrel and its ethical 
implications.191 
ii. Principle of Double Effect 
a.  Object of the Act 
     This subsection defines the object of the act from a non-consequentialist perspective as 
the proximate end, formulated by practical reason, thus of the genus moris, which the will 
chooses (electio). This subsection delves deeply into the development of Aquinas’s 
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understanding regarding the role of the will in action, especially as it relates to intending 
(intentio) and choosing.192 
b. Nominalism, Manualism, and Proportionalism 
      This subsection reveals the impact that William of Ockham’s nominalism has on 
manualism and proportionalism. In particular, it highlights the extrinsic nature of morality for 
them.193     
c. The Object: Contraception and Self-Defense  
      In accord with Rhonheimer’s non-consequentialist definition of the Object of the Act of 
contraception,194 this subsection defines the use of emergency contraception as an act of self-
defense, which he articulates in Ethics of Procreation.195   
d. Genus Moris  
     A consequentialist articulation of the object of the act, which conflates the genus moris 
with the genus naturae gives the impression that one must use the Principle of Double Effect to 
justify emergency contraception to defend against sexual assault. However, as I demonstrate in 
this subsection, a non-consequentialist description of the object of the act precludes the necessity 
of recourse to the Principle of Double Effect. The following chapter discusses two other topics 
that ethicists use the Principle of Double Effect to justify. 
CHAPTER SIX – SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY AND CONTRACEPTION 
      This chapter discusses the application of the Principle of Double Effect to two procedures 
that render the patient sterile or infertile. In both cases the intention is not to sterilize; however, 
this constitutes an unintended, yet foreseen consequence.   
6A. Sex Reassignment Surgery for Gender Dysphoria 
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      Some ethicists argue that the Principle of Double Effect and the Principle of Totality and 
Integrity justify the use of sex reassignment surgery in patients diagnosed with gender 
dysphoria.196 In accord with Church teaching, I argue against gender ideology and sex 
reassignment therapies.197   
i. Sex, Gender, and Gender Dysphoria 
      This first subsection uses contemporary medical literature to define sex, gender, gender 
dysphoria, and sex reassignment therapies.   
a. Defining Sex 
      Defining sex biologically as male or female is not as easy as it may at first appear. In 
accord with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5 th Edition, I analyze the 
physiological criteria that define sex, including: genetic, gonadal, ductal, and phenotypic or 
genital. 198 In addition, I explicate the variety of intersex conditions.199   
b. Defining Gender 
      In this subsection, I enunciate the definition of gender.200 In addition, I discuss the social 
constructionist origins of gender ideology, first attributable to Simon de Bouvoir,201 Ann 
Oakley,202 Suzaane J. Kessler and Wendy McKenna,203 Gayle Rubin204 and Judith Butler.205   
c. Gender Dysphoria 
Here, I reveal the evolution of the concept of gender dysphoria, especially as the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4 th Edition 206 and Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition207 articulate it.   
d. Sex Reassignment Therapies 
      Some advocate for sex reassignment therapies to address gender dysphoria. This 
subsection briefly expounds on these treatment options.208 The definitions in this subsection 
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contrasts with the medical, philosophical, and theological positions of Catholic health care that 
the following subsection explains.   
ii. Objections to Sex Reassignment Therapies 
      United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Doctrine objects to sex 
reassignment therapies on three grounds that I explicate further in this section: medical, 
philosophical, and theological.209 
a. Medical  
     Lawrence S. Mayer and Paul R. McHugh in “Gender Identity” examine scientific 
research and find little to no evidence that medical procedures to change gender have any 
psychological benefit.210 They contest the plasticity of gender that social constructionists 
advocate. At the same time, they counter contradictory arguments that suggest gender is 
biological. Carl Elliott in “A New Way to Be Mad,” finds similarities between body dysmorphic 
disorder and gender dysphoria.211 
b. Philosophical  
     In this subsection, I attribute the ideology of gender to three philosophical trends that I 
expound: anthropological dualism, physicalistic determinism, and existential voluntarism.  
Anthropological dualism I connect with Rene Descartes’ “Cogito, ergo sum.”212 Physicalistic 
determinism I attribute to British Empiricism.213 Existential voluntarism I link to Scotus,214  
Schopenhauer,215 and Nietzsche.216  
c. Theological 
      Contrary to Enlightenment philosophy, Christian anthropology presumes ontological and 
epistemic realism. This subsection articulates Christian anthropology with the presumption that 
the human person is a substantial unity of body and soul.217 At the same time, it avoids 
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essentialism, which contends that sexual difference abides in the soul.218 The illumination of 
Catholic medicine, philosophy, and theology informs its objection to the use of the Principle of 
Totality or the Principle of Double Effect to justify sex reassignment therapies. 
iii. Totality and Double Effect  
a. The Principle of Totality and Integrity  
      Becket Gremmels argues in “Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Catholic Moral 
Tradition: Insight from Pope Pius XII on the Principle of Totality,” that one struggling with 
gender dysphoria may meet the three criteria for the Principle of Totality and Integrity that Pius 
XII proposes to justify sex reassignment surgery. 219 In this subsection, I elucidate Pius XII’s 
version of the Principle of Totality and Integrity,220 and contend with John Brehany that Totality 
does not justify sex reassignment surgery.221  
b. Principle of Double Effect 
      Carol Bayley, in “Transgender Persons and Catholic Healthcare,” argues that the 
Principle of Double Effect justifies the use of sex reassignment surgery in persons with gender 
dysphoria.222 After articulating the Object of the Act of sex reassignment surgery for gender 
dysphoria I demonstrate how it is contrary to Catholic anthropology. It is not merely because sex 
reassignment surgery renders the person sterile that Catholic ethicists object to its use, but 
because it contradicts the Christian understanding of the sexual human person. The following 
section discusses the use of another physically contraceptive procedure.     
6B. Non-Contraceptive Benefits of Contraceptives 
      This section analyzes the ethical use of physically contraceptive methods for non-
contraceptive benefits.   
i. Clinical Analysis  
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a. Intrauterine Devices as a Contraceptive 
      This subsubsection begins by providing the historical development of intrauterine 
devices,223 including stem pessaries, metallic rings,224 copper intrauterine devices,225 and the 
levonorgestrel-releasing intrauterine system, marketed as Mirena® and manufactured by 
Schering-Oy.226    
b. Long-Acting Contraceptives 
      There are two unique long-acting contraceptives available for market in the United 
States: implants and depot-medroxyprogesterone (Depo-Provera).227 In this subsubsection, I 
discuss the history and contraceptive mechanism of these two contraceptives. 
c. Non-Contraceptive Benefits of Contraceptives 
      In this subsubsection, I discuss the non-contraceptive side effects of both intrauterine 
devices and long-acting contraceptives. In particular, I focus on their use to treat 
endometriosis228 and abnormal uterine bleeding.229 Having an awareness of the physical 
circumstances of the act, the next subsection explores the Moral Object of the Act of 
contraception. 
ii. Object 
a. Contraception, Casti Cannubii and the Manualist 
      This subsubsection briefly outlines the historical development of the Church’s precarious 
relationship with contraception.230 In particular, it demonstrates the physicalistic definition of the 
Object of the Act according to Jean Pierre Gury,231 which influences the rejection of 
contraception in Pius XI Casti Cannubii.232 
b. Proportionalistic Reformation of the Moral Object 
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      Here I demonstrate the methodological continuity between the manualists and the 
proportionalists in such authors as Louis Janssens233 and Peter Knauer.234 More precisely, their 
physical definition of the Object of the Act. 
c. Keeping the Object of the Act in the Genus Naturae 
      In this subsubsection, I demonstrate how the action theory of Finnis235 and 
Rhonheimer,236 true to Aquinas, keeps the Object of the Act in the genus moris, which is not 
derivable from the genus naturae, thereby avoiding the Naturalistic Fallacy. This is contrary not 
only to the action theory of the proportionalists, but Ralph McInerny as well.237   
d. The Object of Contraception 
      In accord with Aquinas, Rhonheimer contends that Paul VI presumes that the Object of 
the Act of contraception is in the genus moris.238 At the same time, insofar as it constitutes an 
intrinsically evil act, it violates the norm of Natural Law, the Inseparability Principle.239 Situating 
his definition of the Object of the Act of contraception in the context of virtue, Rhonheimer 
describes it as a circumvention of chastity.240 
e. The Object of Using Contraceptives for Non-Contraceptive Benefits 
      Since the Object of the Act exists on the moral order, not the physical order, one must 
take the first-person perspective to determine what the person chooses in using a contraceptive 
method. It is possible to formulate a practical syllogism that includes the choice to use a 
contraceptive for non-contraceptive benefits.241 Although using contraceptives for non-
contraceptive benefits does not constitute an immoral Object of the Act, it does have at least one 
evil consequence—infertility—which necessitates recourse to the Principle of Double Effect. 
iii. Principle of Double Effect 
a. Thomistic Formulation of Double-Effect Reasoning 
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      This subsubsection articulates a non-consequentialist formulation of the Principle of 
Double Effect.242 Even if one cannot rule the use of contraceptives for non-contraceptive 
benefits, it may still be possible to rule out its use based on the disproportionate evil associated 
with such a choice. 
b. Intention 
     The first-person perspective of intention gives clarity not only to the Object of the Act, 
but also the ulterior end, that is, the reason why one chooses a particular act.243 This section 
highlights the importance of not only having an ethically sound intention concerning the 
proximate end of the act, but also concerning the ulterior end.     
c. Proportionality and Abortifacient Risk 
      Grisez weighs the non-contraceptive benefits of contraceptives against the injustice of 
abortifacient activity consequent to an embryo should breakthrough ovulation and conception 
occur.244 Although some authors conclude that levonorgestrel-releasing intrauterine systems 
definitely do not have abortifacient properties,245 Edward Furton demonstrates that this debate 
remains open.246 Thus, Grisez concludes that one must have a very serious reason to choose a 
contraceptive for non-contraceptive benefits.247 A contraceptive that acts as an abortifacient is 
likely disproportionate to the benefit, however, one that does not act as an abortifacient is 
proportionate. The two preceding chapters apply the aforementioned moral method for Catholic 
health care ethics.   
CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION  
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CHAPTER TWO – NATURAL LAW AND THE MORAL OBJECT 
      This chapter analyzes the concepts of Natural Law and the Moral Object of the Act that 
Aquinas provides a comprehensive and systematic formulation of in his Summa Theologica.  
Each section focuses on the scholarship of two contemporary ethicists—John Finnis and Martin 
Rhonheimer.   
2A: Natural Law 
      Thomas Aquinas articulates his understanding of Natural Law in the context of his 
discussion of law itself, which he identifies as a measure and rule of reason.1 Unlike the laws of 
nature, which constitute a passive participation in the eternal law of God, Natural Law properly 
speaking involves an active participation of the human person in formulating norms according to 
practical reason. Since the human person formulates the dictates of Natural Law, one must 
adequately account for the distinct aspects of human nature, without over or underemphasizing 
the physical or spiritual dimension. Thus, an adequate account avoids the pitfalls of either 
physicalism or spiritualism.   
      This section articulates Finnis and Rhonheimer’s interpretation of Aquinas’s Natural Law 
avoiding the abovementioned pitfalls. The first subsection describes the various components of 
Natural Law. The second addresses the Naturalistic Fallacy, which presumes that the genus 
moris derives from the genus naturae. The third subsection highlights the uniquely personal 
dimension of Natural Law, without falling into spiritualism. Finally, the last subsection 
illustrates the contribution that such a deep understanding of Natural Law makes to the 





i. Natural Law 
      For Rhonheimer, it is essential to maintain the distinction between the concrete working 
of practical reason and one’s reflection upon it, which constitutes moral philosophy.2 Natural 
Law does not first consist of normative statements that one discovers and then applies to one’s 
life.3 Rather, first, on the level of action, one follows precepts in accord with or conceived of by 
practical reason.4 Afterwards, or even in the midst of the whole complex process of acting 
through practical reasoning, one may reflect upon this and formulate so-called ought statements.5 
The reflection on the process of practical reasoning is not practical in nature itself, but theoretical 
or speculative.6 At the same time, one may apply the product of one’s theoretical reflection—
which Rhonheimer identifies with the activity of moral philosophy—to practical decision 
making.7 In this sense, the prescriptive formulations of moral philosophy become practical 
insofar as they guide one’s conscience in practical matters.8         
a. Law 
     Aquinas discusses Natural Law in the context of law.9 Law relates to the dictates of 
reason.10 In fact, laws are the measure and rule of action.11 Insofar as the word law originates 
from ligare, which means to bind, it conveys the notion of compelling action.12 In other words, 
laws govern action. Aquinas relates this concept of reason to human nature, insisting that it 
directs one to his or her end or ends.13 Rhonheimer, following Aquinas, understands law to be 
the ordering of reason to action.14 Moreover, Aquinas understands law to be a proposition 
(propositio), not however in the theoretical sense, but in the logical sense insofar as it constitutes 
a judgment, rather than a statement, therefore, leading to a command or precept (praeceptum).15 
In addition, law is not merely a judgment, but also constitutes a dictate of reason (dictamen 
rationis).16 Ultimately, for Rhonheimer, the precept of reason is an act of the will expressed not 
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in word, but action.17 Only in reflection on practical reason in act is one able to formulate 
theoretically a normative statement in words.18 For Rhonheimer, it is only with this distinction 
between theoretical and practical in mind that one can understand properly Aquinas’s statement: 
“the Natural Law is something constituted by reason, just as the propositio is a work of the 
reason.”19  With this important distinction in mind, one avoids the tendency toward spiritualistic 
dualism or the Naturalistic Fallacy.20 
      Aquinas distinguishes between law that is essential and law that is by participation.21 
Essential law constitutes reason alone, while law by participation is that which the law measures 
and rules.22 Put another way, law may be understood from two perspectives: the one ruling and 
the one whom the law measures and rules.23 Law is a work of reason, so strictly speaking, 
wherever reason does not exist law does not exist, except by similarity.24 Therefore, the law of 
reason acts upon irrational beings—inanimate and animate—insofar as behavior is in accord with 
reason.25 In this sense, they participate in the law.   
      Having established that law is an ordinance of reason, Aquinas further relates it to the 
common good.26 Just as every part relates to the whole in a body, so all the laws relate to the 
common good.27 For Aquinas, the common good is the common end of humanity, which is 
eternal happiness.28 In addition, legitimate authority must promulgate law.29 Legitimate authority 
constitutes one that has the common good of all in mind, whether a single person or a 
conglomerate of leaders.30 Authority must promulgate, that is, make the law known, otherwise it 
has no binding force.31 
b. Eternal Law and Natural Law 
      Natural Law is the eternal law of God written on the heart of each human person.32 
Insofar as legitimate authority promulgates law, God, as the provident ruler of the universe 
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governs through the divine reason.33 The eternal, divine law is not distinct from God, because it 
has no other end than God.34 Insofar as all things have their origin in God, they participate in the 
eternal law of God.35 In other words, all creatures receive the eternal law insofar as the divine 
reason is a measure and rule for them.36 Humans, however, participate in the divine law in an 
even more excellent way insofar as they have a share in the providential role of God.37 The 
divine law not only measures and rules people like it does for all other creatures, but human 
persons also have a role in measuring and ruling.   
      Finnis explicates Aquinas’s understanding of participatio in his Natural Law and Natural 
Rights. 38 Finnis explains that Aquinas means two things: one causality and similarity.39  
Something causes a similar quality in one being when it has that quality in a more excellent and 
less dependent way.40 To illustrate, Finnis explains that humans have intelligence that is far 
inferior to what may be understood as a more superior and perfect intelligence in the separate 
intellect of God.41 As light illuminates the act of seeing, so the divine intellect illuminates the 
human intellect in understanding.42 As such, the divine law does not merely measure and rule 
humans as it does irrational creatures, but just as God measures and rules creatures according to 
the divine law, so humans in a less perfect way measure and rule nature according to Natural 
Law, which constitutes a quality of similarity to the divine law and caused by it.43   
c. Self-Evidence of Practical Reason 
      The first principle of practical reason is like the first principle of metaphysics insofar as it 
is self-evident truth.44 The statement itself suffices to demonstrate that it is true.45 R. A. 
Armstrong in Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching identifies 
what Aquinas means by self-evident.46 First, Armstrong outlines Aquinas’s argument in the 
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Commentary on the Sentences.47 The self-evident knowledge constitutes a substratum of 
knowledge for all subsequent knowledge.48   
      In Acts Amid Precepts, Kevin L. Flannery highlights a parallel between the ordering of 
theoretical and practical knowledge in Aquinas.49 Both begin with apprehension: in theoretical 
knowing, the person apprehends being, while in practical knowing one apprehends good.50 
Aquinas holds that regarding self-evident knowledge a habitus abides within the person.51 For 
speculative knowing, Aquinas calls this intellectus principiorum, while for practical knowing he 
calls this synderesis.52 For habitus, Armstrong uses the English word “capacity,” rather than skill 
or habit, because humans have this ability in virtue of their nature.53   
      While Aquinas insists that these principles or precepts—practical principles for 
Flannery—are self-evident, he does not believe that they are innate, in the sense that one can 
know them without sensation or memory.54 To the contrary, one must have both in order to 
ascertain these principles or precepts.55 In De Veritate, Aquinas, using an argument by reductio 
ad absurdum, insists that some principles must be permanent and unchanging otherwise nothing 
could be known certainly.56 Moreover, Aquinas insists that there can be no err regarding 
synderesis.57   
      Armstrong indicates that the self-evidence of the first precepts of Natural Law are 
analogous to the self-evidence of first principles of demonstration in speculative knowing, which 
implies some degree of difference.58 Aquinas highlights this difference in the Prima Secundae 
where he indicates that something may be self-evident in two ways: one, in itself and two, in 
relation to us.59 Armstrong and Flannery find the examples illustrative of the difference.60 What 
can be known in relation to us (per se quoad nos) constitutes an analytic proposition insofar as 
the predicate is contained in the subject.61 Put another way, so long as one understands the terms, 
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the truth of the statement is undeniably true. For example, the statement: “every whole is greater 
than its parts,” is knowable by all and constitutes an analytic statement known per se quoad 
nos.62   
      Germain Grisez in “The First Principles of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the 
Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2,” insists that the dichotomous distinction between 
analytic and synthetic originating with Kant have no meaning for Aquinas.63 Rather, Aquinas 
understands the subject and predicate as complementary elements of unified knowledge of a 
single knowable reality.64 Put another way, the intelligibility of the predicate belongs to that of 
the subject.65 Grisez understands intelligibility to be all that is included in a word used 
correctly.66 Suffice it to say that for Aquinas, self-evident principles are not mere tautologies, 
that is, restatements of what is already given.67   
      Unlike the first set of self-evident principles that are knowable and undeniable to all so 
long as one understands the definition of the terms, the second set of self-evident principles are 
knowable only to a few—self-evident in itself (per se secundum se).68 In this class of self-evident 
principles, the terms are more complex, but so long as one understands the terms, their truth also 
becomes self-evident. To illustrate, Aquinas uses the example of “man is a rational animal.”69 
Not everyone knows the truth of the proposition, because not everyone knows that the very 
meaning of man entails rational being, however, if one does know the definition of man, one 
knows the truth of the proposition.70   
      The principle of non-contradiction and the first principle of Natural Law are 
foundational, but not in the sense that one may deduce more particular principles or precepts 
from them as though they were general premises.71 Rather, both constitute directive principles 
insofar as one must formulate more particular principles and precepts in accord with them.72   
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      Finnis relates the concept of the self-evidence of principles or precepts of Natural Law to 
the rationality of the notion that any state of affairs may exist without further explanation.73 
Contrary to rationalists of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Finnis insists that it is 
possible for a state of affairs to exist that has no further explanation for its existence outside of 
itself.74 This he identifies as an uncaused cause.75 More precisely, it is not to say that this entity 
has no explanation, but that its explanation is itself.76   
      For Finnis the self-evidence of practical principles means that they are indemonstrable, 
and un-inferable.77 The principles of practical reasoning do not stand in need of demonstration.78 
Moreover, their validity is not a matter of convention or inferring from observation; rather, it is 
objective.79 While it is possible to deny them, it is not possible to be reasonable and deny them.80 
Contrary to the modern criteria, feelings of certitude do not validate these truths.81 Although 
understanding a principle of practical reason is not like understanding a principle of logic or 
mathematics, it is no less true.82       
d. Happiness, Natural Inclinations, and Reason  
      In The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics, 
Rhonheimer highlights the difference between an authentic eudemonistic ethic and one that only 
seems oriented toward happiness, but really constitutes hedonism.83 Both ethical theorists argue 
that happiness is the end or goal of action; however, hedonism not only defines happiness more 
basely as a state of contentment, but also understands this as the motive for action.84 Rhonheimer 
recalls Augustine’s warning not to follow God for a reward, because God is the reward.85 
Rhonheimer is most critical of Kant who ultimately advocates for hedonism, understanding God 
as a divine giver of pleasure, but not in this world; therefore, he evacuates all happiness as a 
motive for action in this life basing all morality on duty.86 While one may understand happiness 
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as the ultimate end of action, this never constitutes the motive for concrete acting.87 Rather, the 
good, which practical reason formulates as good to be done, motivates concrete action.88 It is 
only in this sense that one may say that the will strives for happiness.89     
      For Rhonheimer, practical reason not only constitutes striving for happiness, but also “is 
the reasoning that cognitively directs intentional action.”90 Put another way, practical reasoning 
concerns the person’s intending of means and ends in action.91 Rhonheimer asserts that action is 
a phenomenon of appetition.92 Individuals act because they are seeking or striving for a good.93 
Moreover these inclinations toward the good correspond to one’s substantial form.94 The 
substantial form of human beings is a rational soul; therefore, human appetition or striving 
corresponds to the rational soul.95 For humans the soul consists of the two faculties of the 
intellect and will. Accordingly, Rhonheimer explains that willing is an appetition guided by 
reason.96   
      For Aristotle, happiness, as the ultimate goal, constitutes what one rationally wills for its 
own sake.97 This end does not take the form of a goal for the sake of which, but a goal through 
which.98 In other words, it is an activity that is unique to rational humans.99 This activity is also 
the activity, which the virtuous person delights in the most.100 Aristotle identifies this with life 
according to the intellect; at the highest level a life of contemplation; and at the next level a life 
lived according to virtue, according to reason.101   
      Aquinas discusses natural inclinations in relationship to the classes of forms: 1) purely 
natural appetites constituting inanimate beings such as plants; 2) sensitive appetites 
corresponding to animate beings such as animals; and 3) rational appetites, such as humans.102 
Moreover, each class of beings corresponds with a type of apprehension or knowledge of the 
good. Beings with natural appetites merely tend toward the good with no apprehension of it 
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whatsoever.103 Beings with sensitive appetites apprehend the good only in particular things, but 
not in a general sense.104 Finally, rational beings such as humans apprehend the good not only in 
particular things, but also in a general sense, as in universals.105 Moreover, the rational 
apprehension of the good is intentional.106    
      To each of these classes corresponds a degree of necessity regarding action.  Inanimate 
beings follow natural inclinations of necessity.107 Animate beings follow natural inclinations 
when they perceive objects of desire as useful.108 And rational beings only desire the good in 
general by necessity, but not with necessity any particular good, enabling one to freely choose a 
particular good among options.109   
      The good to which natural inclinations tend corresponds to the end of the being in 
question.110  Aquinas adapts Aristotle’s ‘ergon argument’ to make his point that the good for 
each being corresponds to the substantial form of the being in question.111 The ‘ergon argument,’ 
which I discuss in greater detail in the following subsection, determines that the primary function 
or activity of humans consists in the use of reason.112 Rhonheimer recalls that action is an agent 
of appetition or striving for an object that is good.113   
       Reason formulates every human act, regardless of the origin of the desire—whether 
natural, sensitive, or rational.114 Germain Grisez understands Aquinas’s explanation for the 
diversity of Natural Law precepts to be precisely due to “the different inclinations objects, 
viewed by reason as ends for rationally guided efforts.”115 While inclinations, which originate 
from nature play an important role as raw datum, they themselves do not constitute the Natural 
Law.116 This corresponds with the dictum that laws of nature do not constitute Natural Law.117 
Grisez explains that the tendencies of natural inclinations provide reason with the beginnings of 
proposed ends.118 The precepts that conform inclinations in action constitute the Natural Law.119 
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      Just as it is impossible for reason to err regarding synderesis, so it is impossible for 
reason to err regarding its judgment of the good.120 Saying that reason does not err, does not 
mean that people do not make mistakes, but that mistakes are not attributable to failure of the 
intellect’s perception of good, which subsequently measures action.121 In the De Anima, Aristotle 
holds that since err is not attributable to the intellect with regard to reason, it must reside in 
appetition or imagination.122 In addition, false opinions, emotions or passions, and the will may 
disturb reason.123 Sin occurs when these other factors inhibit reason’s measure of good and bad 
in action.124 Put another way, one sins when the lower, nonrational appetitions dominate the 
appetition of reason.125 Ultimately, this is because the freedom of reason “guarantees the an 
encounter with the good for man qua man.”126 
      As a faculty, Rhonheimer explains that the will, not already rational by itself, pursues 
what the judgment of reason presents to it.127 Contrary to Kant’s formulation of the will, it is not 
pure spontaneity; rather, reason thoroughly determines it.128 Insofar as reason is able to reflect 
upon its own judgments, thereby becoming the object of an act of judgment, it is free.129 It can 
have multiple conceptions of the good.130 This Rhonheimer identifies as freedom of 
specification, which constitutes a freedom of the will due to reason.131   
      However, the will may also be free in execution; that is, choosing or not choosing means 
that are in concert with one’s goal or intention.132 Freedom of execution is the source of freedom 
of choice.133 If one does not want to do something, it does not happen.134 Ultimately, reason 
alone does not suffice as a motivating principle for action; the will can pursue other motivating 
factors, such as feelings, or pure self-willing.135 
 
e. Principles of Natural Law and Basic Human Goods 
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      Each principle of Natural Law corresponds to the natural inclinations in humans, which 
corresponds to all three of the above-mentioned classes of inclinations.136 While the principles of 
Natural Law are not the inclinations themselves, they are nonetheless “an ordering of the  reason 
in relation to or in the natural inclinations,” taking the form of a practical judgment ‘p is 
good.’137 Finnis indicates that the principles of Natural Law are not moral judgments, but the 
substratum for moral judgments.138 Moreover, Natural Law concerns the acts of practical 
understanding in which one grasps the basic values of human existence.139   
      Finnis understands the good not as a desirable objective, but as a form of good with an 
indefinite number of means or occasions for one to participate in or realize, which he uses value 
to identify.140 As such, unless one engages in reflection on the presuppositions of one’s practical 
reasoning, one is not likely to formulate these principles in one’s arguments concerning 
particular goods.141 Again, the self-evidence of these principles means not only that they are 
indemonstrably true, but also that they stand in no need of justification.142 These principles are 
not derivable or inferable.143   
     Armstrong relates the principles of practical reason to human inclinations,144 while Finnis 
relates it to basic human values.145 To the first natural human inclination is that of self-
preservation, which Armstrong formulates as: although a hierarchy of life exists, one ought to 
respect and preserve human life and where possible other life as well.146 This, Aquinas argues is 
self-evident in itself, but not to all.147 Finnis correlates the principle of self-preservation with the 
basic human value of life.148   
      The second basic human inclination, shared by other animals is the inclination to sexual 
union and the rearing of offspring.149 Armstrong following Maritain, insists that certain 
limitations must exist for sexual union, considering how special a place it has in engendering 
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children.150 In addition, the family group ought to comply with a particular pattern.151 Finnis 
relates this principle to life also.152 At the same time, he recognizes that the education and rearing 
of children includes other basic human values, such as sociability and truth.153  
      The third basic human inclination corresponds with rational nature.154 This, according to 
Aquinas, involves the inclination for relationship with God and to live in society.155 Insofar as 
humans need assistance from other people to exist, the principle to live in society following 
certain rules and prohibitions is self-evident.156 For Finnis, this corresponds to the basic human 
value of knowledge.157 In so far as this inclination extends to sociability and religion, it 
corresponds to these goods as well.158 In addition, the rational inclination relates to the basic 
human values of play, practical reasonableness, and the aesthetic experience.159   
     Having introduced the concept of Natural Law, the following subsection highlights the 
importance of avoiding the critical error of the Naturalistic Fallacy.   
ii. Naturalistic Fallacy and Natural Law 
      The concept of the Naturalistic Fallacy originates with G. E. Moore in Principia Ethica, 
in which he argues that the moral good is not merely a conglomeration of physical goods.160 He 
builds on the concept from David Hume that an ‘ought statement’ never derives from an ‘is 
statement.’161 Unfortunately, Hume throws the baby out with the bath water, further insisting that 
morality has nothing to do with reason; instead, insisting that it depends on moral sense or 
feeling.162 While both Rhonheimer and Finnis concur with Hume that ‘ought statements’ do not 
derive from ‘is statements,’ they do not agree that this means that ethics is unreasonable.163 In 
fact, this merely demonstrates the underivability of ethics from metaphysics. 
 
a. Ergon Argument 
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      In Fundamentals of Ethics, John Finnis argues that Aristotle and Aquinas would agree 
with his thesis that reasoning concerning human goods is primarily practical, not theoretical.164 
He offers four reasons why they are often misunderstood as proposing that practical knowledge 
is derivative of theoretical.165 One, Aristotle seeks a holistic explanation of biology with 
cosmology.166 Two, Aquinas utilizes analogies between different natures to elucidate 
concepts.167 Three, interpreters of Aristotle and Aquinas often over-simplify concepts in an effort 
to systematize.168 Four, Finnis takes issue with Aristotle’s so-called ‘ergon argument,’ which 
translates as function or activity that is proper to humans.169   
     In the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues that the unique function of 
humans is the activity of the soul in accord with reason, therefore, a good person acts in accord 
with reason.170 Aristotle argues that just as with a flute player or sculptor the good resides with 
the function, so the good of humans must reside in their function.171 Of course, humans share 
several functions with other organisms, such as, growth and sensation; however, the function that 
typifies human beings must be unique to them.172 For Aristotle, a rational principle characterizes 
human activity.173 In particular, it constitutes a function of the soul. Above all, for Aristotle, what 
sets humanity apart is its activity in conformity with reason.   
      Finnis insists that since this argument is theoretical, not practical in nature it contributes 
nothing substantial to Aristotle’s ethics.174 Moreover, because of this, Finnis argues that it is not 
only uncharacteristic of Aristotle, but does not properly belong to his ethics.175 Furthermore, it 
contributes to the mistaken notion that ethics derives from physics and metaphysics.176 Once 
again, Finnis holds that practical knowledge does not derive from theoretical knowledge.177 
Insofar as the genus moris and the genus naturae differ, one’s grasp of the good in practical 
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reasoning—constitutive of the genus moris—does not depend on or derive from the genus 
naturae.   
      Ralph McInerny178 and Rhonheimer179 both take issue with Finnis’s dismissal of 
Aristotle’s function argument. McInerny disagrees with Finnis’s argument that practical 
knowledge is radically independent of theoretical knowledge.180 He reasons that since there is 
one intellect that knows both speculatively and practically (by extension)—knowing being 
speculatively before knowing the good practically—practical knowing depends on speculative 
knowing.181 Indeed, for him, practical knowing constitutes the knowing of a good being.182 In 
other words, for one to judge that ‘X is good for me,’ one must know what X is.183 Consequently, 
for McInerny, practical knowledge does derive from speculative knowledge.184 
      Rhonheimer agrees with McInerny that Finnis should not discount the significance of 
Aristotle’s ‘ergon argument’ for ethics, but he does not think that this is because practical 
knowledge derives from speculative knowledge.185 For Rhonheimer, McInerny fails to 
distinguish between the initial grasp of first principles and the subsequent reflection upon action, 
which is substantially speculative.186 For Rhonheimer this is the content of moral philosophy, 
which gives rise to normative statements.187 
     For Rhonheimer, it is essential to maintain the distinction between theoretical knowledge 
and practical knowledge, because their founding principles are unique.188 The object of practical 
knowledge is the good and constitutes the Natural Law.189 However, one’s reflection upon the 
act of practical reasoning is descriptive, also called theoretical. It is only in the latter that one 
discovers the Natural Law, which Rhonheimer identifies as moral philosophy.190 It is precisely 
by reflecting on the practical knowing that one derives normative statements or commands.191  
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     Although this appears to contradict what Rhonheimer says above, namely that ‘ought 
statements’ do not derive from ‘is statements’; it does not, because for Rhonheimer, one is 
observing human reason in action.192 In other words, moral philosophy is not merely a social 
science experiment or survey, but reflection on how the human person uses reason to act. Since 
one does not merely observe how one acts, but maintains the connection to practical reason, the 
commands that one formulates remain constitutive to practical reasoning.193   
      Finnis and McInerny presume that the ‘ergon argument’ attempts to justify the foundation 
of practical reasoning through speculative knowledge. Consequently, Finnis rejects the argument 
altogether,194 while McInerny subscribes to it as a confirmation of his presumption that practical 
knowledge does derive from speculative knowledge.195 While Rhonheimer agrees with McInerny 
that Finnis should not reject the ‘ergon argument’ altogether, he does not agree with McInerny’s 
interpretation and conclusion.196 Rhonheimer understands McInerny to be rejecting a red herring 
insofar as McInerny creates or presumes a dilemma that does not really exist.197   
      In Praktische Vernunft und Vernunftigkeit der Praxis: Handlungstheorie bei Thomas von 
Aquin in Ihrer Entstehung aus dem Problemkontext der Aristotelischen Ethik, Rhonheimer 
explains that Finnis fails to see that the ‘ergon argument’ relates to ethical reflection, not 
practical reasoning.198 Therefore, while the argument does nothing for the foundation of practical 
reasoning, it is indispensable for a metaphysical-anthropological interpretation and justification 
of the normative function of practical reason.199 Rhonheimer not only rejects McInerny’s 
conclusion that practical knowledge derives from speculative knowledge, he also insists that 
practical knowledge plays an essential role in elucidating human nature; in fact, one that cannot 





b. Essentialist Understanding of Morality 
      Rhonheimer rejects what he calls an essentialist understanding of morality, of which 
Heinrich Rommen,201 Joseph Pieper,202 Ralph McInerny,203 Steven Jensen,204 R. Hittinger,205 and 
Steven A. Long206 are leading proponents.207 Such proponents conflate metaphysics with 
morality insofar as they insist that actions perfect being.208 Although ethicists often attribute this 
to Aquinas, Rhonheimer insists that this is not what Aquinas proposes.209 Above all, for 
Rhonheimer, such a theory poses an epistemic contradiction: it is impossible to know what to do 
until one has perfected one’s being through action.210   
      Essentialists fail to recognize an important distinction in Aquinas between moral being 
(esse morale) and essential being (esse essentiale), which he discusses in De Veritate.211 For 
Aquinas moral goodness constitutes the perfection of moral being, not essential being.212 
Aquinas insists that creatures cannot fail to be good with regard to essential goodness, but when 
it comes to accidental goodness, it may or may not be good, by participation.213 Being is good in 
its essence insofar as it exists.214 However, with the exception of God, who is good in the 
absolute sense, creatures are morally good insofar as they participate in goodness in an 
accidental sense, that is, insofar as this goodness is super-added to the essential goodness of the 
individual.215 Put another way, creatures are morally good in relation to the one who is goodness 
itself, that is, God.216 Rhonheimer asserts that any attempt to ground morality in natural teleology 
is caught in a vicious circle.217 
      Essentialism relates to another misconception held by proportionalists that moral evil 
merely constitutes the causing of physical evil.218 This is the position held by proportionalists 
such as Peter Knauer,219 Josef Fuchs,220 Louis Janssens,221 Bruno Schuller,222 and Richard 
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McCormick.223 Janssens, for instance, in “Ontic Evil and Moral Evil,” maintains that one 
commits moral evil whenever one causes ontic evil in the world.224 Following this understanding 
of moral evil, both Knauer and Janssens evacuate the Moral Object of its intentional content and 
reduce it to the material component of action.225   
       Therefore, in one sense, proportionalists make the same mistake of essentialists, insofar 
as they constitute moral evil as the causing of physical evil. Once again, they fail to maintain the 
important distinction between orders of the genus naturae versus the genus moris. For the 
proportionalists, however, the moral is not merely derivative of the ontological, but 
constitutively the same. Ironically, this relative equivocation gives rise to a radical dualism that 
centers on the person. Since the Moral Object is materially constituted, morality centers on the 
intention as ends, without regard for the intentional content of the Moral Object. Moreover, as 
the next subsection highlights, proportionalist morality is eventistic, rather than personalistic, 
focusing more on consequences than the deliberate will.   
iii. Natural Law and the Perspective of the Acting Person 
a. The Primacy of the First-Person Perspective 
      In “The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity,” 
Rhonheimer explains the dualistic fallacy as a deficient understanding of the Natural Law that 
presumes a dichotomy between the natural order (objective) and reason (subjective).226 
Accordingly, the Natural Law consists of a pre-packaged normative statement in nature, which 
the soul simply identifies.227 Put another way, the Natural Law simply consists of a law of nature 
that one identifies. In contrast, Rhonheimer insists that Natural Law is primarily subjective since 
it originates within the person and constitutes the openness of the subject to true moral 
goodness.228 The whole process whereby one knows the good—to be pursued—and evil—to be 
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avoided—itself constitutes practical reason and is part of human nature. As such, it is impossible 
to know human nature before one knows the good through practical reason, which is a 
constitutive part of human nature itself. Consequently, for Rhonheimer, ethics and the Natural 
Law do not begin with human nature; rather, one knows human nature insofar as one knows the 
good through practical reason.229   
       One advantage to establishing the Natural Law on human nature is that it provides an 
objective foundation that does not vacillate, as a subjective foundation seems to do, at least from 
a modern perspective.230 Both Pope Leo XIII and Pope John Paul II avoid this whimsical basis 
by connecting it to God through the eternal law.231 Insofar as God creates rational beings and 
implants the light of reason within their heart, the Natural Law is the eternal law that guides 
humans to their ends, formulated by human reason.232 Not only is the Natural Law a reflection of 
the divine law, but also human autonomy is a participation in the divine autonomy, which 
Rhonheimer calls theonomy: “participation and self-possession of the eternal law.”233 For 
Rhonheimer, the participatory nature of the Natural Law in the eternal law may provide 
motivation for following its dictates, especially in difficult circumstances.234 Insofar as the 
eternal law is immutable, the Natural Law’s connection to the former provides an unequivocal 
foundation, and though subjective it remains unwavering.     
      Much criticism against Rhonheimer centers on the role of inclinations in relationship to 
human reason. In fact, critics often accuse him of connecting reason too closely to 
inclinations,235 falling victim of physicalism or so disjoining reason from the inclinations that he 
commits spiritualism.236 Jean Porter accuses Rhonheimer of the latter critique in “Review of 
Natural Law and Practical Reason by Martin Rhonheimer,”237 to which Rhonheimer responds in 
“The Moral Significance of Pre-Rational Nature in Aquinas: a Reply to Jean Porter (and Stanley 
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Hauerwas).”238 Essentially, Rhonheimer avoids both physicalism and spiritualism by rooting the 
acts of practical reason in the person as a substantial unity of body and soul rather than in either 
the body or the soul.239   
      Rhonheimer rejects the notion that human persons are embodied souls, because such 
terminology implies a Cartesian dualism—the soul, equivalent to the person being trapped in the 
body.240 Instead, Rhonheimer reaffirms Boethius’s definition of the human person as a rational 
animal.241 Accordingly, the body contributes natural inclinations with proper goods and ends like 
its irrational counterparts. Moreover, these inclinations too participate in and reflect the eternal 
law, but in a passive, rather than active way.242 Natural inclinations follow an order determined 
by nature with proper operations and goals.243 Natural law presupposes that natural inclinations 
follow the natural order.244 The natural inclinations become properly human through the 
regulation of practical reason, which takes a uniquely active role in ordering goods and ends in 
accord with the eternal law.245   
     Rhonheimer highlights three important points that Aquinas makes regarding the Natural 
Law.246 First, as a work of practical reason, Natural Law does not derive from speculative 
reason, which, as in the first principle of practical reason, the underivability of the practical 
copulas of—prosecutio or fugo—from the theoretical copulas—is or is not—demonstrates.247 
Second, the person, using the intellect in extension, spontaneously understands the ends and 
goods of natural inclinations, and according to practical reason formulates practical precepts, 
which constitute Natural Law.248 Third, insofar as the human person as a substantial unity of 
body and soul regulates these goods and ends of natural inclinations, they constitute Natural 
Law.249   
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      Rhonheimer avoids the pitfalls of physicalism or spiritualism by placing the role of active 
agent not in the faculties of the soul or the body, but the human person, who constitutes a 
substantial unity of both. The human person utilizes the unique components of his or her one 
nature—body and soul—to formulate the Natural Law.   
b. First-Person Perspective of Natural Law in Veritatis Splendor 
      John Paul II, following Aquinas, understands the Natural Law to be a divine light of 
reason, which God imprints on humanity in creation.250 This reason, which promulgates the 
Natural Law, is not merely part of irrational nature, but distinctly part of human nature.251 
Humans do not merely read off the divine law immanently written on the human heart; rather, 
they have an active participation in the ordering function of the divine reason.252 In other words, 
God does not formulate and promulgate it, but human reason does.253 God does not externally 
impose the Natural Law; rather, insofar as humans use reason to formulate the dictates of reason, 
it is uniquely autonomous and internal.254 Humans, created in the image of God, are uniquely 
free and rational, which enables them to discern between good and evil.255    
      At the same time that both Rhonheimer and John Paul II emphasize the role of human 
reason in formulating and promulgating Natural Law, they also hold that individuals do not do so 
with absolute freedom.256 John Paul II, in accord with Leo XIII, understands the Natural Law to 
be a mirror of a higher divine reason.257 Again, the Natural Law is the divine law implanted 
within rational beings inclining them to right action.258 Of course, people remain free to conform 
themselves to this law or not. Because it originates with the divine, Rhonheimer understands 
human autonomy to be a participated theonomy; formulating Natural Law according to human 
reason that God infuses.259     
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      John Paul II rejects dualistic understandings of the human person including both 
spiritualism and physicalism that emphasize the spiritual or corporal aspect of humanity over the 
other, respectively.260 The previous subsection demonstrates how important it is to avoid a 
naturalistic understanding of Natural Law and the human person. In “The Moral Signficance of 
Pre-Rational Nature in Aquinas: A Reply to Jean Porter (and Stanley Hauerwas),” Rhonheimer 
not only explicitly denies that his theory is spiritualistic, but also shows the defects of such a 
theory.261  For John Paul II, humans are by nature body and soul.262 The soul constitutes the 
source of unity as the human form, but it is not exclusively the human person.263 Nor is the body 
raw matter for the soul to form.264 Rhonheimer insists that one’s corporality ought not to oppose 
one’s rational will as though the former is nature and the latter reason, rather, human nature 
constitutes a substantial unity of being that is both body and soul.265   
      Thus human morality pertains to both the bodily and spiritual dimensions of the human 
person.266 Rhonheimer illustrates using the marital act.267 The body provides sexual attraction 
between the sexes that serves procreation, which human reason naturally receives.268 The light of 
reason reveals the marital act as love and communion between two persons making a gift of self 
to the other for transmission of life.269   
      Insofar as the human person is a substantial unity of body and soul, both contribute to 
human morality.270 The body contributes natural inclinations that the soul regulates using human 
reason.271 Of course, the soul contributes inclinations to the good as well.272 To the extent that 
reason regulates these inclinations—of the body or the soul—they constitute Natural Law.273 
Since the intellect, a faculty of the soul formulates these dictates of reason, an outside observer 
cannot see this; rather, one must have the perspective of the person.274 Rhonheimer reminds the 
reader that the formulation of Natural Law is properly a reflexive act of the soul.275 Therefore, 
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following Lehu and John Paul II, Rhonheimer insists that one does not know Natural Law 
through human nature, but one does come to know human nature through the Natural Law.276 
The next subsection demonstrates the value of a personalistic conception of Natural Law. 
iv. Contraception and Natural Law 
      The search for an explanation for the immorality of contraception in the twentieth century 
is a catalyst for a deeper understanding of the Natural Law. The material and superficial rejection 
of contraception on the basis that condoms—and other contraceptives—physically interrupt the 
natural process of the marital act, thereby preventing the possibility of conception does not 
account for anovulants as contraception.277 Put another way, the physical act of preventing 
conception does not provide sufficient grounds for deriving a proscription against the act of 
contraception. Pope Paul VI’s bases his prohibition of contraception on two important principles: 
1) The Inseparability Principle and 2) responsible parenthood. Before articulating how 
Rhonheimer explains the role of Natural Law that avoids both physicalism and spiritualism, I 
highlight an important distinction between contraception and licit birth control.278   
      In Humanae Vitae, Paul VI prohibits “any action which either before, at the moment of, 
or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation—whether as an end or 
as a means.”279 This exclusion does not make any specific reference to the method, but rather to 
intention. Rhonheimer rejects the terminological distinction between artificial contraception and 
so-called natural methods of contraception, because Paul VI declares contraception immoral, 
that is, the intention of preventing conception.280 This does not mean that he rejects responsible 
parenthood, which sometimes involves couples abstaining from the marital act as a means of 
avoiding pregnancy. To the contrary, as the following demonstrates, both Paul VI and 
Rhonheimer, assert that periodic continence, unlike contraception, respects and maintains the 
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inseparability of the procreative and unitive significance of the marital act, and provides a means 
for growth in chastity.281    
a. Inseparability Principle 
      To understand the immorality of contraception, one must understand the good and end 
that it contradicts. In particular, Rhonheimer connects it to the precept of Natural Law relating to 
the marital act.282 For the sake of analysis he distinguishes between the spiritual and bodily 
contributions to human nature, beginning with the bodily, natural inclination common to other 
animals for male and female to join for the transmission of life.283 The connection of the soul to 
the human person—substantial unity—raises the physical act of copulation arising from the 
natural inclination to a new level when reason regulates it and it occurs between husband and 
wife, which Rhonheimer identifies as married love.284 He insists that one resist the temptation to 
neglect the role of the body, since doing so implies an anthropology that incarnates the soul 
within the body as though the two are different natures.285 This is spiritualism, which neglects 
the contribution that natural, bodily inclinations, ordered by nature, have for morality.286   
      The Church distinguishes between two goods of marriage: the unitive and procreative.287 
The unitive significance includes the fidelity to total self-giving manifest in conjugal love.288 The 
procreative significance, which invariably connects with the unitive significance, manifest in the 
conjugal act, reflects one’s openness to fecundity.289 As such, the object of marital act includes 
both significances.  Rhonheimer identifies it as the loving bodily union of husband and wife, 
which necessarily includes its procreative character.290 The inseparable connection between the 
unitive and procreative significance of the marital act, which Paul VI highlights in Humanae 
Vitae constitutes the Inseparability Principle.291   
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     Paul VI holds that each and every conjugal embrace must remain open to both 
significances.292 Rhonheimer distinguishes between function and meaning insisting that although 
one may not be functionally able to reproduce because of sterility or periodic incontinence, one 
ought nonetheless be open in meaning or, better said, in will to fruitfulness.293 In Man and 
Woman He Created Them, John Paul II argues that the body speaks a language in truth that is 
reread each time a couple engages in the conjugal act.294 The truth spoken by the body in the 
conjugal act refers to its innermost structure, which includes the inseparable connection between 
the unitive and procreative meanings.295 Rhonheimer insists that referral to the inseparability 
principle is not sufficient to explain why each and every marital embrace must remain open to 
procreation, because it does not include the object of contraception.296 To explain, Rhonheimer 
has recourse to the virtue of chastity, which the Moral Object of contraception contradicts.297 
b. Responsible Parenthood and Chastity 
      Reason makes the inclination toward bodily union in the marital act human.298 Insofar as 
it constitutes an act touched by reason, it is a truly personal act. Reason is the measure and rule 
of the natural inclination to husband and wife joining in the marital embrace, which makes the 
act both human and personal.299 Rhonheimer identifies the ordering of reason with responsible 
parenthood, which he relates to both the virtue of justice and chastity.300 In particular, he focuses 
on the role that chastity, as an ordering virtue of sexual inclinations, plays for responsible 
parenthood.301 Following Paul VI in Humanae Vitae,302 Rhonheimer argues that responsible 
parenthood necessitates periodic continence, which provides married couples means of growth in 
chastity, that is, the integration of sexual drives to the order of personal love.303 Contraception 
not only denies the procreative significance of the marital act, thereby denying its unitive 
significance, because of the Inseparability Principle, but it also robs the couple of a means to 
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growth in chastity, since it enables them to engage in the marital act without regard for the 
procreative consequences.304  Without the rational ordering that responsible parenthood places on 
sexual drives, the marital act loses its connection to what makes it an authentically human act of 
love oriented to one’s spouse.305 Consequently, contraception disrupts both the procreative and 
unitive significance of the marital act. This also accords with John Paul II’s interpretation.306 
      Rhonheimer’s articulation of contraception eschews physicalism and spiritualism 
defining it as a vice that counters chastity. He shows that the natural, bodily inclination to sexual 
union contributes to morality and that practical reason regulates sexual desire with an orientation 
to responsible parenthood, that invariably relates to personal love, which a proper ordering of 
desire presumes.    
      This section demonstrates that an accurate account of Natural Law includes an adequate 
understanding of anthropology that avoids the pitfalls of physicalism and spiritualism, which 
ethicists that derive Natural Law from the physical order cannot avoid. The next section analyzes 
the related concept of the Moral Object of the Act.      
2B. Moral Object 
      John Paul II, in Veritatis Splendor, rejects the teleological interpretation of action of 
consequentialism and proportionalism, while reaffirming the longstanding concept of the Moral 
Object attributable to Thomas Aquinas.307 Not excluding the role that intention—as ulterior 
end—and circumstances play in determining the morality of human acts, John Paul II maintains 
the primary and fundamental role that the Moral Object as rationally chosen by a deliberate will 
plays in determining the morality of human acts.308 John Paul II also retains the existence of 
intrinsically evil acts, a concept that teleological theorists eliminate.309 His defense of the Moral 
Object and intrinsically evil acts sparks renewed interest in Aquinas’s understanding of action.310   
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      In this section, I explicate the object of the act in the context of Aquinas’s complex virtue 
theory concerning action. Then, I demonstrate the erroneous understanding of the Moral Object 
of the manualists and proportionalists. One implication of the Naturalistic Fallacy is that one 
considers morality from the third-person perspective, rather than a first-person perspective. The 
third subsection not only illustrates the deficiency of the third-person perspective, but elucidates 
John Paul II’s restoration of the first-person perspective regarding the object in Veritatis 
Splendor. The final subsection addresses the topic of contraception that is a sticking point for the 
controversy regarding the Moral Object and intrinsically evil acts.   
i. Aquinas’s Action Theory 
     In the following, I articulate Aquinas’s understanding of the Moral Object. First, I situate 
his discussion in the context of the debate on the role of intentions in relationship to action 
according to Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard. Then, I follow John Finnis’s interpretation of 
Aquinas’s meticulous situating of intention within the person.311 
a. Intrinsically Evil Acts 
      Servais Pinckaers, in “A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts,” articulates 
Aquinas’s development of Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard’s use of intention vis-à-vis 
intrinsically evil acts.312 Although intrinsece malum does not appear in expression before the 
sixteenth century, the concept of deeds being evil in themselves originates in Scripture and 
Augustine explicates it in his De mendacio and Contra mendacium ad consentium.313 Against the 
legalism of his day that focuses merely on the external act or the desires to commit sin, Abelard 
attempts a retrieval of Augustine’s morality rooted in reason and will.314 Abelard places the 
source of evil solely in the intention of the agent; that is, his or her voluntary consent to a desire 
or action.315 In other words, for Abelard, the evil of an action is neither in the desire to commit 
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an evil act, nor in the performance of it, rather, it resides in the agent’s intention. Pinckaers 
indicates that the main thrust of Abelard’s theory is positive, to reposition the focus of morality 
on intention and consent, however, the downside is that it eliminates any consideration of 
external action and desire for morality.316 Although this does not seem to be Abelard’s intention, 
his theory, in principle, excludes the possibility of intrinsically evil acts.317      
      In distinction 40 of the second book of his Sentences, Peter Lombard addresses the 
question of intention and its relationship to external acts.318 First, he restates Abelard’s position 
that external works are neither good nor evil except insofar as an agent intents them as such.319 
Then, Lombard presents the counter-position that some works are good or evil regardless of the 
intention of the agent.320 Lombard offers a via media following Augustine’s direction in Contra 
mendacium ad consentium.321 Augustine holds that some acts are good or evil depending on their 
causa or reason, for instance a couple engaging in the marital act to conceive children, or to give 
food to the poor.322 So long as one does these acts for a good reason, they are good; however, 
should one do them for a bad reason, they are bad. For example, it is not good to give to the poor 
in order to look good; this is vanity.323 However, for Augustine, some acts are evil in themselves: 
theft, fornication, and blasphemy; and one may never do these even for a good reason.324 To 
illustrate, Augustine forbids one to steal from the rich to feed the poor.325   
b. Intention to Action      
      Arguably no one reflects deeper on the inner workings of the person concerning action 
than Aquinas.326 Finnis indicates that many philosophers and theologians misunderstand his 
action theory, which in turn, leads to erroneous implications.327 In Aquinas: Moral, Political and 
Legal Theory (Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought), Finnis meticulously follows 
Aquinas’s articulation of his action theory from the internal perspective, which comes from 
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questions 11-20 of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica.328 Understanding Aquinas’s 
action theory is essential to understanding the Moral Object.   
       Just like the Church Fathers, Aquinas reorients ethics from a legalistic reduction of 
external acts to its original purpose: virtue and beatitude.329 Moreover, like Abelard and 
Lombard, intention has a central role. Intentions concern the movement of the will to ends.330 To 
be sure, many ends may motivate or move people to act, but Aquinas denies any infinite 
regresses, 331 insisting instead that the ultimate end for humanity is beatitude or contemplation of 
the Divine Essence. 332 Regarding ends, Aquinas distinguishes between the order of intention and 
the order of execution.333 What is first in the order of intention is last in the order of execution.334 
Thus, some end inclines the will to execute action. The end begins by motivating to action and 
concludes in execution. To illustrate, the experience of hunger and the past experience of 
satisfaction by eating, may motivate one to eat this cantaloupe here and now. On the order of 
intention, the satiation by eating constitutes an end. On the order of execution, the satiation of 
one’s hunger by eating a cantaloupe constitutes the end, and the final achievement—fruitio.335 
Aquinas’s action theory concerns all the intervening steps beginning with an end on the order of 
intention and concluding with an action on the order of execution.   
      According to Finnis, for Aquinas, intention (intentio) and choice (electio) are the central 
acts of the will.336 Properly speaking, choice concerns means for accomplishing ends, while 
intention concerns ends.337 For example, if one intends to stay warm during the winter, one must 
heat the house and different means exist by which one may choose to achieve the end of heating 
one’s house: burning wood, electricity, or gas. The ability to conceive of means to achieve one’s 
end is practical understanding (intellectus practicus).338 The ability to relate various benefits to 
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each other and make a judgment about the value of one over another is practical reason (ratio 
practica).339 Therefore, practical decision-making involves the will and intellect.   
      Rhonheimer understands Aquinas to assert that the intellect, which ordinarily acts 
theoretically, perceiving and judging the world according to the speculative order of knowing, 
acts in extension (extensio) during practical reasoning.340 One way of distinguishing theoretical 
from practical is by the type of syllogism or mode of reasoning that one uses. Theoretical 
syllogisms only lead to theoretical conclusions that do not entail action.341 For instance, one may 
conclude that since one cat has four legs, all cats have four legs. Practical syllogisms, on the 
other hand, consist of practical premises that give rise to conclusions of action.342 For 
Rhonheimer, the practical syllogism is thinking that involves doing.343 For example, staying 
warm constitutes a necessity for life; therefore, one must choose some means for achieving the 
end of heating one’s house during the winter.       
      Finnis identifies choice as the central event for action, but several internal processes 
involving both the intellect and the will lead up to and follow choice.344 Although each of these 
functions may belong to a particular faculty of the soul—intellect or will—ultimately, it is the 
person who acts.345 Thinking about the interesting proposals that the intellect offers is 
deliberation.346 Sometimes this involves taking counsel (consilium) with oneself or others.347 
      After deliberating and taking counsel, one may determine that one option stands out as 
better than the rest.348 In this case, one reaches a consensus and although assent belongs properly 
to the intellect, Finnis says that one assents to the only eligible action.349 Put another way, since 
one does not prefer one truly eligible option to another, one simply assents rather than 
chooses.350 Aquinas also calls the assent of the will a sentence (sententia) or judgment 
(iudicium).351 If, however, one concludes the process of thinking with several viable options, 
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then one must make a final judgment (iudicum electionis) that does properly constitute a 
choice.352 
      One commits to a final judgment as an action by the will choosing it.353 But choice is not 
enough for action; one must actually command (imperium) the act, using (usus) one’s bodily 
powers to physically actualize it.354 Finally, in the intellect one knows that the act is complete 
(cogitio finis in actu) and through the will one experiences satisfaction in it (fruitio).355   
c. External Act: Materia Circa Quam and Proximate End 
      For Aquinas, actions receive their species from ends.356 Joseph Pilsner holds that Aquinas 
uses the relationship between form and matter in a substantial being to illustrate the analogous 
relationship that ends have for action.357 This is particularly true because human actions cannot 
exist without an end.358 Therefore, just as form gives shape to substantial beings, so ends give 
form to action.359 Pilsner following Aquinas holds that acts of the will, itself a type of motion, 
like all motions, are specified by their end.360 Distinct from natural motions, so-called active 
principles do not determine the species of human acts.361 This is because humans are free, that is, 
not limited by instinct.362 To illustrate, eyes can only see color by means of light; they cannot 
hear or taste or feel, as such. Therefore, the active principle of seeing limits the function of eyes. 
In contrast to humans, active principles limit animals to particular physical behaviors in response 
to stimuli; however, because humans have a will and an intellect, they have a freedom regarding 
decisions and actions that do not characterize other animals.   
      Pilsner identifies three distinct meanings for object in Aquinas. First, object consists of 
that to which an action relates.363 This is what Rhonheimer calls the res aliena.364 Ralph 
McInerny offers a more sophisticated definition: “that which the agent sets out to do, to effect,” 
that is, the act itself.365 According to Pilsner and Rhonheimer, this limited understanding of 
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object does not constitute the meaning of the Moral Object for Aquinas.366 Second, object means 
a certain formal aspect that specifies a related action, habit or power.367 This notion of object has 
reference to qualities and the senses, which Aquinas discusses in his Commentary on Aristotle’s 
De Anima.368 Just as formal aspects of being correspond to the different senses, so formal aspects 
of the good rationally composed by the intellect attract human agents through the will.369  
Therefore, in this sense, the ratio constitutes the formal aspect of the object of human action.  
Finally, but most importantly, the object constitutes the proximate end of action, as opposed to 
the remote end.370 Working together, one may say that the remote end orders the specific act.  
For example, one may steal—an evil proximate end—for the purpose of giving money to the 
poor—a good remote end.371 However, for the act to be good, both the proximate end and the 
remote end must be good.372 Both ends relate to intention, but the proximate end constitutes the 
Moral Object, since it specifies the act, while the remote end acts as a circumstance of the act.373  
     In article 18 of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas addresses the 
sources of good or evil in action.374 He maintains that the goodness of an act depends on three 
distinct sources: Moral Object, end, and circumstance.375 To demonstrate how the Moral Object 
and the end affect the will, Aquinas uses the dichotomous terms of matter and form—analogous 
to the hylomorphic sense376— in relationship to external and internal acts, and materia ex qua 
and materia circa quam.377 The Moral Object determines the species of an act just as form 
determines the species of natural things.378 The end configures the Moral Object, impacting the 
species as well.379 However, John Abraham Makdisi indicates that the end does not replace the 
Moral Object.380 The Moral Object is not the matter ‘of which’ (a thing is made) (materia ex 
qua), but the matter ‘about which’ (something is done) (materia circa quam) giving act its 
species like a form.381 In human acts, the intellect predicates good and evil Moral Objects in 
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reference to reason.382 Good Moral Objects conform to practical reason because they have 
suitable matter (materia debita) and evil Moral Objects do not conform to reason since they have 
unsuitable matter (materia indebita).383    
      Aquinas insists that one consider the species of an act formally with regard to the end—
the object of the internal act—and materially with regard to the object of the external act—that 
which is brought to bear.384 Regarding how ends impact species of acts, Aquinas makes an 
important distinction between external (exterior) and internal (interior) acts of the will, each 
having their own proper object: that which is brought to bear and the end, respectively.385 For 
Sousa-Lara, internal acts pertain to intention and ends, while external acts concern the 
choice/command and the Moral Object.386 This accords with Makdisi who indicates that the 
interior act is the very act of willing, while the exterior act is a voluntary act that the will 
commands.387 The end is formal because the agent chooses the Moral Object to attain it. 
      To illustrate, Aquinas says that he who steals that he may commit adultery is more an 
adulterer than a thief.388 The object of the interior act of the will, also the remote end, is adultery, 
which causes the agent to choose the Moral Object of theft. The end formally configures the 
species of the act of theft, which constitutes his means for achieving the end of adultery.   
      The Moral Object may be indifferent, but the end must be morally good.389 Driving a car 
is indifferent, but doing it to rob a bank is evil, while doing it to go to church is good. In action, 
there is always an end (finis operantis) with a rational good (ratio boni) that the will intends, 
otherwise nothing attracts the will to move.390 Therefore, it is possible to consider the morality of 
the object of the internal act of the will, that is, the object of intention (end), separately from the 
object of the external act of the will, which is the object of the choice (Moral Object).391     
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     Concerning the description of the order of practical reason from the subsection above, 
intention is formal to choice, just as choice is formal to command.392 In his On Evil, Aquinas 
asserts that exterior acts are part of the moral genus only insofar as they are voluntary, that is, 
proceeding from the will.393 By separating content of the exterior act from its voluntariness, one 
is left with the so-called materia ex qua of the human act.394 The will commands the materia ex 
qua of the external act through the other faculties, constituting merely the act’s material 
dimension.395 The choice is formal to the will’s command of the materia ex qua of the exterior 
act.396 Moreover, insofar as the exterior act—materia ex qua—is devoid of voluntariness, it 
receives its moral character solely from the choice.397  
      In addition to speaking about the interior and exterior acts, one may speak of their 
respective objects as well. The will intends the object of the internal act of the will—the end, 
while it chooses the object of the external act of the will, and as the previous paragraph 
demonstrates, the former configures the latter like form to matter.398 Sousa-Lara understands 
Aquinas to equate the object of the external act with the materia circa quam, the Moral Object, 
and the proximate end.399 Aquinas identifies the object of the internal act with the remote end.400 
Rhonheimer notes the confusion that identifying the object of the external act with the Moral 
Object presents.401 He indicates that the object of the external act “is the external act as a good 
understood and ordered by reason.”402 More precisely, the object of the exterior act is the matter 
and circumstances understood and ordered by reason, which present it to the will as good.403 
Therefore, Rhonheimer, following Aquinas, asserts that the Moral Object is the exterior act.404  
Rhonheimer is not considering the external act as prescinded from its voluntariness, that is, 
materia ex qua, but configured by reason materia circa quam.405  On the order of intention, the 
external act is the Moral Object insofar as the intellect forms it and presents it as a proposal for 
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action to the will.406  Moreover, the Moral Object has the character of an end insofar as intention 
focuses on it.407 Thus it is also the proximate end. Since the interior act of the will is the very act 
of willing,408 it is possible for Rhonheimer to call the Moral Object the object of the interior act 
of the will.409 The intelligible proposal to take what does not belong to oneself—to steal—
constitutes the means by which the adulterer accomplishes his end. In its voluntariness, that is, 
insofar as the will intends it as a choice, it constitutes an end, specifically a proximate end, 
chosen as configured by and for an ulterior end—adultery.410 On the order of execution, the will 
forms the goodness of the external act, which possesses a moral quality to the extent that one 
wills it.411   
      Sousa-Lara notes that while Rhonheimer insists on introducing a new term to explain the 
intelligible content of the external act—what he calls basic intentional content—the necessity for 
this disappears if one understands the external act as both the object of choice (Moral Object) 
and that which one commands.412 On the order of intention, reason configures the external act 
and presents it to the will as a proposal, in which case it is materia circa quam, and the Moral 
Object.  On the order of execution, the will chooses and commands the external act.  On the 
order of intention, the moral goodness of the act comes from reason, whereas on the order of 
execution, it comes from the will.413 As the will chooses and commands the external act, in the 
interior act of the will, the will intends the ends.414  
      Having analyzed the concept of the Moral Object in the context of Aquinas’s action 
theory, the following subsection highlight the importance of maintaining the unique origin of the 
Moral Object in the moral order.    





a. Genus Moris Versus Genus Naturae 
     Finnis notes that Aquinas presents in his prologue to his commentary on Aristotle’s 
Politics four distinct orders that correspond to four distinct sciences.415 First, there is the natural 
order that corresponds to the natural sciences, math and metaphysics.416 Second, the order of the 
mind pertains to the science of logic.417 Third, the order of deliberating, choosing and acting 
pertains to the science of moral philosophy.418 Finally, a multitude of practical arts corresponds 
to an order that humans impose on external matter.419 The latter two categories constitute two 
distinct parts of the practical philosophy.420 Many interpreters of Aquinas mistakenly believe that 
moral laws derive from laws of nature.421   
      In point of fact, however, Finnis insists that misappropriating human actions as any of the 
other three categories leads to its misunderstanding.422 Rhonheimer holds that the fundamental 
error of consequentialism is that it reduces morality to poiesis, technical decision making.423  In 
consequentialism, rather than answering what the right choices one should be doing, one uses 
reason to bring about through action as a cause the best possible consequences. Finnis says that 
this amounts to reducing a question of doing to one of making.424 In this sense, the concern of the 
consequentialist is bringing about states of affairs through action.425 Consequentialism derails 
moral decision making from its primary focus of freely choosing good act.426 Instead, human 
action focuses on how to create the best outcome by action.427  The right action for choice is 
relative.  There is little concern about the goodness of the will regarding choices.   
       Finnis acknowledges that one may approach ethics from a speculative or theoretical 
perspective; that is, one may analyze how one comes to know practical truths, discuss and relate 
these to other truths, but ethics is primarily about practical truth.428 Ethics is practical not merely 
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because it is the study of human praxis, but because it concerns one’s acting on real and true 
goods.429 The Naturalistic Fallacy holds that the practicality of ethics derives from the physical; 
contending that the genus moris derives from the genus naturae.430 Rhonheimer calls this error 
physicalism or naturalism.431 It presumes that Natural Law and laws of nature are the same.432 It 
constitutes the primary error of manualists and the teleological theorists who oppose them.433 For 
Rhonheimer, they mistakenly believe that one discovers moral truths; when reason constitutes 
them as acts of practical understanding.434   
b. Manualism and Proportionalism 
       In The Sources of Christian Ethics, Servais Pinckaers describes the characteristics of 
manualism.435 The modern period of moral theology begins with the nominalism of Ockham, 
which focuses morality on obligation and the ideal law.436  A chasm develops between theology 
and pastoral concerns, which necessitates the development of manuals to guide parochial priests 
in confession.437 This corresponds with the counter-reformation and the formation of seminaries 
as institutions for preparing priests to minister in an increasingly pluralistic world.438 Under the 
influence of the Jesuits, the focus of moral theology becomes increasing pragmatic. They 
eliminate speculative content, such as the final end of man and grace altogether, emphasizing the 
commandments, sacraments, canonical censures and penalties, and states of life.439 The manuals 
use cases that illustrate concretely how to apply the commandments and moral obligations. The 
entire attention of morality theology focuses on individual cases of conscience.440    
      The manuals generally have four different categories: human or free action, law, 
conscience and sin.441 Freedom is freedom of indifference with voluntaristic overtones that 
contrast with the limits of the law.442 In this sense, law does not incorporate one’s natural 
inclinations or direct one toward beatitude; rather, it simply constitutes an externally imposed 
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mandate.443 The law becomes an external imposition that obliges, but as G. E. M. Anscombe 
indicates in Intention, ought is a late addition to the practical syllogism.444 Casuistically, the 
conscience represents the person’s use of freedom of indifference to conform external acts to 
externally imposed laws.445 One sins when one fails to use one’s freedom to adequately apply 
laws in concrete action.446   
      Just as Abelard and Lombard respond to contemporary legalism, proportionalists such as 
Peter Knauer,447 Josef Fuchs,448 Louis Janssens,449 Bruno Schuller,450 and Richard McCormick451 
respond to the legalism of the manualist tradition. However, as Rhonheimer indicates, their 
rejection of manual legalism, rooted in physicalism, amounts to letting the Naturalistic Fallacy in 
through the back door.452 To illustrate, one need look no further than the first article that 
introduces the term proportionalism, that is, Peter Knauer’s “The Hermeneutic Function of the 
Principle of Double Effect,” where he says that moral evil consists in nothing more than causing 
physical evil.453 Using the Principle of Double Effect, Knauer argues that so long as a 
commensurate reason exists one may do any action.454 So long as the ends justify the means, one 
may commit any finis operis, which he identifies as the Moral Object.455 In fact, if the ends are 
satisfactory, then the commensurate reason changes the finis operis from a direct causing of evil 
to an indirect causing of evil.456 This is exactly what Richard McCormick means by the 
expanded notion of the object.457 
      Louis Janssens, in “Ontic Evil and Moral Evil,” reduces moral evil to intending ontic 
evils, that is, physical evil.458 He reduces the means (Moral Object) to the material component of 
the act.459 In Thomistic terms, he reduces the Moral Object to the external act prescinded from its 
voluntariness, that is, materia ex qua.460 Consequently, Janssens falls victim to the same flaw 
that Rhonheimer accuses Josef Fuch of: reducing acts to pure events or behavior.461 According to 
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Rhonheimer, proportionalists reduce acting to intending failing to realize that acts themselves 
have intentional content.462 In other words, action for proportionalists involves causing the 
purely physical act or event for an end, which constitutes a state of affairs.463 For this reason, 
opponents accuse proportionalists of being consequentialists.   
       The main problem with the proportionalists’ approach to theology is that it evacuates 
reason from the intentional content of the Moral Object.464 Moreover, by making the genus moris 
derivative of the genus naturae, it establishes a dualism.465 Rhonheimer contends that the proper 
good (bona propria) toward which the natural inclinations tend are of the genus naturae, but not 
pre-moral in the sense that they are indifferent to the genus moris.466 Rather, for Rhonheimer, 
natural, human inclinations are always subject to the influence of practical reason insofar as this 
is a constitutive component of the human person.467 Once again, Rhonheimer affirms that for 
Aquinas, the Moral Object is not a matter out of which (materia ex qua), but a matter concerning 
which (materia circa quam).468 The Moral Object is the external act formed by reason and 
chosen by the will.469   
      An important implication of not deriving the genus moris from the genus naturae is that 
the Moral Object can only be known from the first-person perspective, which the next subsection 
discusses.   
iii: Moral Object and the Perspective of the Acting Person 
     Manualism is casuistic, using cases to teach. Unfortunately, the perspective of the acting 
person, which John Paul II reaffirms as of primary importance for moral theology, is lost.470 In 
fact, one can only know the Moral Object from the first-person perspective.471 This subsection 
addresses the deficiency of the third-person perspective of morality of the manualists and 
teleological theorists. First, following Finnis and Rhonheimer, I show how the naturalistic fallacy 
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reduces action and choice to events, devoid of intentional content. Second, I articulate Finnis’s 
demonstration of the irrationality of a proportionalist utilizing the Socratic Principle. Finally, I 
summarize John Paul II’s personalistic perspective to morality, which avoids the relativistic 
pitfalls of proportionalism.   
a. Avoiding Eventism 
      As morality during the manualist era focuses more on obligation, so theologians 
increasingly define the object of the act in terms of the genus naturae. As the above 
demonstrates, this corresponds to a dualism that renders action indifferent to natural inclination.  
At the same time, as Rhonheimer points out, it makes objects of the genus moris derivative of the 
genus naturae, which constitutes the Naturalistic Fallacy.472 Ultimately, this culminates in the 
proportionalists equating the object with causing evil in the world, without commensurate 
reason.473 Consequently, human acts are nothing more than events that give rise to states of 
affairs.474 Finnis indicates that the proportionalists attempt to guide choice by assessing states of 
affairs from a so-called objective standpoint; as such, they are guilty of eventism.475 Ultimately, 
this renders choice insignificant, since it can only be known from the first-person perspective.476   
      In fact, a consequence of an eventistic perspective for morality is that it reduces the 
Moral Object to intention.477 According to an eventistic approach all acts in themselves lack 
moral content. The only thing that morally specifies them is their reason for acting, that is, the 
end or intention.478 Rhonheimer explains that the act of killing another person, according to an 
eventistic perspective, lacks moral content, except for the intention or end that one has in view of 
killing the person.479 Thus, if the commensurate reason suffices, one may kill another person.   
      For Rhonheimer, what is missing in this assessment is the intentional content that exists 
in doing an act, prior to any consideration of the end, that is, why or for what purpose one is 
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doing this act.480 The intelligible content of ‘the what one is doing’ constitutes the Moral Object. 
This explains what one is choosing in doing a particular act. For example, in the act of killing 
another person, one is setting oneself against the other’s life—a fundamental good of that 
person.481 The act of killing another is, therefore, not inherently morally neutral as an earthquake, 
but intentionally and morally charged, even before one considers the ulterior end of action.482 
Moreover, one can only know the Moral Object from the perspective of the acting person. Only 
the acting person knows if she intends to kill the other person or is practicing self-defense. 
Similarly, the outside observer cannot tell if a man and a woman copulating are committing 
adultery or engaging in the marital act.   
b. The Socratic Principle 
     Finnis and Rhonheimer reject the third-person perspective of morality because it does not 
pass the test of the Socratic Principle.483 The Socratic Principle, which hold that it is better to 
suffer wrong than to do it originates with Democritus.484 The Pauline Principle, ‘evil may not be 
done for the sake of good,’ is a corollary.485 Kant’s categorical imperative that ends do not justify 
the means also derives from this.486 The author of the Gospel of John also raises this question by 
placing it into the mouth of Caiaphas: “Is it not better that one innocent person be put to death 
than that the whole people perish?”487 For both John and Paul, the answer is clearly no.488 For 
Rhonheimer and Finnis, proportionalists clearly teach that one may indeed do evil that good may 
result, so long as the ends justify the means.489   
      For Finnis the biggest difference between a proportionalists and a non-proportionalist is 
that the right choice resides in the outcome of action.490 Finnis illustrates the irrationality of 
proportionalism by demonstrating a contradiction that all eventistic ethics are subject to. Finnis 
offers two apparently similar propositions:  
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(1) It is true that every person x that x should act on the principle that ‘I ought not to do V.’ 
(2) It is true of every person x that x not doing V is a proportionately better state of affairs 
than x doing V.491 
Finnis reformulates (1) to include the Socratic Principle: “(1a) It is true of every person x that x 
should act on the principle that ‘I ought to suffer wrong rather than do wrong.”492 Consequently, 
“(2a) It is true of every person x that x suffering wrong is a proportionately better state of affairs 
than x doing wrong.”493 However, Finnis demonstrates that (2a) contains a contradiction insofar 
as it implies that “(2b) It is true of any person x, y, z that x suffering wrong from y is a better state 
of affairs than x doing wrong to z.”494 In addition, one can derive: “(2c) a suffering wrong from b 
is a better state of affairs than a doing wrong to b” and “(2d) b suffering wrong from a is a better 
state of affairs than b doing wrong to a.”495 These radical contradictions are possible in an 
eventistic ethic because the acting subject disappears.496 
      Rhonheimer explains that the implication of the Socratic Principle is that one cannot 
simply compare two separate individuals to determine which action is correct.497 Sometimes the 
right action is to abstain from acting. To illustrate, Rhonheimer uses the extreme example of the 
French Nazi collaborator Paul Touvier who claims that he killed seven innocent people to rescue 
93 innocent people.498 According to Rhonheimer and Finnis, nothing—no matter how good the 
ends—justifies one willing the death of innocent people. Another example includes the scenario 
of an assailant coercing a hostage to kill another hostage, lest the attacker kill all the hostages. In 
an eventistic ethic one simply weighs the consequences, without any consideration of the 
morality of choosing the death of an innocent person. For a non-proportionalist, it is better to 
suffer the evil of another person’s decision, than to commit evil so as to prevent it. Of course, 
this example has the mistaken logic that one person’s decision to abstain from an evil act causes 
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an even greater evil state of affairs. In fact, the assailant freely chooses to murder the innocent 
hostages. The hostage does not commit a greater evil, by failing to commit an evil that 
purportedly rescues others from death. After all, there is nothing that prevents the assailant from 
violating his word and killing the other hostages anyway.      
c. Personalism in Veritatis Splendor 
     In Veritatis Splendor, John Paul II affirms the traditional personalistic perspective of 
morality that characterizes authentic Thomistic moral theology.499 This is not to say that he 
embraces a relativistic approach to morality, which he clearly rejects.500 Nor does it mean 
denying its objective and universal application.501 It is, however, to say that the Natural Law, 
which governs morality, is not extrinsic to the human person, but constitutive of it.502 In other 
words, God does not arbitrarily dictate commands that have nothing to do with the human 
condition. Rather, the Natural Law, reflective of the eternal and divine law, abides in the human 
person through creation.503 It is precisely its connection to the eternal and divine that renders it 
universal.504   
      In action, the Natural Law manifests itself as practical reason, which guides, but does not 
determine the truly autonomous person in moral decision making.505 John Paul II avoids the 
trappings of reducing moral decision making to biological processes; rather, he insists that 
humans are truly free, though not in an absolute sense that treats human nature as raw datum.506 
Thus, he avoids the trappings of dualism that reduces the human person to either the bodily or 
spiritual component.507 Rather, the human person constitutes a unity of both body and soul, 
reducible to neither.508 By rooting morality in the human person, John Paul II, not only avoids 
conflicts between nature and freedom, which a dualistic understanding of human nature lends 
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itself to, he also further establishes its universal and immutable character.509 This is what 
provides the foundation for moral norms that transcend culture or time.510 
     For John Paul II, the voice of reason speaks within the depth of one’s heart on practical 
matters through one’s conscience.511 While norms both negative and positive may be universal 
and immutable, the human person must still apply these in concrete actions.512 In this regard, the 
personal perspective for morality is invaluable and primary, not because one decides what is 
good to do in an absolute sense, but because one appropriates the truth in action by means of 
one’s conscience.513 Therefore, the conscience stands as a witness to the law and constitutes a 
dialogue between the person and God.514   
     In opposition to proportionalists and teleological theorists, in general, John Paul II both 
rejects the fundamental option and reaffirms the existence of intrinsically evil acts, which 
meeting the appropriate criteria constitute mortal sin.515 John Paul II concurs that one may 
fundamentally orient one’s life toward God, but this does not mean that one’s concrete actions do 
not matter, nor that they have little to no impact on one’s commitment to God.516 It is precisely 
through one’s acts that one reveals one’s commitment.517 Separating concrete acts from one’s 
fundamental orientation represents a dualism rooted in human nature.518 Therefore, following the 
longstanding teaching of the Church, John Paul II reaffirms that mortal sin is possible, when 
one’s act constitutes grave matter; one has full knowledge, and gives deliberate consent of the 
will.519 Indeed, for John Paul II, an appropriate teleology regarding morality understands the 
human person as attaining one’s ultimate end through concrete acts.520   
     Ultimately, John Paul II takes issue with teleological theorists—consequentialists and 
proportionalists—for their rejection of the traditional understanding of the Moral Object.521 The 
next subsection illustrates how proportionalists conceive of the Moral Object as intention.522 As 
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Rhonheimer illustrates in the above subsection, proportionalists evacuate the Moral Object of its 
own intentional content.523 They make the Moral Object equivalent to intention—hence the 
identification as teleologists—while Thomists, such as Finnis, Rhonheimer, and John Paul II 
defend a notion of the Moral Object as having an intentional content of its own.524 John Paul II 
retains the traditional distinction regarding the three sources of morality—Moral Object, 
intention, and circumstances—of which Moral Object is primary.525   
      John Paul II defines the Moral Object as that which the will deliberately and rationally 
chooses.526 The human person, through a deliberate act of the will, chooses a rationally 
configured type of behavior.527 The person constitutes the active agent; as such, one can only 
know the Moral Object from the perspective of the acting human person.528 The intellect 
rationally configures it, which the will deliberately intends, bestowing moral content upon the 
so-called behavior.529 Insofar as certain types of rationally configured behavior conform or fail to 
conform to the suppositum of human nature, that is, truly lead to one’s ultimate end—good or 
evil—intrinsically evil acts do exist.530 As such, each particular human act—freely and 
deliberately chosen—not only builds character—either contributing to growth in virtue or vice—
but also draws the acting human person closer to one’s ultimate end. Moreover, the primacy of 
the Moral Object means that no intention or circumstance can change the Moral Object, making 
an intrinsically evil act good.531   
      In reaffirming the primacy of the Moral Object, John Paul II also demonstrates the 
importance of returning to the perspective of the acting human person when evaluating action. At 
the same time, he rejects any tendency to relativize morality, by rooting the Natural Law in the 
divine law, which God bestows on humanity in creation. Moreover, he understands the human 
person as a composite that avoids the dualistic trappings of teleological theories. Above all, he 
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re-establishes the primary role of the Moral Object for morality. Insofar as this constitutes a 
rationally configured type of behavior, which the will deliberately chooses, it manifests itself in 
particular acts that have teleological import regarding an one’s ultimate end.   
      Having demonstrated the importance of the first-person perspective for Moral Object, the 
next subsection identifies the Moral Object of contraception.   
iv. Object of Contraception 
     The meaning of the Moral Object centers on the debate as to whether or not contraception 
is an intrinsically evil act. John Paul II reorients the understanding and significance of the Moral 
Object as the deliberate act of the will in Veritatis Splendor.532 Before this encyclical, 
theologians arrive at differing conclusions based on their divergent understandings of the Moral 
Object. The following subsection considers the perspectives of the manualists, proportionalists 
and virtue ethicists, especially Rhonheimer concerning the topic of contraception.   
a. Manualism 
      John T. Noonan Jr. in Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic 
Theologians and Canonists traces the historical approach of theologians throughout the centuries 
of the Church regarding their treatment of the pastoral issue of contraception.533 As Pinckaers 
indicates, the manuals are tools for pastoral formation of priests in seminary.534 Consequently, 
the focus is physical and external. Regarding the variety of manual authors, Noonan follows the 
perspective of four: John Gury’s Compendium of Moral Theology,535 Thomas Gousset’s 
Justification de la theologie morale de St. Alphonse de Liguori,536 John Baptist Bouvier’s 
Dissertation on the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue and Supplement to the Treatise on 
Marriage,537 and Francis P. Kenrick’s Theologia moralis.538   
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      Noonan indicates that manual authors eliminate recourse to Augustine in favor of the 
more tolerant Liguori to extinguish the Jansenist influence.539 They equate contraception with 
Onanism or coitus interruptus, that is, the act of withdrawing the penis and ejaculating 
extravaginally.540 Rome’s approach to contraception in the nineteenth century is surprisingly 
tolerant, encouraging priests “not to destroy the good faith without any fruit for souls,” that is, 
not to mention the issue if it is not brought up, but to speak the truth if nonetheless pressed.541 
Equating contraception with Onanism makes it odious and ugly, and a quick, yet superficial 
rejection.542 Of the four manuals that Noonan analyzes, only Bouvier’s has an argument against 
contraception that does not merely constitute a rejection of Onanism.543 Although he argues that 
contraception violates the primary end of marriage, procreation, he nonetheless contends that the 
punishment is due to its equivalence with Onanism.544    
      As the birth control movement spreads in the Western world during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, the need for a more sophisticated, if not nuanced approach to the 
onslaught becomes apparent. Short and sweet arguments with recourse to Old Testament 
retributive justice—divine or not—no longer suffice. For this reason, Pope Pius XI writes Casti 
Cannubii, an encyclical that addresses the nature of marriage and modern threats to it.545 Pius XI 
after articulating the three ends of marriage according to Augustine, condemns the practice of 
frustrating the marital act to avoid having children, but nonetheless intending to gratify desires 
without the so-called consequent burden of having children.546 He unequivocally condemns as 
unnatural, intrinsically vicious, and gravely evil any contraceptive act, which is disruptive of the 
primary end of the marital act of begetting children.547 He admits of no exception to this rule, the 






      Proportionalists offer a nuanced approach to contraception, one that allows for exceptions 
to the exceptionless. Knauer’s argument, which has recourse to the Principle of Double Effect, 
rejects too narrow an understanding of Pius XI’s pronouncement in Casti Cannubii, which he 
perceives as ambiguous.549 It is ambiguous for Knauer because it does not specify whether one’s 
intention to physically interfere with the fertility of the procreative act is psychological or 
moral.550 He indicates that the purely physical evil of losing procreative power does not 
constitute a moral evil, without further content, in particular, intention in the moral sense.551   
      Recall that Knauer’s definition of moral evil constitutes the causing of a physical evil 
without a commensurate reason.552 He insists that without intentional content in the moral sense, 
the act of preventing pregnancy does not yet constitute the Moral Object; therefore, it is 
impossible to make a moral assessment of it.553 It must have a commensurate reason.554 Insofar 
as one can use periodic continence for an evil end of preventing children, Knauer sees no 
difference between using periodic continence or contraception either for good or immoral 
reasons.555 For Knauer, if periodic continence is not realistic for preventing pregnancy, where a 
couple ought not to get pregnant, for a commensurate reason, such as, a lack of resources for 
fulfilling the responsibilities of parenthood in education and rearing, then a couple may use 
contraception.556 Moreover, if utilizing contraception, instead of periodic continence, improves 
the love between the couple, then they ought to use it.557 
c. Rhonheimer 
      In 1968, Paul VI publishes Humanae Vitae, reaffirming the Church’s condemnation of 
contraception.558 Paul VI bases his rejection of contraception on the Inseparability Principle, 
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which constitutes the notion that the procreative and unitive dimension of the marital act are 
inseparable.559 One cannot have one without the other; if one denies or violates the procreative 
dimension of the marital act, then one also denies or violates the unitive dimension.560 Insofar as 
contraception interrupts the procreative significance of the marital act, it also interrupts the 
unitive significance.561 Moreover, Paul VI rejects any argument that attempts to justify the use of 
contraception based on either its means or end, reaffirming the truth of the Socratic Principle: “it 
is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it.”562 
      Rhonheimer argues that the Moral Object of the contraceptive act violates chastity, 
rooted in the Inseparability Principle.563 He bases his argument in anthropology, that is, human 
nature.564 Human acts are always of a human person, which constitutes both a body and spirit.565  
Rhonheimer rejects any dualistic anthropology that separates acts of the body from the soul.566  
Dualists usually equate the soul with the person and relegate the body to mechanistic 
determinism.567 For Rhonheimer, freedom is a constitutive part of the human act of love, which 
the marital act speaks as the language of the body.568 
      Rhonheimer defends Paul VI’s teaching on the Inseparability Principle, making an 
important distinction between meaning and function.569 To say that every instance of the marital 
act must have the procreative and unitive meaning, or the procreative to have the unitive and visa  
versa, is not to say that each and every act must be functionally procreative, that is giving rise to 
conception.570 For this reason, a couple practicing periodic continence respects and maintains the 
openness to the procreative meaning, even if they know or expect the act not to functionally lead 
to conception. The same may be said of a couple that is unable to conceive because of age or 
sterility. Rhonheimer accuses Noonan of misunderstanding this conceptual distinction, which 
leads Noonan to make room for exceptions.571   
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      For Rhonheimer, the Moral Object concerns choices pertaining to action, which the will 
deliberately chooses.572 In particular, the Moral Object constitutes what one does in an 
intentional sense.573 For this reason, Rhonheimer, following Aquinas, understands the Moral 
Object to be formae a ratione conceptae—a form of a rational concept, that is, a proposal that 
the intellect forms according to reason and presents to the will as a choice.574 Therefore, for 
Rhonheimer the description with intentional content, that is, the Moral Object of the marital act 
is: for a married couple to give themselves with their whole spiritual, affective, emotional, and 
sexual being to loving union, which physically manifests itself in copulation.575 Intentionally, 
this includes openness to the meaning, not necessarily, function of procreation.576 Moreover, 
conceptually, the ends of marriage are unique to the Moral Object of the conjugal act. However, 
in the object of the marital act, the aspect of loving union is the fundamental aspect, which 
implies the procreative meaning, not in a secondary way, but as inseparably connected.577   
      For Rhonheimer, recourse to the Inseparability Principle does not suffice to answer why 
one may not utilize contraception in a particular instance, if as the proportionalists say one is 
fundamentally open to life.578 To explain why each and every instantiation of the marital act 
must be open to the procreative meaning, Rhonheimer correlates responsible parenthood to 
chastity, that is, the virtuous integration of sexual drives into the dominion of reason and will.579 
This is not a matter of repelling or suppressing sensual appetites, rather it means impressing or 
modifying them with the seal of reason.580 For Rhonheimer, responsible parents practicing 
periodic continence to avoid conception do not just commit an act of omission by avoiding 
sexual intercourse during fertile times, but commit a deliberate human act; and therefore, bodily 
and sexual act of loving union that is open to procreation.581 Though their act of refrain does not 
entail sexual intercourse, it nonetheless is sexual and a personal expression of mutual love.  
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     In contrast to periodic continence, contraception enables a couple to avoid pregnancy 
without modifying sexual behavior.582 More precisely, contraception constitutes choosing an act 
that impedes the possible procreative consequences of the sexual act.583 For Rhonheimer, 
contraceptive acts are immoral not merely because they physically impede the possibility of 
procreation, but because they render “needless a specific sexual behavior informed by 
procreative responsibility.”584 Moreover, it constitutes a choice against chastity, insofar as they 
are no longer procreative and need to be under the domain of reason and the will.585 Therefore, 
the Moral Object of contraception constitutes a vice against the virtue of chastity.586   
      Having demonstrated the impact that a personalistic conception of both the Natural Law 
and the Moral Object have for the Catholic Church’s official teaching against contraception, the 
following chapter connects this chapter’s insights on the Moral Object to the Principle of Double 
Effect.  
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CHAPTER THREE – PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT 
      In light of the preceding chapter’s insights on the Natural Law and the Moral Object, this 
chapter analyzes the Principle of Double Effect. The first section traces the Double-Effect 
Reasoning from Thomas Aquinas to Peter Knauer. The second section contrasts a teleological 
construct of Double Effect with non-consequentialist versions. 
3A. Double Effect from Aquinas to Knauer 
i. Aquinas and Double Effect Reasoning  
      Aquinas uses Double-Effect Reasoning in two places in the Summa Theologica.1 First, he 
explains killing in self-defense.2 Second, he shows how one may unintentionally scandalize 
others by alluring dress or spiritual acts.3 In the following, I elucidate several criteria that derive 
from Aquinas’s Double-Effect Reasoning. 
      In the first objection to article seven, Aquinas quotes Augustine’s objection to killing 
another, even in self-defense, except for a soldier or official exercising public office.4 The 
objector implies that one may only kill if one exercises public authority. The following objection 
and the response both qualify the meaning of Augustine’s statement. Moreover, the proper 
meaning of intention gives further weight to Aquinas’s explanation.   
      Intention has several means for Aquinas. Understanding his parsing of the terms in the 
explanation of human action clarifies his use of it in the context of Double-Effect Reasoning. In 
the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae, he distinguishes between intending a remote end 
(finis operantis) versus choosing a proximate end (finis proximus or finis operis).5 The proximate 
end is the Moral Object, while the remote end is the reason one does an act.   
      In agreement with Augustine, Aquinas objects to civilians intending to kill a person either 
as a means or an end. One may not intend to kill another even in self-defense. This is because he 
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objects to doing evil for a good result. This constitutes at least two criteria in the Principle of 
Double Effect. One, the Moral Object of the act must be morally good or neutral. Two, one must 
not intend any evil effects.     
      Aquinas uses praeter intentionem to explain the unintended consequences of an act.6 
Returning to his answer on killing in self-defense, he says that an act may have more than one 
effect not all of which one intends.7 Moreover, actions get their species from intention, not from 
what is beside (praeter intentionem) intention, which is accidental.8 Praeter intentionem is a 
multivalent concept that has several meanings in Aquinas’s corpus. Duarte Sousa-Lara elucidates 
three ways Aquinas uses praeter intentionem, which I explicate in the following.9   
      First, regarding moral actions and intention, he insists that the agent never intends evil 
per se, but praeter intentionem or per accidens. Whenever one commits sin, one chooses a good 
with a privation. The will intends the good per se, but the privation accompanies the good, 
praeter intentionem. Aquinas uses the example of one eating unto death as an analogy for one 
who sins intending a good with an associated evil. Just as the diner chooses, and therefore, 
intends the good pleasure associated with eating, not the premature death due to poor health, so 
he chooses and intends some good in the sin, not the evil.10 The premature death and damage due 
to sin are praeter intentionem. It is only in this sense that one chooses to sin.   
      Second, praeter intentionem refers to an unforeseen effect or a causally chance 
occurrence. Intelligible agents choose what they apprehend. If one errs in apprehension, then one 
errs in choosing and intending. For example, if one chooses to drink fruit punch, but instead 
drinks poison, the evil of consuming poison is not chosen per se, since it is outside of both one’s 
apprehension and intention. The consumption of poison is praeter intentionem. Nonetheless, the 
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evil consequences of consuming poison ensue. The agent did not foresee this. Here, praeter 
intentionem refers to an accidental event in that it is both unforeseen and occurs by chance.   
      Third, praeter intentionem, refers to the foreseeable, yet unintended effects of actions. 
This concerns Double-Effect Reasoning. More specifically, it concerns intention’s moral 
specification of the act. An act receives its species precisely from what the agent intends, not 
from its effects.11 As it pertains to Double-Effect Reasoning and self-defense, one may intend to 
preserve one’s life; however, one’s action may kill the assailant. Insofar as one does not intend 
the latter, it is beside (praeter intentionem) the Moral Object.   
      In addition to the negative effect being praeter intentionem, Aquinas also insists that the 
act of self-defense must be proportionate to the attack.12 By proportionate, Aquinas does not 
mean that the ends must justify the means. He is not saying, weighing all possible outcomes, if 
the remote end is good enough, one may have a proximate end that is immoral. For instance, in a 
hypothetical scenario where a captor threatens to kill five hostages, if one does not kill one 
person in exchange for the five, one may not licitly acquiesce. No matter how many people may 
be saved—five or a hundred—or how menacing the foe one may not justifiably commit an 
intrinsically disordered act. No positive outcome can ever justify one intending an intrinsically 
evil act. For Aquinas, proportionality does not mean a change in intention or the Moral Object. 
      Indirectly, however, the amount of force one uses in self-defense reflects intention, and 
therefore, the Moral Object. In this regard, proportionality is a litmus test for Aquinas. For him, 
if one uses more force than necessary, this indicates that one’s intention is not one of self-
defense, but murder. The proportionality criterion necessitates that the defender not use more 
force than necessary to resist the assailant’s attack. If an assailant attacks with a pillow, it is not 
proportionate to resist with a gun.  
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     Aquinas, following Jerome’s interpretation of Matthew 15:12, asserts that one commits 
scandal when one’s actions or words cause another’s spiritual downfall.13 He distinguishes 
between active and passive scandal.14 Active scandal occurs in the one who commits a sin that 
leads another into sin. Passive scandal occurs in the one led into sin. Ordinarily, active scandal 
leads to passive scandal, but one may resist the temptation to scandal, thereby not sinning. In 
such a case, active scandal exists without passive scandal. It is also possible to have passive 
scandal without active scandal, such as when one’s good deeds are the occasion for another’s 
sin.15 For instance, one moved to envy by another’s charity, is an occasion of passive scandal 
without active scandal.   
     Aquinas divides active scandal into two types: direct and accidental.16 Direct active 
scandal occurs when one intentionally leads another into sin by one’s sinful actions. Accidental 
active scandal occurs when one’s sinful actions unintentionally leads another into sin. In this 
accidental case, the scandal is beside the sinful act. In the following article, Aquinas further 
clarifies that one may commit active scandal by “doing something that has the appearance of 
evil.”17   
      Aquinas uses Double-Effect Reasoning again in his discussion about women wearing 
adorning dress. He acknowledges that women’s dress lead some men to lust; however, he allows 
women to adorn themselves if they intend to please their husbands.18 He says “those women who 
have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are in a state of life inconsistent with marriage,” 
sin if they intend to insight lust in another by their dress.19 Intention is central.   
      Having elucidated Aquinas’s version of Double-Effect Reasoning, the following 
subsection traces its development in his successors.   
ii. Antoninus to Gury 
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     Double-Effect Reasoning evolves through the centuries in articulation and prominence. 
Ironically, as it becomes more prominent, it also diverges more from the principles that 
undergird it. As the role of the Moral Object diminishes, a causal system replaces it. The focus 
shifts from choosing proximate ends to causing effects. This subsection follows the 
chronological development of these trends in the following: Antoninus, Cajetan, Vitoria, Suarez, 
John of Saint Thomas, and Domingo of Saint Teresa.    
     According to T. A. Cavanaugh, Antoninus is the first to advance Aquinas’s use of Double 
Effect.20 In his Summa theologica moralis, Antoninus returns to scandal and alluring dress.21  
Antoninus makes explicit Aquinas’s implicit use of Double Effect to justify women wearing 
alluring dress to please their husbands, but unintentionally scandalizing others.22 For Cavanaugh, 
Antoninus does with Aquinas’s discussion of revealing dress, what Aquinas does with 
Augustine’s killing by self-defense.23 Just as Aquinas permits killing by self-defense under the 
umbrella of Double Effect, so Antoninus permits alluring dress, even if it scandalizes another, so 
long as she only intends to please her husband or to follow the custom of her status or country.24  
Scandal and alluring dress is a hallmark example for discussions on Double-Effect Reasoning.   
      Another Dominican, Tommaso de Vio Gaetani (Cajetan) writes a comprehensive and 
influential commentary on Aquinas’s Summa Theologica in the sixteenth century.25 Joseph T. 
Mangan, in “An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect,” says that for the first 200 
years after Aquinas, no significant development occurs for Double-Effect Reasoning until 
Cajetan’s commentary on the Summa Theologica.26 Cajetan interprets Aquinas’s Double-Effect 
Reasoning in line with contemporary formulations of the Principle of Double Effect.27 Mangan 
interprets Cajetan’s understanding of both the means (finis proximus) and the remote end (finis 
operantis) to simultaneously fall under one intention.28 But he distinguishes the end from the 
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necessary effects of the end. While the end falls under the intention, its effects do not. For killing 
in self-defense, the death of the assailant proceeds from the defensive act necessarily as an effect 
but does not fall under intention either as a means or an end.29   
      Cajetan maintains the distinction in Aquinas between one who intends to kill to save 
one’s life and one who intends self-defense but kills. An important development, however, is the 
awareness of the necessary, causal relationship between the act of self-defense and the death of 
the assailant. In I-II, q. 20, a. 5, Aquinas argues that foreseen consequences do increase the 
goodness or badness of an act.30 Thus one might conclude that it is only when consequences are 
not foreseen that one may refer to them as praeter intentionem.31 Cajetan contests this view in 
his commentary.32 He has no qualms about knowing or foreseeing the death of the attacker in 
self-defense. This does not change the scope of intention over the Moral Object. For Cajetan, 
even though one may know that the act of self-defense is fatal, one may still not intend to kill, 
either as a means or an end.     
      Next, Cajetan broadens the application of Double Effect to include not only self-defense, 
but also defense of temporal possessions and spiritual welfare.33 Just as one has a right to self-
defense, so one has a right to defend necessities of life, if no other means exist. Again, the act is 
one of defense, with the effect of the death of a thief. Moreover, if one can defend physical life 
and property (to the death), then it is all the more important to defend one’s spiritual vitality 
(even to death), especially in light of eternal implications.  
       Cajetan also argues that a judge—personally knowing a man to be innocent—ought to 
condemn him to death, if the public evidence convicts him.34Aquinas argues that a judge, acting 
as a public person may only use the knowledge available to her as a public person.35 She does 
not intend to kill, but acting in the confines of the office, she sentences him to death.   
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      Cajetan’s monumental commentary on Aquinas’s Summa Theologica transfers the 
hermeneutic of theology from commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences to Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologica.36 The Dominican, Francisco de Vitoria, follows Cajetan’s lead as department chair 
of theology at the University of Salamanca. With regard to foreknowledge of the death of an 
assailant, Vitoria applies a distinction between choosing and intending to Double Effect, which 
Aquinas and Cajetan avoid. Mangan emphasizes the importance of a correct understanding of 
intention for a proper interpretation of Aquinas’s Double Effect.37 He argues that his Jesuit 
counterpart, Vincente M. Alonso, limits the scope of intention solely to the reach of the remote 
end, whereas Aquinas utilizes a broader sense for intention that includes the proximate end as 
well.38 John Finnis, in Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, highlights the difference 
between the narrow and broad sense of intention.39 Generally speaking, the object of choice 
corresponds to the means, while the object of intention corresponds to the remote end, but for II -
II, q. 64, a. 7, Aquinas uses the broader sense of intention.40 In the footnote, Finnis points the 
reader to Aquinas’s De Malo to illustrate this broader sense of intention, which Aquinas applies 
to Double-Effect Reasoning.41 In De Malo, Aquinas offers a hypothetical scenario of one 
choosing to steal from the rich to give to the poor.42 He argues that while the person may intend 
good, he wills evil. Thus, he concludes, “if we should understand the will by intention, so that we 
call the whole, both the end intended and the deed willed, the intention, the intention also will be 
evil.”43 For this reason, Aquinas specifically denies one the possibility of intending to kill 
another, even for the purpose of self-defense. 
      Since Vitoria maintains the distinction between choice and intention, he argues that one 
may will to kill an attacker in self-defense, but one may not intend to kill him as an end for one’s 
action.44 Analogously Vitoria uses the example of a sick man amputating his arm to save his life.  
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The man intends to save his life choosing to amputate his arm as a means to good health.45 The 
analogy, however, does not hold, because amputating one’s arm is a neutral act. Choosing to kill 
another, either as a means or an end is not neutral, but intrinsically immoral. Aquinas’s broader 
sense of intention that includes both the means and the end precludes Vitoria’s move to justify 
the means by the ends. What exempts the death of an assailant from moral guilt is that it is 
beyond the scope of the intention and will altogether, which is precisely what praeter 
intentionem means.  
     Twenty years after Vitoria’s death in 1546, Francisco Suarez begins studies in theology at 
the University of Salamanca. Whereas Vitoria neglects the morality of the proximate end for 
sake of the ultimate end, permitting one to choose to kill an assailant, Suarez eliminates 
discussion of the proximate end altogether. In addition, he introduces vocabulary that opens the 
door further to causal morality. Sousa-Lara translates Suarez’s words.46 Suarez concedes that if 
one kills another unintentionally, then one is not guilty of per se direct, voluntary homicide, 
which means the act is not voluntary in the absolute sense.47 However, as to the cause-effect 
relationship, that is, insofar as it is known that one’s action causes the death of another, Suarez 
asserts that it is indirectly voluntary, which remains true even if the effect follows per se from 
the cause.48 Where the death is accidental, in that it is not foreseen, he argues that it is not 
voluntary.  
     Suarez’s use of ‘indirect voluntary’ is not consistent with Aquinas, who uses indirect 
voluntary to describe willing by omission.49 For instance, if one willfully chooses not to save a 
person’s life when it is within one’s power to do so, then one kills by omission. The inactive 
willing is what Aquinas means by indirect voluntary, but this is not what Suarez means. In fact, 
Suarez and other commentators develop Aquinas’s notion of indirect willing to include positive 
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acts as well as acts of omission. Afterwards, they apply indirect willing to cases of Double 
Effect, with the implication that indirect willing is synonymous with praeter intentionem.   
      In Aquinas, indirect voluntary connotes culpability, since it is by means of the will 
choosing not to act that one commits a sin. However, Suarez and others remove culpability, but 
maintain an extrinsic connection to the will. What he says regarding the unintended killing of 
another in self-defense illustrates this point: “It is confirmed, on the other hand, that it is 
voluntary only in its cause, it is only indirectly voluntary, even if the effect follows necessarily 
(per se) from that cause.”50 For Aquinas, however, so long as the will connects with the act, 
culpability abides.  Praeter intentionem means that the will in no way intends or chooses the evil 
effect; thus removing moral culpability.   
     In addition to substituting indirect voluntary for praeter intentionem and maintaining a 
connection of the will to the effect, Suarez also eliminates discussion of the proximate end.  
Without any consideration for the proximate end, the first-person perspective of choice that 
constitutes an action as voluntary, is lost. The movement of the will as intention and choice give 
an external act its moral character. The movement of the will is by definition an internal act, 
which can only be known from within the person. By eliminating consideration of the proximate 
end, Suarez pushes morality outside the soul into the natural sphere. Consequently, acts are 
merely causes chosen for their effects.   
      According to Aquinas, one may consider one act in two ways: the natural order and the 
moral order. Insofar as an act causes an effect that has a corresponding order or disorder in the 
natural order it is good or evil on that level. However, for an act to be evil on the moral level, one 
must will it as such.51 Recall the above example of unknowingly, and unwillingly consuming 
poison. An evil on the natural order occurs, but since one does not will it, it is not a moral evil.  
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     Recall from the previous chapter that Aquinas considers two movements of the will: 
intending and choosing. By intending, the will has as its object an end. Intention guides 
choosing. By choosing, the will selects a particular Moral Object, and then commands a specific 
external act. Rationally ordered to its end, the will commands external acts by means of the 
choice. The object of the choice is the proximate end that intention and the remote end formally 
configure, as form to matter in such a way that the will commits one act through intention and 
choice.   
     By way of example, if one kills an assailant, as an outside observer, one does not 
necessarily know the agent’s intention. The external act of self-defense in its purely natural 
sense—materia ex qua—may look no different than one choosing to kill the assailant. Only the 
perspective of the acting person reveals the will. By means of self-revelation, various scenarios 
may arise. One, it may become apparent that the agent fully intends to kill the assailant, 
regardless of self-defense. Two, the agent may intend to kill the agent, as a means to self-
defense, something which Vitoria and many other commentators have no problem with, but that 
Aquinas detests as immoral. Three, the agent may intend to protect one’s self using proportionate 
means, that one may or may not foresee leading to the death of the assailant. The first example 
differs from the latter two in that the proximate end is murder, not self-defense. Without an 
appreciation for the proximate end, the difference between scenarios two and three obfuscates. 
Only the first-person perspective reveals the proximate end.     
      J. Ghoos, in “L’Act a Double Effet Ètude de Théologie Positive,” insists that John of 
Saint Thomas (John Poinsot) is the first to put the full version of Double Effect into written form 
in his treatise on the fundamentals of moral theology, published posthumously in 1645.52 
Cavanaugh speculates that Suarez had little influence on Poinsot.53 Poinsot restricts morality to 
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the realm of freedom, both of which he limits to the internal act of intention that he defines as an 
act of the will.54 Unlike Aquinas, however, he argues that external acts have no intrinsic 
freedom, since the will does not govern them.55 As such, external acts are also devoid of intrinsic 
moral quality, but only have it by analogy, in virtue of intention.56 With so much focus on 
intention, which includes the ultimate end, morality becomes more about causing acts for their 
effects. Ghoos illustrates this inclination by explicating the inchoate criteria of Double Effect in 
Poinsot’s writing. First, one must not intend the harmful consequences.57 Two, the bad effect 
cannot be the proper effect of the intentional object.58 Three, the good effect must offset the 
negative.59 As with Suarez, Poinsot has no account for the distinction between the proximate and 
remote end. Acts are about causing effects. Like his predecessors, he applies Double Effect to 
new and old examples: a butcher selling meat to a Jew who uses it for idolatrous worship; a 
priest who distributes communion to one having made a sacrilegious confession; and killing in 
self-defense.60   
     Mangan, argues that Domingo de Saint Teresa writes the most important articulation of 
the Principle of Double Effect in his Treatise on Sin in the 1647 Carmelite publication of Cursus 
Theologicus.61 The Salmanticenses use four criteria of Double Effect to justify situations of illicit 
sensual pleasure.62 Domingo maintains the causal language dividing the principles between 
causes per se and causes per accidens. The first assertion prohibits causes per se that have only 
unlawful effects or bring about good effects only as a consequence of the unlawful effect.63 The 
second assertion permits causes per se that have an evil effect, if and only if, the good effect is 
either simultaneous to or precedes the evil effect.64 Third, there must be a proportionately good 
reason for performing the act that cannot otherwise be avoided and one must not be able to 
prevent the evil effect.65 Finally, they advise one to weigh the act in relationship to the virtues 
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that it opposes.66 Not all virtues oblige in the same way. If act conforms to a virtue higher than 
the evil effect it opposes, one may commit it.   
     Aquinas’s successors broaden the application of Double Effect; eliminate the distinction 
between the proximate and remote end; and externalize moral deliberation. The following 
subsection examines a manualist’s construct of the Principle of Double Effect.   
iii. Jean Pierre Gury 
     Mangan argues that Jean Pierre Gury is the first to articulate the Principle of Double 
Effect as a theory applicable to the rest of moral theology in his Compendium theologiae 
moralis.67 Christopher Kaczor, in “Double Effect Reasoning from Jean Pierre to Peter Knauer,” 
indicates that many consider Gury to be the leading casuist of the 19th century.68 Because of his 
important role in Catholic moral theology, and his development of the Principle of Double 
Effect, this subsection explicates his version. In particular, it highlights the implications of 
Gury’s cause-effect morality in contrasts to Aquinas’s intention-focused morality. Gury 
publishes the first of 17 editions in his lifetime of the Compendium in 1850.69 I use the 17th 
edition since it presumably represents his most mature formulation.70  
     In the first tractatus, De Actibus Humanis, Gury discusses human acts and willing. Here, 
he explicates the Principle of Double Effect in number nine of chapter 2.71 First, recalling 
Aquinas’s Summa II-II, q. 64, a. 7, he argues that it is morally permissible for there to be a 
situation where two effects follow immediately from a good or indifferent cause, one good and 
the other truly bad, if there is a grave reason, and the end of the agent is honorable.72 Unlike 
Aquinas, but very much like his causal predecessors, Gury identifies human acts as posited or 
actualized causes.73 This concise statement says a lot in just a few words. First, if one concedes 
that positing causes is at least analogous to intending ends, then like Aquinas, Gury argues that 
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some causes are good or indifferent in themselves—and conversely, some are intrinsically evil—
independent of the end of the agent. Given the complexity of the world, he, like Aquinas 
recognizes that multiple effects may proceed from any given cause (or act), some good and some 
bad. Third, not all of these are intended equally. Indeed, for Aquinas, some may not be intended 
at all. Fourth, the immediate following of the effects indicates that the good and bad effects are 
causally independent. In other words, the bad effect does not cause the good effect. Fifth, he 
holds that a grave reason must proportionately justify positing the cause in light of the evil effect. 
Put another way, the good effect needs to outweigh the bad effect. Finally, he insists that the 
agent must not intend the bad, but the good effect.   
      Similar to an argument reductio ad absurdum, Gury logically reasons that the above 
statement must be true, otherwise one would be sinning by: one, intending the bad effect; two, by 
positing the cause itself; or three, by foreseeing the evil effect.74 Regardless of how good the end 
is for which one acts, the act would be unlawful simply because of the evil effect. Two, 
regardless of the intrinsic moral quality of the act, the evil effect means that one sins simply by 
positing it. Three, if one foresees that an evil effect will occur, then the act is definitely sinful. 
All of these absurd conclusions are true if the criteria of the Principle of Double Effect are not 
true. Therefore, in order to avoid this absurd reduction to sin, they must be true.   
      Notice that the above conditions essentially reduce morality to a form of 
consequentialism. Cconsequentialist ethical theories run aground of rendering all of the above 
conditions true. If one only considers consequences, then only effects matter. Such ethical 
theories externalize acts rooting moral quality in consequences. If an action leads to a negative 
consequence, then it is sinful and ought not to be done. This is truer if one foresees evil effect. 
The only thing that saves a consequentialist theory from absurdity is the criteria of 
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proportionality that capriciously weighs effects against effects. This is the basis of Gury’s fourth 
criterion.   
     Gury explains why each of the absurd conclusions is false in the first of two etenim. One, 
since the end is good, it is not on account of it that the act is unlawful.75 Two, since the cause is 
good or indifferent, positing it does not render the act unlawful.76 Gury relies on more than 
effects to justify his ethical theory. Three, foreseeing the evil effect does not render it immoral, 
because it is at least offset by the good.77 Mangan, following the fifth German edition translates 
this as “not on account of the foreseeing of the evil effect, because in the hypothesis the evil 
effect is not intended but merely permitted.”78 Apparently, later editors alter this third criterion 
according to a distinction between permitting evil versus intending evil. Permitting still has a 
connotation of willing. Aquinas’s praeter intentionem is completely separate from the will, 
thereby exonerating the agent of any culpability. Fourth, where the bad does not overpower the 
good, one has a right to obtain a good end from the honorable cause.79 In summary, he insists 
that all four of the above conditions of Double Effect must hold: 1) the end of the agent must be 
honorable; 2) the cause of the effects must be good or at least indifferent; 3) the evil effect must 
not be the means to the good effect; and 4) there must be a proportionately serious reason for 
positing the cause that does not contradict an obligation of virtue such as justice or charity.80   
      Finally, in the second entenim, Gury explains each of the four conditions in greater detail.  
First, the end of the agent must be good; one must not intend the bad effect, otherwise one sins.81 
As with Vitoria and Suarez, the broader sense of intention, that includes the proximate end, is 
lost. The proximate end is entirely assumed into the remote end.      
      Second, Gury insists that the cause must be good or at least indifferent, that is as an act it 
must not oppose any law.82 Obviously, if the cause is evil in itself, the action is imputable to the 
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agent as a fault.83 Again, the concept of the will choosing a Moral Object (proximate end) is lost. 
Gury replaces this with the positing of external causes. The causes externally imposed laws. 
There is no sense that the will chooses rationally ordered object of the moral order; rather, one 
posits a cause in natural order. While intrinsically evil acts may exist, they exist externally to the 
soul. Understood as causes, acts follow laws on the natural order discoverable through trial and 
error. Constituting moral theology externally, he lays the foundation for teleological ethical 
theories.    
      Third, the bad effect must not be the means to the good effect, since this is causing an 
evil effect for the sake of a good effect.84 For Gury, actions involve causing effects. Sometimes 
effects cause other effects. As such, one must not cause an evil effect for the good effect that 
results. Gury’s causal expression fails to encapsulate Aquinas’s prohibition of choosing evil 
means for a good end. This is because, for Aquinas, the Moral Object is not merely an external 
effect, but an object of the moral order that the will deliberately chooses.   
       Fourth, Gury argues that the positive effects must proportionately outweigh the negative 
to justify actuating the cause.85 Kaczor astutely notes that for Aquinas the law of proportion 
regarding Double Effect weighs the act in relationship to the end, while Gury weighs effects to 
effects.86 Recall that for killing in self-defense, the question is about the means chosen to repel 
an attacker. If the attacker is using deadly force, then one may justifiably choose deadly means 
for self-defense; not, however, to justify choosing the evil of murdering an assailant. According 
to Gury, the implication is that so long as the good effect (staying alive) outweighs the negative 
effect (death of the assailant), one may justifiably kill the attacker.   
     Gury’s formulation of the Principle of Double Effect is the culmination of his 
predecessors’ casuistic and causal morality. Like Suarez, he abandons the distinction between the 
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proximate ends and ultimate end. His construct maintains the cause-effect terminology of 
Domingo de St. Teresa. Since willing is about positing causes, he inadvertently equals laws of 
morality with laws of nature and shifts the focus of moral decision making to the perspective of 
the outside observer. Finally, his understanding of proportionality, which constitutes the 
weighing of effects paves the way for Peter Knauer’s proportionalism, which the following 
subsection discusses.   
iv. Peter Knauer  
     Peter Knauer, in “The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect,” says that 
the Principle of Double Effect is not only an important principle for morality, but also the most 
fundamental of all the principles of moral theology.87 His paper is groundbreaking because it 
represents the inauguration of proportionalism, an important movement in moral theology that 
peaks in the late twentieth century under the advocacy of the American theologian Richard 
McCormick, before Pope John Paul II condemns it in Veritatis Splendor.88 This subsection 
elucidates Knauer’s articulation of Double Effect and its subsequent role in proportionalism.   
      Knauer argues that the ‘simply good’ or a physical goodness desirable in itself is 
precisely what is morally good too.89 He holds that the will intends the ‘simply good,’ distinct 
from any evil.90 Obviously, evil constitutes part of reality, but one does not will evil directly, but 
only in association with some good.91 Like his predecessors, he explains human action in terms 
of cause and effect.  Similar to Gury, he also uses the concept of permitting evil effects. Since 
actions cause good or evil, Double Effect aids one in justifying the causing of evil effects.   
      Knauer, attempting to avoid modernist tendencies of relativism that subjective arbitration 
risks, attributes an objective morality to Aquinas. He sees a direct correlation between what one 
intends and the external world in which acts produce effects. For this reason, he argues that the 
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Moral Object (proximate end) is ‘the end of the work’ (finis operis), also the effect of the act in 
the world.92 Knauer equates the effect with the Moral Object.93  
     Knauer realizes that for an action to be moral there must be some connection between it 
and the will or intention, otherwise one simply identifies the effect with the external, physical 
act.94 Intention morally qualifies act. But it must be objectively grounded; so, he roots the good 
(or evil) of an intention in the physical, external world. He says, “all physical evils which are not 
justified, and which arise in pursuit of a value, are in the moral sense eo ipso morally intended 
and belong to the finis operis itself.” In other words, the will intends physical evil in the world.   
      Knauer maintains this position, not only to objectively ground morality, but also because 
he believes that a consistent reading of Aquinas demands it. He refers the reader to I-II, q. 1, a. 3 
and to I-II, q. 18. 95 In I-II, q. 1, a. 3, Aquinas says that acts receive their species from their end.96 
He further indicates that only acts proceeding from a deliberate will are human.97 In addition, the 
object of the will is the good and the end, but the end is the principle of human acts.98   
      In the answer, Aquinas does not explicitly specify the nature of the end. Since the 
discussion of passions and heat immediately precedes his discussion of human acts, it is 
understandable how one could interpret ends physically. But Aquinas, referring the reader to the 
first article, clearly distinguishes purely physical, involuntary acts from distinctly human acts 
that proceed from the deliberate will.99 If this is not enough, he eliminates further confusion in 
his response to the second objection, when he says, “the end, insofar as it pre-exists in the 
intention, pertains to the will.”100 That is, the ends of human acts originate in the will. Therefore, 
the disorder of an intrinsically evil act corresponds more to a privation in the deliberate act of the 
will, than any evil effect in the world. Basing morality in the subject person does not detract 
from the objectivity of Aquinas’s ethical theory, since he roots it both in Natural Law and the 
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human person. It does, however, mean that the moral order is not the same as, nor derivative of 
the natural order.  
        Regarding the role of the remote end (finis operantis), Knauer insists that it too must not 
merely be in the will, but must correspond to the external end.101 What has been said above in 
this subsection regarding ends of the will and the broad sense of intention in response to Vitoria 
in the second subsection, suffices to clarify that moral ends are not derivative of the natural 
order, but the moral order. Moreover, moral ends do not depend so much on their external effects 
as the orientation of the will.  
      Because of the strong correlation between the effects of an act and the intention of the 
will, Knauer equates the proportion of the intention of the act to the end in Aquinas to the 
contemporary formulation of commensurate reason.102 Since Knauer equates the object of 
intention with effects, he like Gury considers the criterion of proportion to be about the weighing 
of effects, not the proportioning of intention to a remote end, as a good rationally ordered by the 
intellect and intended by the will. Knauer asserts “that an evil effect is not ‘directly intended’ 
only if there is a ‘commensurate reason’ for the act.”103 Put another way, one may cause an evil 
effect if there is a commensurate reason.104   
      Knauer links his distinction between direct and indirect to three other aspects of 
traditional moral theology: 1) formal and material cooperation in evil; 2) intrinsic and extrinsic 
acts; and 3) negative and affirmative laws. He argues that once one applies the Principle of 
Double Effect to the formal and material cooperation in evil the distinction between the two 
becomes the same as direct and indirect, respectively.105 While formal cooperation in evil always 
constitutes a direct willing of evil, where commensurate reason abides material cooperation in 
evil constitutes indirect willing of evil.106   
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      Knauer makes a distinction between intrinsically evil acts and extrinsically evil acts. He 
claims that intrinsically evil acts are always forbidden, while he permits extrinsically evil acts 
where there is commensurate reason.107 By intrinsically evil acts, Knauer does not mean the 
same thing as Aquinas. For Aquinas, intrinsically evil reflects a disorder in the will’s intending 
of a proximate end that can never be rationally ordered to the good. For Knauer, the only 
difference between the two is that an intrinsically evil act constitutes an extrinsically evil act 
without a commensurate reason.108 With the application of Double Effect or commensurate 
reason, the distinction between the two reduces to the difference between direct and indirect 
causing of effects.   
      Finally, Knauer argues that the difference between a negative law and an affirmative law 
consists in its obligation to the agent. He insists that negative laws are always obligatory, no 
matter what, whereas, affirmative laws are obligatory, unless one has a commensurate reason not 
to obey them.109 Relating these to causality, he asserts whenever one violates a negative law, one 
directly causes evil, which is always prohibited.110 However, one may licitly violate the 
affirmative law causing evil indirectly, if one has a commensurate reason.111 Regarding natural 
law, he argues that the only unchanging norm is the obligation “to seek the best possible 
solutions in their total existential entirety.”112 This clearly links Natural Law and morality to the 
natural order through effects.   
     Ultimately, for Knauer, the Principle of Double Effect “means that to cause or permit an 
evil without commensurate reason is a morally bad act.”113 Without a commensurate reason, the 
evil is no longer accidental to the intention of the person, but becomes the Moral Object.114  
Whenever a commensurate reason exists, it occupies the place of the Moral Object and alone 
determines the moral quality of the act.115 To illustrate he argues that when killing in self-
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defense, the commensurate reason constitutes self-defense. Knauer insists that a commensurate 
reason is not just any reason whatsoever, but must outweigh the evil in exchange for the good in 
such a way that it is not contrary to nature.116 Whenever one wills evil directly, that is without a 
commensurate reason, one intents something in such a way that it cannot be achieved according 
to nature. This is precisely what constitutes sin as being contrary to nature. In other words, one 
permits or causes a physical evil, without a commensurate reason.  
     Several things are apparent from the above discussion regarding Double Effect and 
commensurate reason. According to Knauer, moral quality derives from the natural order as an 
effect, which constitutes the Moral Object. Furthermore, whenever a commensurate reason 
exists, evil is accidental or caused indirectly, which is what he means by praeter intentionem. 
This is contrary to Aquinas’s understanding of praeter intentionem that means outside the will 
altogether. For Aquinas, one does not will the evil at all, either directly or indirectly.   
     By rooting moral quality exclusively in the end, either as effect or commensurate reason, he 
affirms that ends do justify means. This is the hallmark of proportionalism. So long as one has a 
sufficient reason, one may use any means to achieve one’s end. Indeed, he rejects ethical theories 
that render an act evil merely because of means.117 If the means are not good enough, it is simply 
because one does not have a commensurate reason.118 With sufficient commensurate reason, one 
can justify the causing of virtually any evil. For this reason, proportionalists, like Knauer deny 
Aquinas’s version of intrinsically evil acts.  
     In summary, like his predecessors, Knauer maintains the external orientation of the action 
with a focus on direct and indirect causing/permitting of effects. Moreover, to maintain 
objectivity, he grounds morality in the natural order. He dissolves the distinction between the 
proximate and the remote end with his proportionality criterion that justifies the any means for a 
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good end. The following section contrasts the proportionalist’s version of the Principle of Double 
Effect with that of non-consequentialists. 
3B. Contemporary Formulations of the Principle of Double Effect 
     In Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II rejects components of teleological ethical 
theories including proportionalism.119 This section explores contemporary formulations and 
applications of Double Effect by several authors. First, it explicates John Finnis, Germain Grisez 
and Joseph Boyle’s use of Double Effect in defense of craniotomy in “‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’: A 
Reply to Critics of our Action Theory.”120 Second, it highlights the distinction between intending 
and foreseeing, which T. A. Cavanaugh, following G. E. M. Anscombe argues is a difference 
between practical and speculative knowledge, respectively.121 Third, it explores several practical 
applications including: euthanasia/terminal sedation, terror bombing/tactical bombing, and 
craniotomy/hysterectomy.   
i. Finnis, Grisez and Boyle: Defending Craniotomy 
      Finnis et al., in “‘Direct’ and ‘indirect’: a Reply to Critics of Our Action Theory,” offer 
eight cases that illustrate the intuitive veracity of their action theory, which incorporates the 
perspective of the acting person, in common language.122 Next, they offer a proper account for 
the role of intention with regard to the perspective of the acting person.123 Finally, they 
demonstrate how this perspective may justify a physician performing a craniotomy.124    
a. Eight Cases that Illustrate Intention 
      Finnis et al. use eight cases to show that intention, and therefore, the perspective of the 
acting human person is important for moral determination.125 The first case consists of a boy who 
decides to forgo his lunch, choosing instead, to buy a toy airplane with his lunch money.126 This 
first case demonstrates that action consists of a choice for a particular proposal among several 
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options.127 Here, the boy, both intends to carry out the chosen proposal, and to attain the purpose 
of the act.128 By choosing to the buy the airplane instead of lunch, he experiences hunger.129 But 
he does not intend the hunger; rather, he tolerates it as an unintended side effect.130 This shows 
that actions often have unintended consequences.131   
      In the second case, a patient succumbs to a rare, but fatal side effect of his blood pressure 
medication.132 This illustrates that one does not necessarily intend bad side effects, even when 
one foresees and causes them through one’s actions.133 In the third case, a man chooses to drive 
home drunk, rather than to take a cab or stay at his friend’s house; consequently, he hits and kills 
a bystander.134 This demonstrates that even though one may not intend negative side effects, one 
can still be morally responsible for them.135 The fourth case, a stuttering witness testifying on 
behalf of a defendant, demonstrates that one’s behavior in acting may constitute a side effect 
preceding both one’s intended action and purpose.136   
      The fifth example, a farmer castrating bulls to fatten them up, shows that observable 
context is not enough to determine what a person is actually intending to do.137 As an outside 
observer, one may conclude that the farmer is sterilizing the bulls for the purpose of making 
them infertile. Only the perspective of the acting person determines whether a consequence 
constitutes a side effect or the purpose for one’s action.138 The sixth case, upsetting the minority 
by commending an unpopular outgoing president, shows that even when one’s behavior 
constitutes the choosing, doing and purpose of an act, there may be side effects distinct from 
it.139   
      The seventh example consists of a company director choosing when to halt production to 
retool, based on both a slight financial gain and the ability to undermine unionization.140 This 
shows that foreseen effects may not be the reason one chooses, even when doing so looks no 
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different from the outside.141 Finally, the eighth case is a spy who kills his beloved guest for the 
purpose of silencing her.142 Although the spy kills the guest for the purpose of silencing her, this 
ulterior motive does not detract from the fact that he intends and chooses to kill her. This 
highlights the important perspective of the acting person, which indicates what the person 
intends by an action.143  
      Finnis et al. conclude that the above examples demonstrate the important role of intention 
from the first-person perspective. Moreover, although the emphasis in ethics and law denigrates 
its significances as of late, it remains, as it has throughout history, an important component for 
moral decision-making.144 Unfortunately, Bentham’s utilitarianism conflates what one foresees 
with what one intends.145 Finnis et al. refer the reader to contemporary jurisprudence that 
maintains a distinction between intended and unintended actions.146 That is not the same as 
saying that there are no consequences for one’s actions, if the consequences are not intended. 
The third case of the drunk driver killing a pedestrian proves this.147 
b. Perspective of the Acting Person 
      Finnis et al. demonstrate the importance of the perspective of the acting human person for 
an adequate account of Aquinas’s action theory that also conforms to John Paul II’s critique of 
proportionalism and defense of the Moral Object in Veritatis Splendor.148 Following the 
perspective of the manualists and Enlightenment philosophers, proportionalists continue to focus 
on the third-person perspective regarding morality.149 As the above cases demonstrate, the 
observer’s perspective does not adequately account for intention, especially regarding the Moral 
Object. In the previous section, I highlight a distinction between the broad and narrow sense for 
intention that Finnis elucidates in his reading of Aquinas’s De Malo.150 The broad sense of 
intention includes both the proximate end and the ultimate end; however, more narrowly 
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understood, it constitutes only the ultimate end.151 Much confusion arises from the failure to 
distinguish between the broad and narrow understanding of intention. Finnis et al. indicate that in 
Veritatis Splendor, John Paul II uses the term intention in the narrow sense.152   
      In the broad sense of the interpretation, intention is important insofar as the Moral Object 
constitutes the willing or intending of a means for an end. The Moral Object that one wills is 
what the person chooses through a deliberate will.153 Only the perspective of the acting person 
enables one to identify the Moral Object, which is the primary determinant of an acts morality.154 
Actions that have a Moral Object contrary to the good constitute intrinsically evil acts or 
exceptionless, non-tautological negative norms.155   
      Finnis, in Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth explains Aquinas’s defense of 
exceptionless moral norms.156 Augustine, in Contra mendacium argues that there are at least two 
exceptionless moral norms: lying about the faith—even to catch heretics—and adultery.157 In 
response to this, Peter Abelard argues that the moral quality of an act depends entirely on 
intention.158 Perhaps inadvertently, readers accuse him of denying the existence of intrinsically 
evil acts.159 For instance, Peter Lombard, in his Sentences argues that certain acts are wrong in 
themselves (mala in se) precisely because they do not depend on the purpose, will, intention or 
motivation of the acting person.160 In his commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas argues that 
intrinsically evil acts are wrong precisely because of the acting person’s will, intention and 
purpose.161 Even if the intentions and circumstances are good, the object can be wrong insofar as 
the will’s choosing of it is wrong.162 For instance, lying to catch a thief is wrong because one 
cannot deliberately will or choose to lie in a good way.   
      Intention, understood in the broad sense, includes both, the choosing of a Moral Object 
(proximate end), and the intending of an end (remote end); the difference being one of proximity 
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to the acting agent.163 Insofar as one chooses a particular action for a given end, the former 
constitutes the proximate end, while the latter is the ulterior (or remote) end.164 Although there 
may be no chronological distinction between an agent’s choosing a proximate end and intending 
an ulterior end, the former has greater proximity to the agent, insofar as the will deliberately 
chooses that action.165 In this sense, the proximate end acts as a means to the ulterior end.166 If 
the proximate end violates an exceptionless moral norm, then it’s object is immoral and ought 
not to be done. Moreover, the quality of the ulterior end or circumstances cannot change this.  
c. Debunking Unsound Arguments against Craniotomies 
      Having established the use of intention according to their action theory, Finnis et al. 
utilize it to debunk so-called unsound arguments against craniotomies.167 In particular, they 
reject the cause-effect approach to morality that presumes a third-person perspective.168 To this 
end, they reject seven traditional arguments against craniotomies.169 First, they rebuff the 
argument that a craniotomy just is killing a baby, precisely because this presumes an outsider’s 
perspective, constitutive of the cause-effect approach to morality.170 Such an argument presumes 
that the species of the act consists of the natural order; however, Aquinas specifically places the 
character of the moral act in the moral order.171 Second, they reject any claim that “since the 
procedure alone does not help the mother, it may not be done,” since such an assertion, once 
again, restricts morality to the physical domain.172 Third, the physical dissimilarity to removing a 
gravid uterus is not enough to constitute an ethical difference.173 Alternatively, the physical 
similarity to partial-birth abortion, does not render the proposal the same.174 The permissibility of 
an alternate procedure that squeezes the skull without crushing it, points to the fact that the 
physical act alone does not characterize the object.175 While alternatives, allowing the mother 
and child both to die and the death of the child through craniotomy are repugnant; Finnis et al. 
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argue that the exceptionless moral norm prohibiting the killing of the innocent does not exclude 
craniotomies.176   
      Finally, Finnis et al. assert that just because a procedure cannot be safely taught or done 
does not mean that it is immoral.177 For clarity, however, they accept the Church’s teaching 
against the direct killing of the unborn.178 They argue, however, that a craniotomy does not 
constitute direct killing.179 Moreover, one may assert that craniotomies are immoral, but they 
insist, not because it constitutes direct killing.180 
d. Defending Craniotomies 
     Next, Finnis et al. rebut an argument which Kevin F. Flannery makes asserting two 
physical differences between a hysterectomy of a pregnant woman with uterine cancer versus a 
craniotomy.181 First, the physician performs the hysterectomy on the woman, and the craniotomy 
on the child.182 Second, descriptively, the hysterectomy does not necessitate the death of the 
child according to its definition, while the craniotomy does. To the first objection, Finnis et al. 
argue that direct physical action does not entail direct killing of the innocent, as countless 
examples indicate.183 For instance, in self-defense, the defendant may kill the assailant using 
direct physical means, but this does not equate to direct killing of the innocent as the adopted 
moral proposal. Regarding the second, they insist that what counts for moral analysis is content 
of the proposal the agent actually adopts, not what an outside observer may ascribe to it.184 
Accordingly, they assert that their description of a craniotomy does not include killing a baby.185   
       In “Natural Law mens rea versus the Benthamite Tradition,” Flannery says that 
performing a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman’s cancerous womb needlessly early changes 
the act to direct killing.186 Finnis et al., however, insist that although failing to wait a few weeks 
to save the baby constitutes an injustice to the baby and homicide, it does not then become direct 
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killing.187 Similarly, a bomber proposing to explode an aircraft in flight to collect insurance on 
the aircraft kills the passengers only indirectly.188 They contend that asserting that neither case 
constitutes direct killing does not detract from the grave moral wrongness of the acts.189 
       Finnis et al. refute the allegation that their moral theory depends on the criterion of the 
indivisibility of performance, which Jean Porter concludes is of central importance for them in 
“‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’ in Grisez’s Moral Theory.”190 Recalling the rebuttal to the second 
illusory argument in section III—crushing the skull alone does not suffice, but that removal of 
the body must follow—they reiterate the insignificance of the inseparability of the primitive or 
physical act.191 Again, what matters for the moral determination of the act is what one actually 
proposes as a means to one’s end, not what one could propose.192 Porter argues that the weakness 
of their action theory is the inability to actually know what the agent is, in fact, choosing.193 
Indeed, such a weakness, she argues, enables one to substitute motives after the fact.194 For 
Finnis et al., the apparent lack of objective from the third-person perspective, does not equate to 
an actual lack of objectivity.195 Regardless of what may be ascribed by one’s self or an outside 
observer after the fact, the means chosen at the time of deliberation objectively are what they are; 
and the conscience of the agent testifies to this.196 Moreover, in contrast to what Porter infers on 
Grisez, namely that the intention be understood psychologically and logically, they assert that 
both are irrelevant since the object chosen constitutes a proposition rationally configured to some 
intended good end.197 While emotions motivate, they do not constitute what one actually does, 
which is a product of practical reason.198   
      Using the example of killing in self-defense and euthanasia, Porter reveals her inability to 
distinguish between the intended end and the accepted side effects.199 Indeed, the statement 
regarding self-defense, “attempt to kill again,” and the example of a physician’s botched attempt 
 
 140 
to euthanize a patient, indicate that the respective agents actually chose an immoral means from 
the beginning, namely to kill.200 What makes killing in self-defense permissible is precisely the 
agent’s intent not to kill, but defend one’s self, even if one foresees the death of the agent. 
Likewise, intention distinguishes euthanasia from sedation to relieve pain that expedites the 
dying process. In both cases, death constitutes an unintended side effect, not the end for one’s 
action.   
      Finnis et al., utilizing an action theory based on perspective of the acting person, defend 
their view that the object of the act in performing a craniotomy does not constitute direct killing, 
but the reducing the dimensions of the cranium, of the child, which indirectly or unintentionally 
leads to the death of the child. They contend that their opponents’ failure to grasp the soundness 
of their argument constitutes an inability to understand the complexity of their theory. Two 
errors stand out, one, they reduce the means to the external, physical act alone, or two, they fail 
to differentiate the object from the unintended side effects. The following explores the intended 
versus the foreseen in greater deal from the perspective of T. A. Cavanaugh. 
ii. A Thomistic Response to Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle 
      T. A. Cavanaugh in, Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil, addresses 
Finnis et al.’s perspective on craniotomies.201 Essentially, Cavanaugh argues that their inability 
to arrive at the conclusion that craniotomies constitute direct killing amounts to relegating the 
moral realm to the conceptual realm to such a degree that not only is each person’s moral 
deliberation incommunicable, but a disconnect exists between the mind and the external 
world.202 Cavanaugh asserts that they fall victim to H. L. A. Hart’s critique of rendering what 
constitutes a contingent connection merely conceptual.203 In his discussion regarding self-
defense, Aquinas says, “An act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the 
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end.”204 By implication, if the means chosen is not proportionate to the end, one may correctly 
conclude that the Moral Object is immoral. For instance, if one intentionally uses more force 
than necessary to repulse an assailant’s attack, this may indicate a Moral Object of murder, not 
self-defense. Moreover, it is not necessary to conclude this merely from the first-person 
perspective. In other words, a third-person perspective on action does say something about an 
agent’s intention. 
     Finnis et al., utilizing the writings of John Paul II, argue against using the third-person 
perspective to determine another’s intention: “the truth about what is intended and being done is 
available, primarily if not exclusively to the acting person in that acting.”205 Ostensibly this is 
because it caves to the teleological tendencies that John Paul II condemns.206 Such a subjectively 
grounded method risks relativism. While it may be true that what one actually deliberates, 
chooses and carries out in choice is known primarily, if not exclusively by the acting person, if 
one cannot communicate this in words or behavior, then nothing prevents one from covering 
one’s actions with lies. Cavanaugh indicates that language constitutes one means of 
communicating intention, but the body, in its behavior does so too.207 For instance, regarding 
adultery, John Paul II in Man and Woman He Created Them: A  Theology of the Body says, “The 
body tells the truth through faithfulness and conjugal love, and, when it commits ‘adultery’ it 
tells a lie, it commits falsehood.”208 Not with standing differences, confusion and ambiguity in 
language and behavior, an objective truth, whether of the moral order or the natural order is 
certainly communicable.   
      The dilemma seems to abide between the role of the Moral Object and its relation the 
exterior act. Duarte Sousa-Lara discusses the relationship between the interior (internal) act and 
the exterior (external) act in relationship to the proximate end in “Aquinas on Interior and 
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Exterior Acts: Clarifying a Key Aspect of His Action Theory.”209 Following Aquinas’s 
articulation of exterior acts in De Malo, Sousa-Lara indicates, “exterior acts belong to the genus 
moris [Moral order] only insofar as they are voluntary.”210 Conceptually, one may abstract the 
voluntariness from the exterior act, which constitutes the materia ex qua, also called the material 
element of the human act or the primitive act.211 Alternatively, the materia circa quam is the 
proximate end (Moral Object) and the object of choice.212 Sousa-Lara, following Martin 
Rhonheimer and Finnis et al., argues that the materia circa quam, links the soul of the act 
(proximate end) to the body of the act (materia ex qua).213 Moreover, in this regard, the materia 
circa quam already has a formal element, a rational good able to move the will.214   
      Manualists, proportionalists and many Thomists interpret exterior acts merely as the 
physical acts commanded by the will.215 Such an interpretation renders the exterior act devoid of 
rational configuration to the good, in which case the connection between the physical act in 
natural order and the moral act in the moral order is tenuous at best. The third-person 
perspective, being speculative in nature, only reveals the natural order. For this reason, many 
Thomists insist that one needs more than a third-person perspective to determine intention. 
Sousa-Lara takes Aquinas to relate the interior act with intention and the remote end.216 In 
addition, the exterior act refers to the choice, the proximate end, and the commanded act.217 
Thus, a connection occurs between the natural and moral order in the exterior act.  
      For intrinsically evil acts, Aquinas insists that an inappropriate or unsuitable matter 
abides, which the will chooses.218 This matter is the Moral Object, suitable or unsuitable in 
relationship to reason219 and the human person.220 Insofar as the will deliberately chooses the 
inappropriate matter, a disorder abides within the will itself.221 The will externalizes the 
disordered choice by commanding the act. Again, insofar as the external act is voluntary, it 
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retains its connection to the moral order.222 As a commanded act, the exterior act manifests in the 
natural order. Thus, a connection abides between the practical and ontological. In “‘Materia ex 
qua’ and ‘Materia circa quam’ in Aquinas,” Sousa-Lara indicates that the physical act limits the 
range of possible Moral Objects.223 For example, there are only three possible Moral objects for 
coitus: marital love, fornication, or adultery. While an outsider’s perspective can limit the 
options, only the first-person perspective indicates which Moral Object one chooses.  
      Practical reason does not formulate the Moral Object in a conceptual vacuum. John 
Abraham Makdisi in his dissertation, “The Object of the Moral Act: Understanding St. Thomas 
Aquinas Through the Work of Steven Long and Martin Rhonheimer,” following Aquinas shows 
how circumstances on the natural order can impact the moral order.224 As the third criteria for 
determining the morality of an act,225 circumstances are of the natural order that add to or detract 
from the morality of an act only accidentally, but do not change the Moral Object.226 However, if 
one chooses that which is a circumstance in another act as the reason for acting, then it 
determines the Moral Object.227 For example, if one chooses lethal means to rebuff a non-lethal 
attack, then the Moral Object is not self-defense, but murder. In addition, if a couple engaging in 
the sexual act are not married in natural order, then the act cannot be one of marital love. So long 
as both freely choose it, the Moral Object must be either fornication or adultery. 
      That the natural order limits the range of possible Moral Objects does not detract from 
the primacy of the first-person perspective in morality.228 Indeed, the above demonstrates the 
unique importance this plays for Thomistic action theory. It does; however, mean that since some 
external behaviors correspond with certain intentions, one may attain a closer awareness, even if 
not perfect, about what the acting agent intends. Though he does not word it in such terms, 
Cavanaugh rightly demonstrates that the conceptual disconnect between the practical choice and 
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the contingent physical behavior of crushing a child’s skull in a craniotomy clearly and 
unambiguously manifests a direct intent to kill.229 As a subsection demonstrates below, while 
one may make a conceptual distinction between crushing the skull of a child and killing it, the 
effect so intimately connects with the act it is a constitutive part of the intent, not a foreseen 
effect.230 The following subsection differentiates terminology for the Principle of Double Effect.  
iii. Intended and Foreseen in T. A. Cavanaugh 
    This subsection elucidates Cavanaugh’s distinction between intending and foreseeing.  
a. Double-Effect Terminology 
     In Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil, Cavanaugh argues for the 
distinction between intended and foreseen, as opposed to alternative formulations: intended/side 
effect, direct/indirect, or intended/unintended.231 Cavanaugh dislikes the use of side effect 
because it implies that it has no ethical significance.232 Moreover, he asserts that proponents 
often insinuate that bad side effects are less bad, and therefore, permissible to allow.233 This is 
precisely what foreseen avoids.234   
      In addition, the direct/indirect distinction is ambiguous and leads to confusion.235 The 
confusion arises because one may use direct or indirect in reference to intention or cause, which 
mean very different things.236 For instance, in self-defense, one may use force, that directly 
causes harm to one’s assailant, but one does not intend it directly, but indirectly.  In contrast, one 
may directly intend to harm another through an action that only does so causally indirectly.   
      Cavanaugh insists that permitting, allowing and accepting do not suffice to describe the 
foreseen, yet unintended.237 Once again, it fails to capture the distinction between intending and 
causing. For instance, in passive euthanasia, one intentionally omits action, causally permitting, 
allowing, and accepting the patient to succumb to the dying process to relieve suffering.238 
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Causally, the agent does nothing, allowing, permitting, accepting, the process of dying to 
proceed unhindered. However, intentionally, the agent intends for the patient to die. 
      Cavanaugh dislikes the intended/unintended distinction as well, because as Finnis 
indicates unintentional implies accidental or lack of foresight.239 Logically, unintended is not 
necessarily the contrary of intended insofar as it may mean both intending-not-to-x and not-
intending-to-x.240 Only the latter is the contrary to intending.241 Ultimately, Cavanaugh 
concludes that an important distinction for Double Effect is intended/foreseen, where the latter is 
not intended. 
b. Intention/Foreseen Distinction 
      Cavanaugh argues that certain actions inexorably have a malevolent intention attached to 
them: euthanasia, terror bombing, and craniotomy.242 One cannot commit these actions without 
intending harm. At the same time, this does not mean that agents cannot intend harm by actions 
that do not necessarily have evil intentions linked to them, such as, terminal sedation, tactical 
bombing and hysterectomies.243 Put another way, one cannot choose euthanasia, terror bombing 
or a craniotomy as a means to an end without intending harm. Though malicious intent is not 
inexorably linked to terminal sedation, tactical bombing and hysterectomies, one may 
nonetheless intend harm choosing them as a means to an end—good or bad.   
      Cavanaugh asserts, with G. E. M. Anscombe that changing the direction of intention does 
not thereby render one’s act devoid of intention.244 In other words, one cannot simply redirect 
one’s intention in such a way that one’s act is not intentional. Moreover, one cannot add 
secondary intentions to cover for primary intentions.245 According to Cavanaugh, such an 
approach to foreseen effects is a non-starter.246   
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      Cavanaugh demonstrates the deficiency of the counter-factual test that Charles Fried 
offers.247 Fried asserts that one may determine whether one intends the bad effect, by answering 
the question: would one commence without the foreseen negative effect?248 According to Fried, a 
negative response indicates that the agent intends the evil, while a positive answer indicates one 
does not intend the malevolent effect.249 Following James Sterba, such a test does not suffice to 
conclude that the agent does not maliciously intend the foreseen means.250 To establish intent, 
Sterba recommends asking if the foreseen bad effects help to explain why one chose a particular 
action.251 If the answer is yes, then one may tie it to intention.252   
     Next, Cavanaugh addresses closeness and conceptual necessity to determine if an effect 
constitutes intention or foreseen effect.253 According to Cavanaugh, certain actions have a 
conceptual necessity attached to them.254 For example, it is impossible to conceive of 
assassinating someone without killing.255 Intending to assassinate conceptually necessitates 
intending to kill.256 Likewise, for Cavanaugh, intending to perform a craniotomy inexorably 
entails killing a child, even if one can conceptually distinguish the act of crushing the skull and 
the child dying.257 Accordingly, Cavanaugh asserts, “if one’s intent conceptually includes the 
effect, then one intends that effect.”258 
     Next, Cavanaugh defines the nature of intention and distinguishes it from foreseen 
effects.259 To begin with, he observes that intentions concern that which is desirable.260 
Unfortunately, desirable has several references, including reason and feelings.261 Regarding 
intention, desirable concerns that which one determines to be rationally good to effect, 
something that may be affectively undesirable.262 As such, it is clear that intention is different 
from emotional feelings. 
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      For Cavanaugh, intention also has a volitional content oriented to achieving a particular 
good in action.263 More than simply wanting or desiring a good, one wills to act according to 
plan by intending.264 In fact, what distinguishes wanting from intending is the plan for action.265 
To achieve one’s goal, one both intends the end in sight and the means to achieving the end.266 In 
contrast, foresight lacks the volitional content of intention; rather, it consists of an awareness of 
causal relations.267 Knowing causal relations does not amount to having a plan of action and 
acting accordingly. When one acts with foresight, however, it does reveal one’s intention.268   
      Deliberation is the process whereby one formulates an intentional plan of action.269 To 
intend is for an agent to tend toward some end, the intervening space of which constitutes the 
means.270 It is precisely through deliberation that reason discovers means to achieving ends.271 In 
deliberation, the end answers the question why and the means answer the question how.272 
Committing one’s plan to action, Cavanaugh logically induces that one may say “end x by means 
y.”273 An important distinction between intention and foresight is that the former causes 
deliberation, while latter does not.274   
      It is important for Cavanaugh to avoid any consequentialist tendency, which reduces 
means to causes and ends to effects. The difference between means/ends and causes/effects is 
that means relate to ends as through an agent’s deliberation.275 An agent deliberates over possible 
causes to achieve specific effects and insofar as the agent intends causes for effects they are 
means for ends.276 As an example, a cue ball may hit an eight ball into a corner pocket, such that 
an observer says that the cue ball causes the eight ball to going into the pocket. But a qualitative 
difference occurs when an agent intentionally hits the cue ball so that this constitutes a means to 
attaining the end of putting the eight ball in the corner pocket.277   
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      Recall that for Aquinas there are four irreducible orders—order of nature, logical order, 
moral order, and practical arts—that correspond to four irreducible sciences—natural sciences 
(math and metaphysics), logic, morality, and technical sciences.278 Following Anscombe’s lead, 
Cavanaugh highlights the epistemic difference between intention and foreseen effects that 
corresponds to the difference in orders.279 Intention corresponds to practical knowledge; 
therefore, it consists of knowing by doing without observation; while foreseeing effects 
corresponds to speculative knowledge—knowing by observing.280 As such, both have different 
directions of fit.281 Foreseen effects, insofar as they constitute speculative knowledge are true 
insofar as what one knows corresponds to the truth that is.282 Intentions, on the other hand, are 
true when one’s execution of action achieves its end.283 Therefore, intentions give rise to actions, 
while foreseen effects correspond to events or happenings.284 Moreover, since foresight 
constitutes a different order from intention, it does not define one’s act or inform one’s behavior, 
as the latter does.285   
     While intent may at times be difficult to observe, different intentions give rise to different 
behaviors that although subtle and sometimes ambiguous, are nonetheless often discernible.286 
Cavanaugh illustrates by showing how different intentions inform the same behavior, with 
differences, as for example, blinking to send a message looks quite different from blinking to 
remove an irritant from one’s eye.287   
      To eliminate confusion and correct error, Cavanaugh advocates for the adoption the 
intention/foreseen distinction in Double Effect. The above demonstrates that this lexicon offers 
several advantages for highlighting important distinctions between what one intends and the 
foreseen effects. The next subsections apply this distinction to three contrasting topics: 
euthanasia/terminal sedation; craniotomy/hysterectomy; and terror/tactical bombing.288   
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iv. Euthanasia Versus Terminal Sedation 
      This subsection discusses the distinction between euthanasia and terminal sedation. 
a. The Catholic Church: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation 
      In the Declaration on Euthanasia, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith defines 
euthanasia as “an action or omission which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all 
suffering may in this way be eliminated.”289 Intention plays a vital role in determining whether 
an act constitutes euthanasia. In Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life, William May 
highlight a distinction between active and passive euthanasia that relates to intention.290 Active 
euthanasia constitutes an act of commission whereas passive euthanasia is an act of omission, 
both for the end of eliminating suffering by killing.291 He further delineates, taking into account 
the will of the patient: voluntary—the patient agrees, non-voluntary—the patient is unaware and 
involuntary—the patient refuses.292 Few question the immorality of nonvoluntary or involuntary 
euthanasia, since it violates the patient’s autonomy; however, voluntary active or passive are 
finding increasing acceptance among ethicists.293   
      Pope John Paul II, in Evangelium Vitae, contends that insofar as euthanasia entails the 
intentionally terminating human life, it violates the exceptionless moral norm to respect the 
inviolable dignity of the human person.294 At the same time, this does not mean that physicians 
may not use treatments at their disposal to relieve pain and as an unintended, yet foreseen effect 
expedites the dying process by depressing respiratory function.295 Moreover, while one is obliged 
to accept proportionate or ordinary treatment, one may refuse disproportionate or extraordinary 
treatment.296 Since the treatments and methods chosen to euthanize—actively or passively—or to 
relieve pain are often identical, the first-person perspective is crucial for determining intent.  
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      Many physicians contend that continuous, deep sedation, when done properly, does not 
shorten a patient’s life.297 If true, this renders obsolete recourse to the Principle of Double Effect 
to justify the unintended, but foreseen expedited death of the patient. However, insofar as the 
Church encourages patients to maintain consciousness to prepare themselves for death as they 
near the end of life, the Principle of Double Effect justifies sedation for patients experiencing 
intense pain or anxiety.298 Thus, even if painkillers do not hasten death, ethicists rely on Double 
Effect to vindicate rendering a patient unconscious at the end of life.299  
b. Joseph Boyle: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation 
      In “On Killing and Letting Die,” Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. formulates an argument defending 
the moral distinction between killing and letting die.300 First, he indicates that it is possible to 
wrongly let someone die.301 He holds that such an act of omission is just as morally 
reprehensible as killing a person by commission.302 He acknowledges that not all cases of letting 
die are morally wrong.303 However, he insists that “most cases of killing—and all case of directly 
killing the innocent—are morally wrong.”304 If the abovementioned premises are true, then two 
converse conclusions are true: 1) not all cases of deciding to let someone die simply constitutes 
the application of the judgment that it is wrong to kill; 2) the moral decision to kill someone is 
not merely the application of the decision that it would be wrong to let this person die.305 Boyle 
highlights that for traditional ethics the proscription for killing the innocent includes killing via 
euthanasia, because the patient is innocent in the relevant sense, that is, innocent as non-
combatants in war.306 Moreover, killing in euthanasia constitutes direct killing, rather than 
indirect killing—a foreseen, yet unintended effect of an action—since one intends the death of 
the patient, usually as a means to bring about an end to suffering.307 In active euthanasia, the 
patient’s death constitutes the means for ending pain.308 
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      Boyle raises an objection that opponents such as James Rachels often level against the 
moral significance thesis, namely, that it is sometimes worse to let someone die, than to relieve 
their suffering quickly by killing them.309 To illustrate, Rachels argues that parents who let their 
Down syndrome child die by starvation, neglecting to repair an intestinal blockage, should have 
simply acknowledged their intention—not to raise a child with Down syndrome—and killed the 
child via active euthanasia to forgo the painful death of starvation.310 Boyle indicates that 
Rachels’ inference does not justify his wholesale rejection of the thesis, but merely shows that 
one can abuse it.311 Indeed, as Boyle illustrates there are many cases where one determines that 
treatment is futile or burdensome, and therefore, one ceases treatment, allowing the patient to 
die, but this does not necessarily mean that one intends the death of the patient, as one clearly 
does in active and passive euthanasia.312    
     The moral significance of the distinction between passive euthanasia and allowing one to 
die, without necessarily intending death, depends on two assumptions: 1) that there is a 
difference between what one intends and what one foresees, but does not intend as a side effect; 
and 2) that this distinction has moral significance.313 Boyle demonstrates that Rachels’s rejection 
of a distinction between euthanasia and letting die, presumes falsely that all decisions for the 
latter entails a decision to end the patient’s suffering by death, which is patently not true.314 
Others such as Michael Tooley315 contest the moral significance thesis with the so-called moral 
symmetry principle, which asserts that there is no moral difference between killing and letting 
die, but is only supportable by example.316 
     Michael Tooley offers two examples in which one intends the death of the other, but the 
physical difference consists in Jones letting Smith die by a bomb (by not warning him), as 
opposed to Jones killing Smith by shooting him.317 Daniel Dinello counters using an example of 
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two patients desperately in need of the other’s organ to survive: Jones needs a heart transplant or 
will die in two hours and Smith needs a kidney transplant or will die in four hours—each are the 
only possible donor candidate for the other.318 Boyle indicates that this counterexample does not 
suffice to disprove the symmetry principle, because there may indeed be a difference of 
intention.319 Clearly it is wrong to kill Smith, but this does not entail the decision to will Jones’s 
death.320 As such, the symmetry principle still remains valid for some cases, but this does not 
invalidate Boyle’s thesis.321 In turn, Boyle concludes that while there are certainly cases where 
one may intend another’s death by letting her die, this does not constitute a logical necessity, 
since it is possible to allow her to die without intending her death. 
      In the abovementioned paper, Boyle demonstrates that a physician’s intention may not 
always include the death of the patient, but when it comes to terminal sedation, intent—an 
important factor for resolving legal disputes—is precisely what one must prove. In “Medical 
Ethics and Double Effect: The Case of Terminal Sedation,” Joseph Boyle argues that the 
Principle of Double Effect is transferable to medical ethics.322 In particular, by analyzing 
documentation and dosage, Boyle argues one can determine the physician’s intention.323 
Following Aquinas and Gury, Boyle articulates the four criteria of Double Effect.324 First, the act 
in question must be good or indifferent, which he indicates prescribing and administering 
analgesics to be.325  Second, the bad effect must not be the cause of the good.326 Again, in this 
case, the bad effect—the death of the patient—is not necessarily the cause of relieving the 
patient’s pain. Third, the bad effect must not be intended.327 Fourth, Boyle highlights the 
condition of proportionality, which necessitates a grave enough reason to justify the accepted, 





c. Intention/Foreseen Distinction: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation 
       Using the intention/foreseen distinction, Cavanaugh explains the difference between 
voluntary active euthanasia and terminal sedation.329 In the case of euthanasia, the physician 
deliberates over how to achieve the intended end of ceasing the patient’s pain and concludes that 
killing the patient is a good solution.330 Consequently, the physician deliberates further about 
how to terminate the patient’s life.331 Arriving at a practical action, the physician administers a 
lethal dose of a drug.332 Since the physician intends to end the patient’s pain by means of death, 
pain relief alone does not qualify as success; the patient must die.333 In the case of terminal 
sedation, having the goal of ending the patient’s pain, the physician deliberates that a barbiturate 
drip is the best solution, even though he foresees this causing a premature death.334 Unlike in the 
case of euthanasia, the foresight that the barbiturate-drip causes death, does not invoke further 
deliberation in the physician about utilizing it for that purpose.335 Put more simply, the foresight 
does not provoke further deliberation, whereas the intent to kill does; which stands out as a 
defining difference between foresight and intent.336 Moreover, regarding terminal sedation, 
although the physician expects the patient to die using the barbiturate-drip, if death does not 
ensue, he does not fail in achieving his goal.337 Failure occurs if the barbiturate-drip does not 
relieve the patient’s pain.338 Thus, Cavanaugh concludes that the distinction between euthanasia 
and terminal sedation contrasts as “necessarily-intended-death versus foreseen-not-necessarily-
intended-death.”339 
v. Hysterectomy Versus Craniotomy 




a. Direct Killing in Abortion 
      In Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul II points to the Didache as testimony for the 
Church’s unbroken teaching against direct abortion: “you shall not put a child to death by 
abortion nor kill it once it is born.”340 Direct abortion occurs whenever one wills the death of the 
unborn child either as a means or an end to one’s action.341 He recapitulates what the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith articulates as the Magisterial Teaching of the Church 
that this prohibition against killing begins at the moment of conception, which corresponds to the 
inviolable dignity of the human person.342 The Church does not prohibit indirect abortion for 
proportionate reasons.343 Indirect abortion means that one does not will the death of the child.344 
The classic scenario is a woman with a gravid (pregnant), cancerous uterus who undergoes a 
hysterectomy to save the mother’s life.345 The foreseen, yet unintended effect is the death of the 
child.  
b. Defending Craniotomies 
     As the above demonstrates, Finnis et al. argue that the same line of reasoning justifies 
craniotomies, since for them it is nothing more than cutting the cranium.346 Germain Grisez 
defends craniotomies in Living a Christian Life.347 First, he insists that four criteria must exist: 1) 
some pathology threatens both mother and child; 2) it is not safe to wait; 3) there is no way to 
save the child; 4) the procedure that saves the mother’s life results in the child’s death.348 In 
“Double Effect and a Certain Type of Embryotomy,” Joseph M. Boyle argues in favor of 
craniotomy, under the circumstances given by Grisez, rejecting the traditional belief that it 
constitutes direct killing.349 Boyle understands direct killing “as that killing in which the 
resulting death either is intended or is immediate or is the effect of a cause which may not 
morally be posited.”350 Boyle defends H. L. A. Hart’s assertion that the craniotomy is not direct 
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killing, holding that it is no different than the indirect killing that occurs when removing a 
gravid, cancerous uterus via hysterectomy.351 Hart insists that in both cases the fetus’s body must 
be removed from the woman’s body.352 In fact, however, for the hysterectomy the body of the 
fetus does not pose the threat, so properly speaking, this is not what the surgeon removes; rather, 
she removes the uterus that carries the child. Even if the woman were not pregnant, the physician 
must remove the cancerous uterus. In the case necessitating a craniotomy, however, the condition 
of the child being stuck constitutes the pathology.   
      Following Hart, Boyle insists that if there is no conceptual connection between a side 
effect and what one intends in action then the side effect is outside of one’s intention—praeter 
intentionem.353 Boyle argues that since the craniotomy has no conceptual connection to the death 
of the child,354 it does not constitute direct killing.355 Rather, he argues that the conceptual 
content of a craniotomy is merely the altering of the dimensions of the fetus’s skull.356 Boyle 
continues the argument asserting that the fetus’s death is neither the means nor the end of saving 
the mother’s life, for which the physician performs a craniotomy.357  
      Cavanaugh indicates that common language points to an awareness of a correspondence 
between the conceptual and causal.358 For Cavanaugh, Finnis et al. so narrowly define 
craniotomy that it conceptually excludes the death of the child.359 As such, their conceptual 
definition excludes what is causally necessary to craniotomy, the death of the child.360 In fact, the 
causal necessity is so strong; it is virtually impossible to conceive of even the possibility of a 
craniotomy that does not also entail the death of the child.361 Moreover, R. A. Duff argues that 
this connection is so strong that it is even logically impossible to define craniotomy without 
including the death of the child.362 Duff offers two examples which he proposes are analogous to 
saying that a craniotomy does not logically entail the death of the fetus: 1) a man decapitating his 
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wife to see her surprise in the morning; and 2) a man intentionally colliding his car with a police 
officer’s, but only intending to knock him off, but not cause injury.363 Boyle rejects the first, 
insisting that the stated claim cannot possibly be the intention of one’s act.364 The second he 
rejects because he argues that a stunt man may indeed intend such a consequence without 
injury.365 Just because Duff’s two examples do not hold up to Boyle’s criticism does not suffice 
to negate his argument altogether.366 The fact that one cannot conceive of a child surviving a 
craniotomy suffices to prove Duff’s point.   
c. Craniotomies and Hysterectomies 
      As Cavanaugh indicates, the procedure of crushing the skull, by its definition entails the 
death of the child, and therefore, one cannot practically distinguish killing the child from a 
craniotomy.367 He utilizes the intention/foreseen distinction to shed further light on this 
situation.368 In both cases, the physician desires to save the mother’s life, which leads to further 
deliberation about means.369 In the case of the gravid, cancerous uterus, he concludes that its 
removal is the only viable solution.370 The death of the child is foreseen as causally necessary, 
but the success of the procedure does not depend on this.371 Moreover, the definition of the 
procedure does not depend on the death of the child; it is possible to perform a hysterectomy on a 
woman who is not pregnant.372   
      In the case of the craniotomy, however, the physician after deliberation concludes that 
intentionally crushing the baby’s skull and extracting its body from the birth canal is the means 
to saving the mother’s life.373 In a craniotomy, she is not using forceps to maneuver the child’s 
head and body through the cervix, in which case one may argue that the intention is to remove 
the child’s head and body from the cervix without necessarily killing the child.374 Rather, she is 
cutting the skull, and removing the brains, essentially beheading the child, which by definition 
 
 157 
not only causes the death of the child, but also intends it.375 Therefore, Finnis et al.’s objection to 
the fifth argument against craniotomies, namely that it is never done to help the child, does not 
hold.376 Most importantly, however, Cavanaugh argues that the craniotomy is direct killing, since 
the intentional content necessitates the removal of the contents of the child’s head, which 
inexorably links to the child’s death.377 While she succeeds in saving the mother’s life, should 
the child somehow survive the procedure, she has not succeeded in doing a craniotomy.378 The 
next subsection considers the difference between terror bombing and tactical bombing.  
vi. Terror Bombing Versus Tactical Bombing 
     This subsection highlights the distinction between terror bombing and tactical bombing. 
a. Traditional Just War Theory 
     The American Civil War constitutes the most devastating war on United States’ soil and 
the tactic of “Total War” not only represents a fundamental change in approach, but also shapes 
the nature of war for the twentieth century and beyond. William Tecumseh Sherman’s 
unforgettable words, “war is cruelty” and his further argument that the “crueler it is, the sooner it 
will be over” seems to resonate with many theorists.379 As oxymoronic as it may seem, 
philosophical tradition does advocate for rules of war and just war theory. While Augustine first 
gives voice to just war, it is Aquinas that articulates its conditions.380 Today, just war theorists 
often distinguish between jus ad bellum and jus in bello; that is, just reasons to go to war and just 
action in war, respectively.381  In general, the latter qualifies questions pertaining to bombing.   
      James F. Childress, in “Just-War Theories: The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and 
Functions of Their Criteria,” says that the primary goal of war is not to kill or injure, but to 
incapacitate the enemy’s ability to wage war, which informs the rules in war.382 This constitutes 
an exceptionless moral norm of war that for Childress provides a foundation for the criteria of 
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justice in war: 1) enemies that surrender deserve protection and medical care; 2) one ought not to 
target non-combatants; 3) one should use proportionate force; and 4) avoiding weapons or 
practices that inflict unnecessary suffering.383 Childress further indicates that should one foresee 
that an attack poses a risk to civilians, due proportion ought to inform one’s decision making.384 
These criteria alone should discourage any legitimate military authority from utilizing terror 
bombing.   
b. Just War, Terrorism, and Nuclear Deterrence 
     In 1987, Finnis et al., in Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism, reject the use of 
nuclear weapons as a deterrent, calling for an immediate abandonment of this policy by Western 
governments, in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union would likely not reciprocate.385 They base 
this decision on the threat that it poses to the human lives of the Soviet Union.386 Their line of 
reasoning stands on appreciation for the basic human goods, of which human life—not only the 
condition for realizing other human goods—is itself.387 Finnis et al. formulate the first principle 
of morality in terms that integrate both human goods and the first principle of natural law: one 
ought to choose and will acts in favor of human good and avoid those that are not.388 This gives 
rise to the universal Golden Rule: treat others, as one would like to be treated. 389 The 
Democritean Principle is another intermediate principle: “do not do evil that good may come.”390   
     After affirming that human life is not only the means to enjoy other basic human goods, 
but a basic human good itself, Finnis et al. use the three abovementioned principles to defend 
their thesis that “it is always wrong to choose to kill a human being.”391 Although their theory 
restricts violence greatly, they do not advocate pacifism.392 They permit the killing of the non-
innocent in just wars, but only as a means to defend or halt serious attacks that cannot be 
otherwise stopped.393 One’s use of force in war is justified, if and only if, one chooses it to 
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defend or stop the unjust enemy’s aggression, but not if one intends to kill the enemy.394 
Consequently, they reject wars of aggression for any reason altogether.395  
      Finnis et al. argue that killing an offender out of retribution or retaliation consists of 
choosing a bad means for a good end.396 Although one may accidentally kill innocent people in 
combat, it is never morally permissible to kill the innocent intentionally.397 Therefore, since the 
use of nuclear weapons in the context of deterrence entails retaliatory action and the intentional 
murder of innocent non-combatants, it constitutes an intrinsically evil act.398 Moreover, since 
keeping nuclear weapons, as a deterrent is only effective if one is actually willing to use them, 
this act also constitutes an intrinsically evil act.399 Furthermore, recalling the Socratic Principle, 
that “it is better to suffer wrong than to do it,”400 Finnis et al. advise all Western nations to 
immediately disarm their nuclear weapons, for the welfare of the citizens of the Soviet Union.401   
      In “Catholic Teaching on War and Peace: Its Application to American Foreign Policy 
after 9/11,” Joseph Boyle revisits the topic of nuclear deterrence, arguing that it constitutes a 
form of terrorism.402 In an earlier paper, “Just War Doctrine and Military Response to 
Terrorism,” however, Boyle maintains a distinct difference between terrorism and deterrence.403 
Terrorism consists in the use of violent actions for the purpose of influencing decision-making in 
its survivors.404 By definition, deterrence entails the threat of either just or unjust response to 
criminal acts, and therefore, does not necessarily exclude the threat of using terrorism.405 For 
instance, Boyle argues that nuclear deterrence during the Cold War constitutes the threat of 
terrorism.406 In the later paper, however, Boyle conflates the two acts, deterrence and terrorism, 
insisting that nuclear deterrence constitutes a form of terrorism, not merely an act of terrorism.407   
      Boyle’s conflation of the two distinct acts is another instance of failing to see how the 
physical act itself influences and contributes to the definition of the act. It is one thing for one to 
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threaten terrorism in an act of deterrence, but quite another for one to actually commit a violent 
act of terrorism.408 Boyle is correct in asserting that nuclear deterrence constitutes the threat of 
terrorism, but not in saying that the act of deterrence itself is terrorism.409 Certainly an analogy 
exists insofar as the threat of terrorism attempts to persuade, but a true difference abides between 
a threat and a violent act, which terrorism by definition entails.   
c. Terror Bombing and Tactical Bombing 
      Cavanaugh uses the intention/foreseen distinction to further highlight the immorality of 
terror bombing in contrast to discriminate tactical bombing.410 In both cases, the agent desires 
victory, but uses different means to achieve this end.411 The terror bomber, by definition intends 
harm to non-combatants, maiming, or killing in an attempt to demoralize the enemy.412 While the 
ultimate end is victory, the terror bomber seeks to achieve this end by means of killing or 
maiming non-combatants.413 Such behavior necessarily coincides with the terror bomber’s 
intention. If one achieves victory without killing or maiming non-combatants, one has attained 
one’s ultimate goal, but failed to achieve one’s proximate means.414 Not only does terror 
bombing violate the exceptionless norm to not intentionally kill, but it violates at least three of 
the abovementioned criteria, possibly excepting only the norm to do no harm to surrendering 
combatants.   
      In contrast to terror bombing, tactical bombing entails the intent of destroying an enemy’s 
ability to wage war by attacking installations of war.415 The tactical bomber foresees that 
bombing a combatants’ installation causally necessitates the death of enemy combatants and 
even non-combatants.416 While the tactical bomber is aware of this, it does not determine the 
outcome of deliberation.417 Moreover, since the death of the non-combatants does not constitute 
the intention of one’s action, it also does not define success.418 In other words, if no non-
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combatants die in the bombing of military installations, the tactical bomber may still claim 
success, so long as it damages the installations.419 So long as the tactical bomber uses due 
proportion in determining which targets to hit in relationship to potential harm to non-
combatants, he or she does not violate any of the abovementioned criteria.   
      The three contrasting cases above distinguish between intrinsically evil acts and those 
that have causally foreseen effects, but do not violate exceptionless moral norms.420 In each case, 
Cavanaugh demonstrates that where one violates an exceptionless moral norm the harm not only 
constitutes a causally necessary effect, but the agent also intends it as a means to one’s end. As a 
volitional act, one must do more than answer “would one pursue the action were the evil not 
brought about?”; but “is one successful in accomplishing the intended act without the harm being 
done?”421 In each of the cases that violate an exceptionless moral norm the answer is negative, 
while in the permissible cases, the answer is positive. In other words, doing the harm in the 
permissible cases does not define the act, whereas in the impermissible cases it does.   
     The first subsection of this section presents Finnis et al.’s argument in favor of 
craniotomies arguing that from the perspective of the acting person they do not constitute 
intentional killing.422 Next, based on the work of Sousa-Lara’s understanding of the external act 
constituting the choice and the commanded physical act, I argue that a certain degree of 
predictability regarding primitive physical acts enables one to observe and determine moral 
intention with a limited degree of potential.423 Cavanaugh’s distinction between intended means 
and foreseen effects not only provides an adequate terminology, but also enables one to 
sufficiently distinguish acts that violate exceptionless moral norms from those that Double-Effect 
Reasoning justifies.424 The three subsequent subsections present the Church’s traditional 
teaching regarding three different ethical dilemmas including: euthanasia/terminal sedation, 
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craniotomies/hysterectomies, and terror bombing/tactical bombing. In addition, these respective 
subsections account for Finnis et al.’s perspective on the aforementioned topics. Finally, the 
three contrasting examples illustrate the veracity of Cavanaugh’s theory.425   
      The following chapter applies the theory of this and the preceding chapter first to health 
care ethics consultations, and then, to the Principle of Cooperation.   
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CHAPTER FOUR – HEALTH CARE ETHICS CONSULTATIONS AND COOPERATION 
      Having explained the function of the Principle of Double Effect for Catholic health care 
ethics, this chapter assesses the role of two separate, but related tools, health care ethics 
consultations and the Principle of Cooperation.  
4A. Health Care Ethics Consultations 
     This section highlights several features for health care ethics consultations. Using the 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services,1 it offers a unique approach 
that incorporates aspects of the Core Competencies of the American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities, 2 the Veterans Health Administration,3 and other literature.   
i. Health Care Ethics Consultation 
      The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities indicates that health care ethics 
consultations respond to ethical dilemmas in the clinical setting.4 In particular, they facilitate the 
resolution of conflicts between values that inhibit decision-making regarding clinical action.5  
Ultimately, they should improve the quality of health care by helping participants to resolve 
ethical dilemmas.6 This is also how health care ethics consultations differ from other consultation 
services. Both the Veterans Health Administration and the American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities distinguish between case consultations and non-case consultations.7 Case 
consultations pertain to a particular clinical case, whereas, non-case consultations refer to other 
types of consultation, such as, answering general ethical questions, policy review, organizational, 
and professional questions.8 The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities focuses its 
competencies on case consultations, though the scope of application is not necessarily limited to 
such.9   
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      While there are several approaches to health care ethics consultations, including: 
authoritarian, pure consensus, and facilitation, the American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities argues that the facilitation approach works best.10 In the authoritarian approach, the 
ethicist usurps the decision-making authority of the patient or surrogate and makes decisions for 
them.11 This is problematic because the ethicist fails to respect the autonomy of the patient and 
care team. The consensus approach is faulty because it does not necessarily incorporate values 
and norms, but rather bases decision-making entirely on an agreed upon consensus.12 The 
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities offers a twofold explanation in favor of the 
facilitation approach. One, ethicists help identify values; and two, they assist in formulating an 
ethical resolution.13  
      In principle, because of its integration of relevant sources, the facilitation approach 
avoids sliding into moral relativism.14 For Catholic hospitals, this includes the use of the Ethical 
and Religious Directives. As a facilitator, ethicists utilize a broad spectrum of skills that surpass 
the role of philosopher or theologian. They develop strong interpersonal skills, such as listening, 
coordinating meetings so that all voices are heard, helping people articulate their values, and 
helping to resolve conflicts.15 At the same time, consultants need to avoid manipulating patients 
or clinicians into adopting their personal preferences.16 This does not mean refraining from 
educating or pointing out unethical practices.17 Ultimately, the facilitation approach is desirable 
because it empowers patients, surrogates, and clinicians to act on well-articulated values.   
     One size does not necessarily fit all, when it comes to how many individuals to include in 
an ethics consult. The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health 
Administration differentiate three sizes: 1) individual, 2) consultation team, and 3) Ethics 
committee.18 Necessity determines the size of the consultation. The American Society for 
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Bioethics and Humanities recommends individual consultation when the need for information is 
urgent.19 In addition to time constraints, all parties may not feel comfortable communicating in 
large groups.20 Ethicists should meet with patients and clinicians before the formal meeting to 
make sure all the relevant information is shared.21 Even where time is not necessarily a 
constraint, the efficient use of personnel may preclude a formal meeting of the entire ethics 
board.22 The disadvantage of an individual consultant is that one must have all the relevant 
competencies and there is no way to guard against biases.23 
      The advantage of a larger group of consultants is the multidisciplinary perspective and 
the representation of more competencies and experience.24 A team consult is smaller than a 
whole committee. Members should be chosen for complementary competencies.25 Although they 
are not as efficient as an individual consults they are quicker than committees. According to the 
Veterans Health Administration, the team consultation is the most commonly used model for 
health care ethics consultations.26 The full ethics board meeting presumably engages the widest 
variety of expertise and competencies ensuring collective proficiency.27 Although it utilizes the 
greatest personnel hours, it helps for evaluating quality of a consult and policy-making, not to 
mention the avoidance of legal repercussions.28 For this reason, the American Society for 
Bioethics and Humanities recommends using it for potentially high profile clinical cases.29    
a. Proficiencies 
      Before discussing the mechanisms for health care ethics consultations, I discuss 
proficiencies for handling them.30 The Veterans Health Administration and the American Society 
for Bioethics and Humanities divide proficiencies into three classes: 1) knowledge; 2) skills; and 
3) attributes, attitudes, and behaviors.31 Knowledge consists of the information that ethicists 
ought to master for consultations. Skills consist of practical techniques important for running 
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them. The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities divides these skills into three 
categories: 1) ethical assessment and analysis skills; 2) process skills; and 3) interpersonal 
skills.32 The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health 
Administration list attributes, attitudes, and behaviors that an ethicist ought to have and 
develop.33 While it may not be necessary to have advanced proficiency in all these areas, it is 
important to have at least some basic proficiency in each. In the following, I discuss each 
proficiency in greater detail.   
       First, I discuss knowledge that ethicists and board members ought to attain. The fewer the 
number of members participating in a consultation, the greater amount of knowledge that single 
individuals must have. To begin with, it is important for consultants to be familiar with the field 
of ethics. This includes knowing various ethical theories and how to apply them. The American 
Society for Bioethics and Humanities encourages proficiency in consequentialism, deontology, 
virtue-based ethics, natural law, communitarian, and feminist theories.34 As an applied science, it 
is important to be familiar with casuistic approaches as well.35 An ethicist for a Catholic hospital 
should be familiar with the Catholic theological tradition and the Ethical and Religious 
Directives.   
      In addition to familiarity with the philosophical and theological theories, it is important to 
be familiar with the common issues and scenarios that arise necessitating its application. This 
includes, but is not limited to: confidentiality, patient rights, end-of-life decision-making, 
beginning-of-life decision-making, surrogate decision-making, competency, conflict of interest, 
competency of minors, and organ donation.36 It is important to know institutional policies, along 
with federal and local laws pertaining to healthcare.37 Even though an ethicist may not be a 
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practicing clinician, it is nonetheless important to be familiar with the clinical literature, practice, 
and terminology.38   
      As an applied field, health care ethicists need to develop certain practical skills. First, 
ethicists must be able to assess and analyze information ethically.39 To begin with, one must 
determine what the uncertainty or conflict of values consists of.40 In order to achieve this goal, 
one must gather all relevant information from the patient, surrogate, family, clinicians, attorneys, 
and administrators.41 At the same time, one must be mindful of power relations, ethnic, cultural, 
and religious influences.42 It is important to maintain the scope of the consultation to ethics.43 
Moreover, one must identify, articulate, and clarify the ethical concerns, values, and beliefs held 
by all including oneself.44   
      In terms of analysis, the ethicist has to access relevant information to clarify the relevant 
ethical concepts to facilitate ethical decision-making.45 Sometimes this means clarifying whom 
the appropriate decision-maker is.46 Success in analyzing involves being able to integrate all 
relevant information from many different sources including practical and theoretical. One must 
also be able to identify personal biases and limitations so that one can seek assistance.47   
      Next, both the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health 
Administration consider processing skills.48 To begin with, the ethicist needs to determine if a 
request actually constitutes an ethical dilemma or another type of problem that needs to be 
referred elsewhere.49 Next, the ethicist needs to decide which type of consultation model to 
utilize: individual, team, or committee, and who needs to be involved: patient, surrogate, family, 
and clinicians.50 Before having a formal meeting, the ethicist should speak to the patient, and 
other parties to collect information and get an idea of what the situation entails.51 This process 
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also entails documentation in the patient’s health records.52 The ethicist must also be able to run 
an effective ethics consultation, which necessitates the development of good interpersonal skills. 
      Perhaps the most important interpersonal skill that an ethicist must have is listening.53 
While listening may seem like a passive activity, it involves lots of work, if it is done well. 
Listening begins with respecting each person and being able to empathize with his or her 
perspective.54 Effective health care depends on hierarchical structures, but these can lead to 
moral distress for subordinate clinicians, especially when they identify inappropriate behavior or 
practice in their superiors. An ethicist must be attentive to the power dynamics at work and 
attend to concomitant moral distress of subordinates and helping superiors to hear their concerns 
without feeling overthrown or betrayed.55 The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities 
calls this leveling the playing field.56   
      Good listening includes active listening. This means helping others articulate their views 
without adding to or taking away from the content of their message. Ethicists have an important 
role to educate others on ethics and to help others express their views in ethical terms. Being able 
to recapitulate another’s view in such a way that others can understand it better, sometimes 
including the one espousing it, is an important tool of communication for ethicists, especially 
since ethics is not the expertise of everyone.57 By using this skill with each respective party, an 
ethicist ensures that all are heard helping to bring about effective resolutions amenable to all.58   
     Finally, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health 
Administration discuss attributes, attitudes and behaviors that they believe are requisite for an 
ethics consultant.59 First, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities says that ethicists 
should be tolerant, patient, and compassionate.60 The healthcare world is high-stress and when 
ethical dilemmas arise, tensions and emotions are high. An ethicist brings a sense of calm and 
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understanding, working constructively even in situations of duress.61 Next on the list are honesty, 
forthrightness, and self-knowledge.62  These virtues help one address uncomfortable issues that 
most prefer to avoid. Ethical dilemmas are often messy; people are vulnerable. These virtues 
help the ethicist to avoid tendencies toward quick resolution through manipulation.63   
      Courage is another important virtue that helps one raise the red flag and address unethical 
behavior, especially when doing so is not popular.64 Humility and prudence are two virtues that 
aid one in choosing the right battles and not over-stepping one’s bounds.65 Ethicists need to be 
good leaders, acting decisively, but also having restraint at times.66 Above all, they need to be 
people of integrity, which means that their words match their behavior and beliefs.67   
b. Veterans Health Administration 
      Both the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health 
Administration offer a method for running consultations. However, before discussing this, I 
mention two topics related to the above proficiencies that ethicists need when leading health care 
ethics consultations, that is, skills for facilitating consultations, and evaluative, quality 
improvement skills.68 To facilitate an effective meeting, one first introduces the participants, 
their roles and expectations.69 It is always a good idea to begin a meeting by emphasizing the 
importance of confidentiality.70 Next, one lays the ground rules and clearly defines the goal and 
timeframe for meeting it.71 The ethicist should run the meeting so that each party has an 
opportunity to speak, but making sure that the team stays focused.72 To facilitate this, it may be 
helpful to have an agenda drafted before the meeting. Finally, the ethicist needs to determine 
what type of follow up is necessary, including whether to have another formal meeting.73 
      It is important for ethicists to also do prep work before the meeting, including picking 
appropriate members that complement and represent different competencies.74 Furthermore, one 
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must mentor and offer further training to members. In addition, one must maintain a good 
rapport with the leadership of the institution and be familiar with procedures and policies.75 
Finally, ethicists should inform staff and patients about access to health care ethics consultations.   
      No service is complete without some means of evaluation and quality assurance. This 
involves evaluation of the access, process, and implications to the organization and policies of a 
health care ethics consultations.76 The ethicist needs to provide means for collecting and 
analyzing relevant data to determine not only the effectiveness of the consultation in terms of 
outcome, but also in how it is accessed and run.77 Being self-reflective and not afraid to critique 
one’s approach is key to success in this arena. Looking for patterns in the content of consultation 
may lead one to discern the need for change in practice or policies within the organization.78 
Having positive relationships with the administration can make this more effective.   
      For the procedure of running health care ethics consultations, the Veterans Health 
Administration recommends the five step approach: clarify, assemble, synthesize, explain, and 
support.79  They intends the step-by-step procedure to be analogous to a clinician’s physical 
exam or history of a patient.80 In this sense, the ethicist should follow it precisely when 
performing an ethics consult for an active patient case.81 This also provides an outline for 
documenting in the patient’s records.82 In the following, I discuss each of these steps in detail.   
     According to the Veterans Health Administration’s approach, one must first clarify the 
consultation request.83 They indicate that ethical problems concern values and/or conflict of 
values.84 The ethicist helps the requester articulate the issue or concern at hand.85 Often, ethical 
concerns accompany dilemmas that require expertise in other fields, such as, legal, medical, 
psychological, spiritual, or administrative, in which case referral is necessary, in addition to 
addressing the ethical concern.86 Having determined that the case involves an ethical concern, 
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one determines if it is an active patient case; if it is, then one follows the procedure in the 
Veterans Health Administration and records it in the patient’s records.87 Next, one obtains 
preliminary information, such as, contact info, date, time, urgency, requester’s role, brief 
description, assistance desired, and care setting.88 Then the ethicist should share realistic 
expectations for about the process with the requester.89   
      Finally, regarding clarifying the request, the Veterans Health Administration asks the 
ethicist to formulate the ethics question, for which they offer a five-step process.90 First, the 
requester describes the situation ethically as she understands it.91 Second, the ethicist identifies 
value labels for strongly held beliefs, ideals, principles, or standards, such as honesty, equality, 
rights, justice, etc.92 Third, having identified values, the ethicist then describes them from the 
perspective of respective parties.93 Next, of all the values mentioned, the ethicist identifies the 
“central value perspective,” that is what constitutes the value or values in conflict.94 Fifth, the 
ethicist formulates the main ethical concern.95 Finally, the Veterans Health Administration 
recommends formulating this concern according to the format of one of three questions:  
1. Given that [1st central value], but [2nd central value], what decisions or actions are 
ethically justified? 
2.  Given that [1st central value], but [2nd central value], is it ethically justifiable to 
[decision or action]? 
3. What ethical concerns are raised by name of document, and what should be done to 
resolve them?96 
 
      Second, the ethicist must assemble all the relevant information.97 The Veterans Health 
Administration reformulates Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade’s four topics—medical indications, 
patient preferences, quality of life, and contextual features98—into three categories: 1) medical 
facts, 2) patient preferences and interests, and 3) other parties’ preferences and interests.99 In 
addition, they insist that ethicists gather relevant ethical information for the case.100 Although it 
is not the ethicist’s job to make recommendations regarding medical decisions, the medical facts 
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are important, and where the ethicist lacks clinical knowledge, he ought to ask more questions.101  
Sources for information include: patient, health records, staff, family members, and friend.102   
     Third, the ethicist needs to synthesize the information such that it addresses the ethical 
concerns.103 Because many may feel reluctant to share in a formal meeting, it is important to 
gather information prior to determining whether to convene a formal meeting.104 Before a formal 
meeting, the ethicist should formulate the problem in words, meet with all parties, and bring 
relevant literature.105 During the meeting, the ethicist should work to level the playing field and 
engage the group in creative problem solving.106   
      One of the most important roles of an ethicist is ethical analysis, which involves 
formulating and weighing arguments and counterarguments based on ethical principles and 
theoretical perspectives.107 The Veterans Health Administration recommends that ethicists use 
more than one ethical perspective, such as, casuistry, consequentialism, utilitarianism, 
principlism, deontology, and virtue ethics, to name a few.108 Performing quality ethical analysis 
involves not only formulating arguments and counterarguments, but also weighing them to 
determine a conclusive response to the dilemma.109 In addition, it is important to determine who 
the appropriate decision maker is.110 This is not always easy. Often it is the patient, but if the 
patient is incapacitated or a minor, then a surrogate decision maker takes over. I discuss this 
topic in greater detail below. Finally, when there are multiple competing ethically sound options, 
the ethicist facilitates deliberation avoiding manipulation by imposing personal preferences.111 
      The decision having been made by the appropriate decision maker, the ethicist now has 
the responsibility of explaining this to the other participants.112 This involves contacting the 
requester, clinicians, family members, and other relevant participants personally to share the 
outcome of the consultation, giving them an idea for the plan going forward.113 Sometimes, this 
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involves educating participants about ethics, policy, law, or medical practices.114 It also involves 
documenting both in the patient’s health records and the consultation records, for which the 
Veterans Health Administration offers a procedure.115 
      The final step is supporting the consultation process.116 The consultant should follow up 
with participants to determine the effectiveness of the consult, resolve further issues, offer an 
empathetic ear, and educate further, if necessary.117 This provide an opportunity to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the service, and if necessary, to make adjustments to the process.118 This is also 
how one may identify underlying systems issues.119    
      The Veterans Health Administration’s approach to health care ethics consultations is a 
tried and true process that enables ethicists to provide effective services to patients, surrogates, 
and clinicians. So long as an ethicist incorporates the Ethical and Religious Directives into this 
approach, especially regarding ethical analysis, there is no reason Catholic Health care systems 
should not embrace and follow them.   
ii. Principles and Topics for Health Care Ethics Consultations  
      Today, much of biomedical ethics depends on principlism, an ethical theory originating 
in Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress’s book Principles of Biomedical Ethics.120 The 
authors establish a foundation for biomedical ethics based on a common morality, which consists 
of four foundational principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.121 In the 
following, I discuss these four principles, relating them to health care ethics consultations. I also 
integrate recommendations from Jonsen et al.’s text, Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to 






      The first principle is autonomy, which Beauchamp et al. discuss in the fourth chapter of 
their text.123 Contrary to common misconceptions, Beauchamp et al. do not believe that respect 
for autonomy trumps all other ethical principles, nor is it excessively individualistic, excessively 
rational, or overly legalistic.124 While there are many definitions for autonomy, it at least means 
that one has the capacity for self-rule that is free from interference and limitations or inadequate 
understanding.125 More explicitly, autonomy consists of two conditions: liberty (freedom from 
compelling influences) and agency (ability to intend action).126 Beauchamp et al. argue for a 
three-condition theory within reach of competent agents: 1) intentionality, 2) understanding, and 
3) non-control.127 For an act to be intentional, the agent must conceptualize and plan for it, but 
consequences do not necessarily have to go according to plan.128 An agent only needs a 
“substantial degree of understanding and freedom from constraint” for one to be autonomous.129  
To be non-controlling, it must be free from forces internally or externally coercive or 
manipulative.130 While acts are either intentional or non-intentional, they may be more or less 
autonomous according to degrees of understanding and control, the threshold of which 
determines whether an action is substantially autonomous.131   
      There are a number of important concepts that depend on autonomy, including: 
determination of competence, informed consent, and confidentiality. Jonsen et al. also base 
patient preferences on autonomy. In addition, autonomy plays an important role for quality of 
life determination from the patient’s perspective.132 I begin by discussing informed consent.   
      Regarding patient preferences, Jonsen et al. ask six questions, the first of which pertains 
to informed consent.133 To the patient, the physician describes the diagnosis, the recommended 
course of treatment, and its reasons, along with alternative treatments, explaining benefits, and 
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risks to each, to which the patient either accepts or declines the recommendation.134 Although 
legal standards regarding quality of disclosure once depended on the perspective of the 
physician, today they are patient-centered.135 The minimum legal standard is “the reasonable or 
prudent patient standard,” while Jonsen et al. encourage movement toward a “subjective 
standard,” disclosure uniquely conformed to the individual patient.136   
      Jonsen et al. offer four criteria that constitute appropriate disclosure: 1) medical status; 2) 
potentially helpful interventions, including risks and benefits; 3) professional opinion regarding 
alternatives; and 4) a recommendation based on the physician’s best clinical judgment.137 In 
conveying this information, physicians ought to communicate it in such a way that it avoids 
technical terminology, and presents statistics in common, easy to understand examples.138 Jonsen 
et al. assert that physicians ought to disclose professional experience regarding outcomes of 
procedures, especially when the risks are high or the treatment is elective.139 It is one thing to 
provide patients with information, but quite another to ensure understanding. Jonsen et al. say, 
“Physicians have an ethical obligation to make reasonable efforts to ensure comprehension.” 140 
Clinicians may facilitate comprehension by not only allowing patients to ask questions, but by 
asking questions of the patient to test understanding.141 Since nothing in healthcare should 
happen without documentation, the clinician ought to document the conversation regarding 
informed consent, including the patient’s concerns and demonstrated comprehension, which 
constitutes more than a mere signature.142 Although it is true that physicians are often pressed for 
time, and bad news may be difficult to explain, initially misunderstood, or induce anxiety in the 
patient, taking the time to inform consent not only promotes patient shared decision-making, but 
strengthens the physician-patient relationship, and engenders a better therapeutic outcome.   
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      Unfortunately, not all patients are mentally capable or legally competent to receive and 
process information to make a reasonably informed decision concerning care. As such, clinicians 
need to establish the capacity of a patient for decision-making. Legally, only a judge can make a 
determination that one is incompetent to make personal decisions regarding finances and 
healthcare; however, clinically, sickness, anxiety, or drugs may compromise one’s decisional 
capacity.143 Clinically, mental capacity to give consent entails the ability to receive and process 
information, understanding the consequences of decisions, being able to communicate and think 
rationally about one’s values and goals in relationship to the physician’s recommendation.144 
Obvious situations where this capacity is lacking include: comatose, unconscious, or severely 
demented, in which case a surrogate acts as the decision-maker.145 However, ethical dilemmas 
arise when mental capacity to give consent is questionable, for instance, under the influence of 
drugs, fear, trauma, or severe illness.146 In life-threatening situations, where mental capacity is 
doubtful, a physician has the right to intervene; otherwise, it is necessary to determine decisional 
capacity.147 
     If a physician determines that a patient does not have decision making capacity, then the 
following must be done: 1) determine if the patient has any written advance directives; and 2) 
determine if and whom the surrogate decision-maker is.148 Jonsen et al. list several methods of 
advance planning including, but not limited to: 1) a durable power of attorney for healthcare, 2) 
directive to physicians, and 3) living will.149 Today healthcare institutions are required to ask for 
advance directives and to offer assistance in completing them, if lacking upon admission.150 The 
simplest advance planning is to appoint a durable power of attorney for healthcare, which makes 
decisions regarding one’s healthcare in the event that one becomes incapacitated.151 The patient 
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ought to know the surrogate and she ought to know the patient’s values and desires regarding 
healthcare decisions.152   
       It may also be helpful to have an advance directive or directive to physicians.153 This 
constitutes a legal document expressing to the physician one’s wishes if one is incapacitated.154 
Often this contains a provision appointing a designated decision maker.155 A living will 
expresses one’s wishes in a less formal way, but may provide more guidance regarding quality of 
care or specific conditions.156   
      If healthcare decision-making falls to a surrogate, because of the patient’s incapacity, and 
one is not designated, legislative statutes dictate an order of priority based on relation: 1) spouse, 
2) parents, 3) children, 4) siblings, etc.157 Conflicts may arise because of surrogate incapacity or 
financial interests. Jonsen et al. identify two standards that guide surrogate decision-making: 1) 
substituted judgment and 2) the best interest standard.158 Substituted judgment occurs when the 
patient either expresses preferences explicitly or the surrogate may reasonably infer from the 
patient’s past statements or known values.159 Whenever the patient’s preferences are not known, 
the surrogate ought to makes decisions in the best interest of the patient.160 Needless to say, this 
is not always easy, but ought to be according to known beliefs and values of the patient.161   
      Jonsen et al. identify incapacitated patients without a surrogate or next of kin as an 
“unbefriended or unrepresented patient.”162 Without representation, these patients are highly 
vulnerable. Under such circumstances, the physician team often makes decisions for the 
patient.163 To reduce conflict, Jonsen et al. recommend that hospitals institute policies that allow 
for outside consultation.164  
      Regarding minors, Jonsen et al. indicate that in general, physicians need the consent of a 
parent or guardian to offer treatment; however, there are some exceptions.165 In emergencies, 
 
 190 
minors, those below the age of 18, may be treated without permission according to presumed 
consent.166 In addition, certain procedures or drugs may be administered without parental 
consent, including treatment for sexually transmitted infections, contraception, drug addiction, 
and abortion (though the latter is sometimes explicitly excluded by law in certain states).167 
Moreover, emancipated minors may be treated without parental consent; and under specific 
conditions, mature minors (15 years or older) may be treated.168 Regarding the mentally ill, only 
a psychiatrist may hold a patient against his will for the sole purpose of treating the mental 
illness, however, not other comorbidities, without consent.169   
      Conscientious objection concerns the autonomy of the clinician, sometimes limiting that 
of the patient.170 Ideally, healthcare decision-making takes place within the physician-patient 
relationship as a shared enterprise. If conflicts arise, however, physicians are not always obliged 
to simply do whatever patients want. Physicians should not perform procedures or prescribe 
medicine that is contrary to the goals of medicine.171 In addition, a clinician may object to 
participating in a treatment or procedure that she believes to be immoral.172 For instance, a nurse 
may refuse to assist in an abortion or a pharmacist may refuse to fill a prescription for the 
RU486.173 While existing laws support conscientious objection, there are limits to its ethical 
practice.174 For instance, it is unethical to refuse to treat a patient out of prejudice or for immoral 
notoriety.175 Conscientious objection is a serious moral decision that a clinician must give great 
consideration to, which includes the legal ramifications and potential harm to patients.176 
b. Non-Maleficence and Beneficence 
     Non-maleficence consists of the principle to do no harm.177 Beauchamp et al. present 
non-maleficence in conjunction with beneficence, according to four distinct non-hierarchical 
norms: “1) one ought not to inflict evil or harm; 2) One ought to prevent evil and harm; 3) one 
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ought to remove evil or harm; and 4) One ought to do or promote good.”178 The first requires one 
to intentionally avoid actions, which cause harm, while the latter three, associated with 
beneficence, require one to act helpfully.179 They contrast harm from wronging another.180 
Specifically, harming for them means thwarting, defeating, or setting back a party’s interest.181 
One who is harmed is not necessarily wronged.182 A surgeon may amputate a diseased limb that 
harms a patient, but does not wrong the patient.183 Nor is one necessarily harmed when 
wronged.184 For example, when an insurance company unjustly refuses to pay a patient’s hospital 
bill.185  
      Questions concerning non-maleficence inexorably link to questions on quality of life. 
William May asserts that allowing quality of life and autonomy to either determine or trump the 
dignity of the human person underlies arguments condoning intrinsically evil acts such as active 
voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.186 Under the guise of mercy and respect for 
autonomy proponents defend patients’ and physicians’ rights to such acts.187 Following the 
Catholic tradition, based in Natural Law, May defends the dignity of every human person, 
inexorably part of human nature, and therefore, constituting the basis for the principle of 
autonomy.188 For May, autonomy exists for the purpose of achieving the flourishing of the 
human person as a human person—body and soul.189 According to May, lines of reasoning 
defending euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, presume a dualism that differentiates the 
human person from the human body.190 Moreover, quality of life constitutes the litmus test for 
the dignity or worth of a person’s life, since below an arbitrary threshold life may be justifiably 
terminated.191 This threshold is arbitrary because it depends on the subjective judgment of the 
individual making the determination. May argues that insofar as autonomy and respect for it 
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issues from the dignity of the human person, using it to violate the dignity of the human person, 
under the guise of respect for it, is inconsistent.192   
      Some argue that the slippery slope trajectory of quality of life arguments render it 
untenable for any ethical consideration whatsoever.193 However, May, following the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s reasoning in its Declaration on Euthanasia, insists 
that quality of life does have an important role to play for utilizing treatments.194 One may 
classify treatments, including procedures, medicines, or interventions, as proportionate 
(ordinary) or disproportionate (extraordinary).195 Proportionate treatment consists of any 
treatment that has a reasonable hope of benefit with an acceptable amount of burdensomeness.196 
Disproportionate treatment consists of treatment that the patient or proxy determines to be 
excessively burdensome or futile.197 According to May, respect for the dignity of the human 
person obliges one to accept proportionate treatment, whereas, it permits one to reject 
disproportionate treatment, even when doing so hastens death.198 Quality of life is an important 
factor for determining both the burdensomeness and usefulness of a treatment; as such, it 
maintains an important role for biomedical ethics in the Catholic tradition.199 According to the 
Catholic tradition, one does not use quality of life to make a judgment about the value of one’s 
life in the absolute sense as to whether one should live or die; rather, one makes a judgment 
about treatment.200   
      Beauchamp et al. indicate that patients and families often experience significantly more 
moral distress at the thought of discontinuing treatment, once commenced, than simply foregoing 
it from the beginning.201 This is particularly controversial when it comes to life sustaining 
devices such as cardiovascular implantable electronic devices.202 It is quite distressing because 
deactivation of such devices sometimes leads to immediate death.203 Despite controversy and 
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frequent concomitant moral distress, the difference between foregoing treatment and 
withdrawing does not limit one’s right to reject disproportionate treatment.204  
     The principle of non-maleficence obliges clinicians to do no harm.205 Insofar as it is a 
negative norm, obliging one to refrain from action, non-maleficence accordingly obliges no one 
to do any positive act, which active euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide constitutes.206 
Therefore, alone it cannot justify such acts. Even with other principles, however, insofar as non-
maleficence is a more stringent obligation, it ought to overrule any further consideration of such 
acts.207 Regardless, most medical interventions have some concomitant harm. In all cases, 
however, non-maleficence, in addition to respect for autonomy, limited by respect for the dignity 
of the human person from which autonomy proceeds, demands that one demure from requests to 
kill patients or aiding them in any suicidal act. This exceptionless moral norm, however, does not 
mean that one may not utilize quality of life, along with other factors to determine whether a 
treatment is proportionate, even when one knows that its cessation accelerates death.208   
c. Justice 
     Unlike non-maleficence, the principle of beneficence places a positive obligation, rather 
than, a negative obligation on the clinician to care for a patient.209 Beauchamp et al. list five 
prima facie rules which beneficence obliges: “1) protect and defend the rights of others; 2) 
prevent harm from occurring to others; 3) remove conditions that will cause harm to others; 4) 
help persons with disabilities; and 5) Rescue persons in danger.”210 In particular, however, the 
contractual relationship between physician and patient carries specific obligations on the part of 
the physician, which demand a high degree of professionalism.211   
      According to Jonsen et al., beneficence demands that clinicians always keep the 
wellbeing of the patient above any personal goals.212 Moreover, integral to professionalism is 
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honesty with the patient, collaboration with other caregivers, and respectability.213 Above all, 
physicians ought to avoid exploiting patients for personal gain—financial or otherwise.214 This 
important obligation to avoid exploitation, relates not only to beneficence, but justice and 
fairness as well.215 In particular, it relates to the avoidance of conflicting interests.216   
     Jonsen et al. consider conflicts of interest in detail in the chapter pertaining to contextual 
features.217 Factors such as profession, family, religion, financial, legal, and institution, influence 
the physician-patient relationship, and therefore, require ethical consideration regarding their 
importance in clinical cases.218 Justice, the virtue that pertains to the social distribution of 
benefits and burdens in a fair and equitable manner, is the primary ethical principle for this 
topic.219 Jonsen et al. narrow the focus to fairness, which delineates to participants that which 
each deserves and can reasonably expect in a relationship or transaction.220 In particular, Jonsen 
et al. apply fairness to conflicts of interest; situations where one’s professional role makes it 
possible to take advantage of another.221 Jonsen et al. consider ten questions pertaining to 
contextual features.222  
      First, Jonsen et al. address conflicts of interest in relation to professionalism and 
professional relationships to which he connects to three principles: primacy of patient welfare, 
patient autonomy, and social justice.223 Today physicians have multiple loyalties or allegiances, 
but the principle of primacy of the patient, based on altruism, that is, doing what’s best for 
another, means that whenever conflicts arise, the patient’s priorities take precedence.224 In 
addition to loyalty to patients, physicians have relationships with other medical staff, which may 
give rise to moral distress, when subordinates observe unethical practices of superiors.225 This is 
precisely an issue that Jonsen et al. say ethics consultations ideally resolve.226 To avoid unethical 
practices in physicians’ relationships with business, Jonsen et al. recommend transparency and 
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compliance with the law and recommendations of the American Medical Association Council on 
Ethics and Legal Affairs.227 Finally, Jonsen et al. acknowledge the importance of taking time for 
family, which improves physicians’ health and performance.228   
      Next, Jonsen et al. address the interests of third parties for patient care including: family, 
government, hospital, insurance company, lawyers, employers, etc.229 Family members may be a 
source of aide for the patient or tension and conflict. Whenever family members act as obstacles 
to care, Jonsen et al. recommend attempting to determine the source of conflict and realigning 
cooperation in treatment.230 Often confidentiality, rooted in respect for autonomy of the patient, 
limits the amount of information that physicians can share with family members. However, when 
personal information impacts a third party, confidentiality may be breached.231  
      In 1996, congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which 
regulates confidentiality in healthcare legally on the federal level.232 According to the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, physicians may share medical information when it 
helps the patient or prevents harm to a third party.233 For instance, if a patient has a sexually 
transmitted infection, the physician may inform known sexual partners, if the patient refuses.234 
Furthermore, clinicians have a duty to report suspected cases of physical or sexual abuse and 
when patients intend to harm themselves or others.235   
      Genetic conditions introduce a whole new consideration for confidentiality and its impact 
on third parties, such as, spouses and family planning, and children. Not only do genetic tests 
vary in accuracy, but genetic conditions vary in impact and levels of predisposition.236 In other 
words, testing positive for a particular genetic mutation does not always result in developing the 
pathological condition. In some cases, however, such as Huntington’s disease, genetic testing 
accurately predicts future onset, but not necessarily time or degree of onset. In general, where 
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there is greater accuracy and the pathology more serious, Jonsen et al. recommend that 
physicians encourage patients to share information, especially, if it is likely to have an impact on 
others.237 The Ethical and Religious Directives encourage families to seek genetic counseling, 
and to allow it to inform designs regarding family planning, so long as one follows the Church’s 
teachings regarding the transmission of life.238 
      Fourth, Jonsen et al. address financial conflicts of interest.239 Because of the increasing 
costs relegated to the patient in copays and deductibles, physicians must take into account the 
cost of prescriptions and procedures.240 Moreover, physicians are obliged to inform patients of 
alternative treatment options, even though it may result in a financial loss.241 Regarding transfers 
in emergency departments, Jonsen et al. say that they ought to be made based on medical 
indication, rather than financial incentive.242 Indeed, all medical recommendations should be 
based clinical effectiveness, rather than cost.243   
      Fifth, Jonsen et al. considers the impact of allocating scarce resources on patients.244 
While physicians should not waste resources on futile treatments, they should avoid bedside 
rationing, which is allowing societal efficiency to influence clinical treatment of patients.245 
Catastrophic events may necessitate triaging, the limitation of resources to rescue workers, or the 
most likely to survive, before treating terminal patients. Outside of these extreme circumstances, 
physicians should make decisions based on medical indication on the clinical level, rather than 
consideration for the use of societal resources.246   
     Sixth, Jonsen et al. address the role of religion in the clinical setting.247 Both physicians 
and patient find great meaning in religion. For patients, this is especially true when they are sick, 
suffering or nearing death. Jonsen et al. encourage mutual respect regarding religious views, but 
not neglect or exclusion from a discussion, especially insofar as it may impact a patient’s 
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openness to and compliance with treatment.248 For this reason, Jonsen et al. encourage physicians 
to discuss religious views with patients in an understanding way and to seek accurate information 
from appropriate resources such as chaplains.249   
       Seventh, Jonsen et al. consider the legal issues that may affect clinical decision-
making.250 Eighth, Jonsen et al. speak to the influence that research and education may play in 
clinical decisions.251 A physician has conflicting interests whenever he or she is both a clinician 
and researcher.252 Clinical research involves intervention or observation on patients or normal 
volunteers for the purpose of gaining scientific knowledge.253 It is essential to appropriately 
inform participants and to receive consent, without coercion.254 Institutional review boards 
assure that experiments follow ethical procedures, inform participants of risks/benefits, receive 
consent, compensate participants fairly, do no harm, or take advantage of vulnerable 
populations.255 
      This section analyzes proficiencies for health care ethics consultations from the 
perspective of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health 
Administration. Then discusses the impact that principlism and the Ethical and Religious 
Directive have on health care ethics consultations. The following section examines another 
important principle of health care ethics from the perspective of the Ethical and Religious 
Directives.   
4B. Principle of Cooperation 
     This section explores the development of cooperation, beginning with its origin in 
Thomistic action theory and Liguori’s moral theology. It also considers the development of 
Cooperation in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services of the 
United States Catholic Bishops. Then, it articulates two contemporary formulations of the 
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Principle of Cooperation, one that addresses the impact of proportionalism and another that 
considers the mirror Principle of Appropriation.  
i. Principle of Cooperation 
      Just as acts may have more than one effect, so one’s acts may contribute to another’s bad 
act. The Principle of Double Effect accounts for the former, while the Principle of Cooperation 
accounts for the latter.256 This section compares Cooperation with Double Effect.   
a. Cooperation and Double Effect: 
      Ethicists highlight the similarities between Double Effect and Cooperation.257 The former 
elucidates when an act with both a good and evil effect may occur, just as the latter illuminates 
when and how much one’s act may licitly contribute to the evil of another. Contrary to the 
Principle of Tolerance, in Double Effect and Cooperation, an agent commits an act.258 While 
Double Effect considers the morality of one’s act in relationship to two effects: one evil, the 
other good, Cooperation considers the morality of two distinct acts attributable to two distinct 
agents: one agent’s act contributing to another’s immoral act. Traditional formulations of Double 
Effect have four or five conditions that correspond to similar conditions in Cooperation.259 First, 
regarding Double Effect, the object of the act must be good or indifferent.260 Consequently, the 
first condition of Cooperation insists that the act of the cooperator must be good or indifferent.261   
      Next, Double Effect insists that the agent must not intend the evil effect, but the good 
effect.262 Put another way, one may only foresee the evil effect, but one must not intend it.263 As 
such, the next condition for Cooperation concerns the intent of the cooperator. The agent must 
not intend the evil that the principal agent intends.264 Formal cooperation in evil exists when the 
cooperator agrees with the evil intent of the primary agent.265 The cooperator is guilty insofar as 
the will conforms to the evil intent of the principal agent.266    
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      Clearly, intention—broadly speaking—plays a primary role for both principles. 267 First, 
intention determines the proximate end of the act, which constitutes the Moral Object.268 Second, 
intention determines the remote end that the agent intends.269 Therefore, the intention of the will 
is the primary means for determining the sinfulness of a cooperator’s act in the aid of another’s 
sin.270 The first two conditions of Cooperation rule out formal cooperation.   
       In Double Effect, the third condition insists that the evil effect must not be the means to 
or cause of the good effect.271 Therefore, correspondingly, the condition for Cooperation insists 
that the principal agent must be the cause of the evil, not the cooperator’s act.272 Thus, the 
cooperator’s act must be sufficiently distant from that of the primary agent. Insofar as the 
cooperator does not agree with the evil intent of the principal agent, it is material.273 However, 
regarding distance, one must first determine whether an act constitutes immediate or mediate 
material cooperation.274 Immediate material cooperation occurs when one cooperates in the act 
itself in such a way that one’s participation is indispensable to the act’s completion.275 For 
instance, a nurse assisting a physician in a sterilization constitutes immediate material 
cooperation. According to traditional formulates, immediate material cooperation is always 
immoral, and therefore, forbidden, which this third condition rules out ethically.276  
      On the other hand, mediate material cooperation is more distant from the principal 
agent’s act. This occurs when one performs an act that paves the way for the immoral act to 
occur.277 For instance, the nurse prepping the patient for sterilization or doing post-operative 
care, both constitute mediate material cooperation. Therefore, the difference between immediate 
and mediate cooperation concerns the level of participation, the former comprising the joining of 
the principal agent in the act, while the latter is distant enough that the principal agent does not 
depend so much on the cooperator’s act that without it the evil deed could not be done.278   
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      While formal cooperation in evil and immediate cooperation in evil are always morally 
forbidden, mediate material cooperation in evil may be permissible if the appropriate criteria 
exist.279 Alphonsus Liguori first articulates a rudimentary version of Cooperation in his Moral 
Theology.280 He observes that servants, in particular, often find themselves in precarious 
situations, whereby they contribute in some way to the sinful actions of their masters.281 For 
example, masters may expect a servant to saddle a horse in anticipation of visiting a brothel or 
accompanying the master thereto.282 Insofar as refusing to offer assistance places the servant in 
jeopardy of losing his job, thus posing a grave inconvenience, Liguori argues that the servant 
may comply with the expectations of the master to the extent that one’s actions remain remote to 
the master’s sin.283 Liguori offers two criteria that if met satisfy his Principle of Legitimate 
Material Cooperation:284 1) the act in question must be morally good or indifferent itself; and 2) 
there must be a proportionately good reason for committing the act.285 The first two conditions of 
Cooperation address Liguori’s first criteria, as the above demonstrates. His second criterion, 
however, corresponds to the fourth condition. In Double Effect, the good effect must be 
proportionate to the evil effect.286 For instance, in the removal of a cancerous, gravid uterus, 
saving the mother’s life is proportionate to the evil of the child’s death. For Cooperation, the 
cooperator’s decision to act must be proportionate to either the evil avoided or the good 
promoted.287   
     Based on the condition of proportionality, Liguori indicates that the obligation of charity 
does not extend to the point of gravely inconveniencing the cooperator.288 For instance, Liguori 
argues that for grave reason, such as fear of losing one’s job, a servant could saddle a horse or 
accompany a master to a brothel.289 Moreover, a nurse may decide to cooperate in a mediate 
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material way in the sterilization of a patient by prepping or caring for the patient post-
operatively, because failing to do so means losing one’s job or harms the patient.   
      Therefore, according to the fourth condition of Cooperation, ethicists further differentiate 
mediate material cooperation utilizing: distance and dispensability.290 Regarding distance one 
may further distinguish between proximate and remote cooperation.291 If the cooperator’s act is 
causally close to that of the primary agent’s act, then it is proximate.292 If causally further away, 
then the act is remote.293 For instance, the nurse prepping a patient for sterilization proximately 
cooperates, while the administrative assistant at the front desk remotely cooperates.294 In both 
cases of mediate material cooperation, the agent performs a good or indifferent act that the 
primary agent uses as an occasion for sin.295 However, the closer one is to the primary agent’s 
act, the more serious one’s justification must be.   
      In addition to considering how closely one’s act relates to the primary agent’s act, one 
may also consider how indispensable one’s mediate material cooperation is.296 To be clear, one is 
not answering whether one’s act inexorably connects to the principal agent’s act—the affirmative 
constituting immediate material cooperation (always forbidden) and the negative making it 
mediate material cooperation (sometimes permitted)—but how indispensable one’s already 
constituted mediate material cooperating act is to supporting the principal agent’s act. If one’s 
participation is necessary, that is, if one refuses to perform one’s job, thereby preventing the 
occurrence of the immoral procedure, then one needs a more serious reason not to object; for 
instance, if one is the only nurse that can prep a patient for an immoral procedure.297 On the other 
hand, if one is more dispensable or free, then one needs a less serious reason to object; for 
instance, if another nurse could simply step in and fill the role.298   
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      At first glance, this may seem counterintuitive. One may object, for instance, insisting 
that since in the second scenario other nurses could perform the objectionable task one is freer, 
and therefore, more obliged to object than in the first scenario, where the nurse is seemly less 
free to object without graver consequences. The rationale is that the more indispensable one is, 
the greater one’s duty to object.299 In other words, because other nurses could just as easily step 
in and complete the task in the second scenario, it is more efficacious for one to object.      
      Orville N. Griese in Catholic Identity and Health Care: Principles and Practice 
highlights a corollary condition to the proportionality condition in these principles.300 Just as 
there ought not to be any legitimate alternative to the act in question for Double Effect,301 so one 
may perform an act that cooperates with another’s evil, if and only if, a legitimate alternative 
does not exist.302 This constitutes the fifth condition in both principles.303 For example, if a nurse 
could excuse oneself from assisting in immoral procedures without fear of retribution, he ought 
to do so.304   
      The above demonstrates a connection between these principles that ethicists traditionally 
maintain. Intention plays a primary role, both in characterizing the proximate end and the remote 
end in the first two conditions. In addition, sufficient separation from the principal agent’s action 
also has a vital role for justifying mediate material cooperation. The following subsection 
elucidates Cooperation through its application to sterilizations in Catholic health care facilities. 
ii. Cooperation and Sterilization 
      This subsection closely scrutinizes the United States Bishops’ use of Cooperation to 






     Catholic hospitals receive pressure to perform intrinsically evil procedures such as 
abortions and sterilizations in their facilities.305 Moreover, economic advantages also coerce 
Catholic institutions to form joint ventures with non-Catholic hospitals that do perform 
procedures that violate exceptionless moral norms. J. F. Keenan and Thomas R. Kopfensteiner in 
“The Principle of Cooperation: Theologians Explain Material and Formal Cooperation,” defend 
the use of Cooperation not only by individuals, but also by institutions.306 Gerard Magill in 
“Organizational Ethics” indicates that while one applies moral responsibility to institutions, this 
is only done analogously, since moral responsibility ultimately belongs to individual persons.307 
Because so much is on the line when considering such enterprises—including the closing of 
facilities—bishops use Cooperation to justify joint ventures where possible.308 The wide 
availability, high public acceptability, and high utilization of contraceptive services, including 
sterilization makes this a particularly precarious sticking point for Catholic hospitals considering 
joint ventures.   
      In 1975, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith responds to a request for 
clarification on the Church’s stance on sterilization in Catholic health care facilities.309 It 
categorically rejects any Catholic hospitals formally cooperating in—giving approval or consent 
to—procedures that are “directed to a contraceptive end,” including sterilizations that 
deliberately impede “the natural effects of sexual actions.”310 It also affirms the traditional 
doctrine regarding material cooperation “to be applied with the utmost prudence,  if the case 
warrants.”311 In addition, it advises, “great care must be taken against scandal and the danger of 
any misunderstanding by an appropriate explanation of what is really being done.”312   
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      In 1977, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops offers commentary on the above 
mentioned document.313 After restating the three principles that the Congregation offers 
verbatim, the United States Bishops present six guidelines for hospital policy.314 First, citing the 
Congregation’s document, it affirms that Catholic hospitals may not approve sterilization 
procedures that are directly contraceptive, even for medical reasons, for instance, to prevent 
pregnancy in women in which pregnancy foreseeably aggravates a serious condition.315 Two, the 
United States Bishops acknowledge that Catholic hospitals have both the responsibility and legal 
right to choose which procedures it will or will not perform.316 However, in the extraordinary 
circumstance where hospitals are under duress or pressure, and “when it will do more harm than 
good,” hospitals may materially cooperate in such procedures.317 Three, since this may only 
happen in extraordinary circumstances, the decision making must involve the bishop or his 
representative, to allay scandal.318 Fourth, they insists that after carefully weighing the evidence, 
hospitals must cooperate only in a material sense, not a formal sense.319 In other words, the 
hospital must not agree to the sterilization procedure because of medical reasons, which 
constitute formal cooperation, but because of pressure to cooperate that results in more harm 
than good.320 Fifth, because of the extraordinary nature of such circumstances, the Bishops insist 
that hospitals consider each situation on a case-by-case basis, not presuming that the same 
decision applies to all cases.321 Finally, to diminish scandal, the Bishops recommend that 
hospitals explain their decision, reaffirming their disapproval for sterilization, of which material 
cooperation does not constitute.322   
      In 1980, the United States Bishops promulgate another document on the topic of 
sterilization, focusing more specifically on tubal ligations.323 After reaffirming the prohibition on 
sterilization in the two previously mentioned documents, they further emphasize that the 
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reasoning for justification must be extrinsic to the case in consideration.324 Thus, one must avoid 
formal cooperation with evil, which choosing sterilization for medical reasons constitutes. An 
extrinsic example that they offer in their commentary on the Congregation’s document is the 
greater evil of closing a hospital by, for instance, exhausting the financial resources of the 
hospital on litigation.325 Moreover, they recommend increased and continued collaboration 
between the local ordinary, the health care facility, and the sponsoring religious community.326 
The reemphasis on the extrinsic nature of the justification for material cooperation in Catholic 
health care facilities foreshadows the vacillation on presenting the Church’s teaching on material 
cooperation in future editions of the Ethical and Religious Directives.   
b. The United States Bishops’ and Cooperation 
      The third edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives contains an articulation of the 
Principle of Cooperation in its appendix that diverges slightly from traditional versions, which 
later gives rise to conflict with the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.327 First, it 
highlights the distinction between formal and material cooperation, emphasizing that in formal 
cooperation the cooperator intends the same object as the principal agent.328 In addition, based on 
an argument that intention not only constitutes an explicit act of the will, they argue that implicit 
formal cooperation occurs when the object of the cooperator’s action is indistinguishable from 
that of the principal agent’s, regardless of what she says.329 Next, they distinguish between 
immediate and mediate material cooperation.330 Immediate material cooperation, like implicit 
formal cooperation has the same object as the principal agent, but acts under duress or pressure, 
some of which, but not all may morally justify one’s acting.331 Alternatively, if the cooperator’s 
object remains distinct from the principal agent’s, then it constitutes mediate material 
cooperation, “and can be morally licit.”332 The United States Bishops also mention the role that 
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distance and proportion play in characterizing and justifying mediate material cooperation.333 
Finally, they mention the virtue of prudence, the factor of scandal, and the prophetic role of the 
Church in the world.334    
      Only six years later, in the fourth edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives, the 
newly formed United States Conference of Catholic Bishops eliminate the appendix on “The 
Principles Governing Cooperation,” indicating in the introduction to the sixth part on “Forming 
New Partnerships with Health Care Organizations and Providers,” that the brief summary did not 
forestall misinterpretations and even gave rise to problems in application.335 Kevin D. O’Rourke 
et al. offer some explanation for the change in their article “A Brief History: A Summary of the 
Development of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services.”336  
First, O’Rourke explains that the need for a more authoritative set of directives for Catholic 
health care systems in the United States, one that overcomes so-called “geographical morality,” 
first arose in the late 1960s because of the rise in proportionalism and its use to justify 
intrinsically evil acts such as sterilizations in Catholic hospitals.337 Because of the poor reception 
among proportionalist ethicists, the Bishops submit the matter to the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith.338 Which, in turn, leads to the above mentioned response on sterilization 
by the Congregation to the United States Bishops.339 
       O’Rourke explains that the third edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives results 
from the necessity to provide a theological basis for the legalistic pronouncements of the 
previous two editions, and to address new issues that arise since its first two promulgations, 
including, consent in research, advance directives, and cooperation with non-Catholic 
facilities.340 Contrary to what Keenan and Kopfensteiner hold,341 O’Rourke contends that the 
United States Bishops did not have approval from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
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for the appendix on Cooperation, before its vote approving the third edition, which includes the 
appendix, in November of 1994.342 In the spring of 1999, the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith asks Bishop Joseph A. Fiorenza, the president of the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops to revisit the sixth part of the third edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives, the 
appendix on cooperation and the 1977 commentary on the Congregation’s document on 
sterilization, insisting that these documents contribute to misapplication of cooperation and the 
principle of partnerships.343 The fourth edition incorporates four changes to the sixth part of the 
third edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives: 1) a new directive, 70 forbids Catholic 
health care institutions from engaging in immediate material cooperation in intrinsically evil acts 
such as sterilization, 2) they eliminate the appendix on cooperation altogether, 3) a footnote 
indicates that the directive 70 supersedes the 1977 commentary on Quaecumque Sterilizatio, and 
4) they give a definition for scandal that coincides more with the Catechism’s definition.344 
c. The Object of the Cooperator 
      O’Rourke’s article implies that the United States Bishops took liberty in their 
interpretation on Cooperation not consistent with traditional articulations and the Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith calls them to task on this.345 I argue that this misinterpretation by the 
United States Bishops centers on a misunderstanding of the Moral Object and its relationship to 
Cooperation. First, the appendix says that formal cooperation exists when the cooperator intends 
the same object as the principal agent.346 Second, the appendix distinguishes between implicit 
and explicit formal cooperation, suggesting that the difference consists in the spoken intention of 
the agent, while, once again, the commonality is in the Moral Object.347   
      By definition, however, Cooperation always has two distinct agents and two distinct 
actions.348 In formal cooperation, the cooperator agrees with the intention of the principal agent, 
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but his act always remains distinct, contributing nonetheless to the principal agent’s act. 
Otherwise it does not constitute a case of Cooperation at all, but of two people choosing the same 
object, which amounts to the same act, which amounts to two co-principal agents. As such, it is 
one thing to agree with another’s Moral Object, and to aid him in completion, and quite another 
to intend the same Moral Object in act. This is because, by definition, the Moral Object is the 
species of the act itself.349   
      Shedding more light on intention gives greater clarity. Aquinas indicates that intention is 
an act of the will towards an end.350 Broadly speaking, intending may refer to the remote end or 
the proximate end (Moral Object).351 In act, however, one always chooses a specific means to 
one’s end, the means constituting a Moral Object.352 Conceptually, one may distinguish the end 
from the means, in act they constitute a single act of the will.353 Therefore, if one intends the 
same Moral Object as another, then one no longer merely cooperates, but commits the same act, 
which constitutes co-principal agents, and Cooperation does not apply.354 In Compromise and 
Complicity, Chiara Lepora and Robert E. Goodin distinguish ‘complicity simpliciter’ from other 
colloquial uses that involve co-prinicipalship: full joint wrongdoing, co-operation, conspiracy, 
and collusion.355 In complicity simpliciter, the secondary agent contributes causally to the 
principal agent’s wrongdoing, as opposed to merely doing wrong together.356   
      Another important distinction is that between the physical act itself—prescinded from its 
voluntariness—and the act as moral, which also clarifies that choosing the same Moral Object is 
choosing the same act. Acts are moral insofar as they are voluntary, and therefore on the moral 
order, not the natural order.357 Consequently, two distinct physical acts may indeed constitute a 
common Moral Object; however, insofar as they do, they also constitute the same moral act. For 
instance, if one chooses to kill someone, it does not matter how one does it in the physical sense, 
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that is, whether one uses a gun or a knife, the Moral Object remains the same, a choice to kill 
another person. As such, insofar as two individuals have the same Moral Object, they also have 
the same act, even if, in manifestation, they commit unique physical acts. Therefore, once again, 
insofar as they commit the same act, Cooperation does not apply.   
      As such, the appendix on Cooperation in the third edition of the Ethical and Religious 
Directives should maintain the distinction between agreeing with another’s action—regardless of 
whether it is object or remote end—and having the same object as the principal agent. Although 
Cooperation necessitates that the cooperator’s object be distinct from the principal agent’s, 
formal cooperation, by definition also means that the cooperator’s act is immoral.358 For 
instance, the getaway driver in a bank robbery plays a distinctly different role in the activity, but 
nonetheless, agrees with the principal agent’s object of stealing money and provides an 
invaluable role as the getaway driver. An inexorable link between the two actions exists, but the 
objects remain distinct. The principal agent, the bank robber steals believing that the getaway 
driver will provide a necessary means of escape. Likewise, the getaway driver provides the 
means of escape to the robber agreeing with the Moral Object of the principal agent’s act, 
probably presuming a share in the loot.   
      The premise that intention consists of something more than an explicit act of the will, 
which specifies the distinction between explicit and implicit formal cooperation is ambiguous, if 
not misleading, and therefore, in need of greater clarification. The above demonstrates that 
intention abstracted from its voluntariness consists of the physical act alone (genus naturae).359 
To be sure, one may speak as though there is a difference between intending the proximate end 
or remote end, but in action there is one act of the will.360 The ethicists of the National Catholic 
Bioethics Center offer a definition for explicit and implicit formal cooperation in evil that 
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accounts for this difference in Moral Objects that the Cooperation necessitates. For them, explicit 
formal cooperation occurs when one agrees with the evil acts of the principal agent and 
intentionally chooses acts, which make it possible for the agent to do them.361 Alternatively, 
implicit formal cooperation occurs when one “intentionally contributes to the principal agent’s 
act not for the sake of the evil act itself, but as a means to some other end of the cooperator.”362 
For example, a Catholic hospital may agree with a non-Catholic hospital’s intention to provide 
sterilizations, making the process for obtaining these within the joint venture more attainable. On 
the other hand, the Catholic hospital may actually not agree with the practice of sterilizations, but 
nonetheless expedite the process for obtaining them in the non-Catholic portion of the facility, 
because doing so increases the bottom line. The former constitutes explicit cooperation, because 
the cooperator agrees with the principal agent, while the latter constitutes implicit cooperation, 
because although they disagree with the principal agent’s intention, they nonetheless choose 
means which contribute both to the attainment of the principal agent’s means and goal—
providing sterilizations—and the goal of making more money. In implicit cooperation, the act of 
the principal agent becomes a means to the goal of the cooperator. Regardless, in no way does 
this definition fit the United States Bishops’ definition, which maintains that the agent intends 
the same Moral Object as the principal agent.363 
      In addition to agreeing with the evil intention of the principal agent, formal cooperation 
also has the cooperator committing an immoral act, that is, choosing a distinct, but nonetheless 
immoral object.364 On the other hand, in material cooperation, the cooperator both disagrees with 
the intention of the principal agent and commits an act that is morally good or indifferent.365 
While ethicists unequivocally forbid any form of formal cooperation, if sufficient distance exists 
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between the cooperator’s act and the principal agent’s act and a proportionate reason exists, then 
ethicists permit, at least, mediate material cooperation.366   
      In contrast, the appendix asserts that both immediate material cooperation and implicit 
formal cooperation have the same object as the principal agent and that the only difference 
between the former and the latter is that the cooperator experiences duress in immediate materia l 
cooperation, but not in implicit formal cooperation.367 Again, if the cooperator and the agent 
have the same object, then they are co-principal agents and Cooperation does not apply.368 
Following the traditional formulation of the Principle of Cooperation, the ethicists of the 
National Catholic Bioethics Center maintain that immediate material cooperation “occurs when 
the cooperator assists in or contributes to the essential circumstances of the immoral act.” 369 
Mediate material cooperation, on the other hand, “occurs when the cooperator assists in or 
contributes to the nonessential circumstances of an immoral act.”370 Since one assists in a 
derivative sense in bringing about an intrinsically evil act in immediate material cooperation, this 
constitutes an immoral act that one must always avoid.371   
     Peter J. Cataldo in “Models of Health Care Collaboration” offers four characteristics for 
licit collaboration between Catholic and non-Catholic health care entities.372 First, Cataldo insists 
that collaborations must avoid institutional integration of governance, management, or 
finances.373 Second, certain powers must be reserved for institutional integrity and 
independence.374 Third, each institution must maintain its own assets and liabilities.375 Finally, 
any and all joint activities must be incompliance with the Ethical and Religious Directives.376 
Consequently, Catholic health care institutions commit formal cooperation if the management of 
the non-Catholic entity that performs immoral procedures falls under the Catholic executive 
management, if one does not adequately delineate the earnings from immoral procedures or if the 
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Catholic entity provides space or support for the non-Catholic entity to perform these 
procedures.377    
      The above mentioned changes to the Ethical and Religious Directives and the retraction 
of what the United States Bishops say in its commentary on the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith’s document on sterilization point to a faulty interpretation of Cooperation, which 
connects to its poor use of the object of the act in the appendix to the third edition of the Ethical 
and Religious Directives. Though not an explicitly written teaching, the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith simply reaffirms a traditional interpretation of Cooperation, based on a 
Thomistic understanding of the object of the act, one that forbids both formal cooperation and 
immediate material cooperation in intrinsically evil acts.   
d. The United States Bishops’ 2018 Articulation of Cooperation 
      In 2018, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops published the sixth edition of 
the Ethical and Religious for Catholic Health Care Services, which offers new directives for 
collaborative arrangements, and a new introduction to the Principle of Cooperation. This 
subsubsection briefly illuminates this.  
      To begin with, the United States Bishops define formal cooperation quoting Pope John 
Paul II’s definition in Evangelium Vitae, “Formal cooperation ‘occurs when an action, either by 
its very nature or by the form it takes in a concrete situation, can be defined as a direct 
participation in an [immoral] act…or a sharing in the immoral intention of the person committing 
it.’”378 Moreover, they insist that formal cooperation not only includes holding the same 
intention as the principal agent, but also participating directly in the immoral act.379 In addition, 
they contend that one formally cooperates even if one does agree with the intention of the 
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principal agent, but simply uses one’s participation as a means to some other end.380 The above 
discussion identifies this as implicit formal cooperation.381  
      In contrast, they define material cooperation as disagreeing with the principal agent’s 
intention, not participating directly in the immoral act (including as a means to another end), but 
contributing causally, not essentially.382 In addition, they hold that some instances of this are 
morally wrong, while others are justifiable. Then, they delineate factors for consideration: moral 
object of the cooperator; how much the cooperator’s act causally contributes to the evil act, and 
how important the goods are to be preserved or harms to be avoided.  
      Importantly, the United States Bishops, in contrast to the articulation of Cooperation in 
the third edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives replace object with intention.383 
Moreover, in accord with editions following the third, they continue to prohibit immediate 
material cooperation and uniquely any material cooperation with abortion.384 The following 
subsection considers contemporary authors on Cooperation. 
iii. Contemporary Contributions to Cooperation 
     This subsection discusses two contributions to the development of Cooperation. Luke 
Gormally highlights important differences between a consequentialist interpretation of 
Cooperation and one that is consistent with Thomistic virtue ethics. M. Cathleen Kaveny offers a 
mirror principle to Cooperation, that accounts for appropriation of evil.   
a. Rejecting the ‘No Difference Argument’ 
      Christopher Kutz in Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age highlights an 
important deficiency in consequentialism, which bases the determination of right action on the 
consequences of one’s act.385 According to Kutz, consequentialism does not account for 
wrongdoing, where choosing otherwise does not have an impact on the outcome of a scenario.386 
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For example, since one pilot’s decision to not drop his bombs in an air raid does not change the 
outcome for innocent civilians, consequentialism does not account for such an ethical 
decision.387 Luke Gormally in “Why Not Dirty Your Hands?  Or: on the Supposed Rightness of 
(Sometimes) Intentionally Cooperating in Wrongdoing,” attributes the latter form of reasoning, 
which he calls the “‘no difference’ argument,” to consequentialism.388 Contrary to the 
implication of the title of his paper, which makes use of a common cliché for complicity,389 he 
subscribes to a Thomistic virtue ethic that emphasizes intention and affirms the existence of 
absolute moral norms determined by Natural Law.390 Gormally rejects the above mentioned line 
of reasoning by revealing the faulty logic issuing from consequentialism.391 Second, he affirms 
the traditional Christian position that actions form character, and therefore, one intention in 
cooperation is primary. The following articulates the Thomistic action theory that underlies 
Gormally’s critique of consequentialism’s version of Cooperation.    
     First, Gormally connects human dignity with the good through the first principle of 
Natural Law: Insofar as the good leads to human flourishing it ought to be sought and evil, 
leading to diminution, ought to be avoided.392 Insofar as connaturality abides between the good 
and flourishing human nature, objective moral absolutes that guide human action also exist.393 
Moral absolutes, such as the prohibition of killing innocent people and exclusion of adultery, 
correspond to respect for the good in each and every human person due to their dignity.394 Most 
importantly, Gormally indicates that moral absolutes constitute types of action that have 
reference to practical reason issuing as proposals for choice.395 Proposals, as reasons for action 
constitute the Moral Object.396 While virtue ethicists often make a distinction between the Moral 
Object and the remote end, both incorporate intention, which consists of an act of the will as 
choice for a particular proposal configured by reason.397   
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     Gormally uses Thomistic action theory to debunk four erroneous propositions that 
consequentialism engenders.398 First, consequentialism perpetuates a myth that one is equally 
responsible for the foreseeable consequences of refusing to cooperate as one is for 
cooperating.399 Second, the right choice depends on a calculation of utility and disutility based on 
foreseeable consequences.400 Third, there are no moral absolutes; the right circumstances or 
goals can justify any action.401 Fourth, all effects are important for calculating the utility of 
action.402 By implication, Double Effect and Cooperation do not matter.403   
      In a consequentialist framework, the right action gives rise to the best state of affairs, 
regardless of intention as means or end.404 It presumes that humans have more control than they 
actually do; for instance, not only to control outcomes, but also to judge what the best outcome 
in fact is.405 Moreover, consequentialism neglects the formative nature of acts. One becomes 
virtuous by choosing virtuous acts; conversely, one becomes vicious by choosing vicious acts.406   
     Gormally defends a Thomistic action theory as foundational for Cooperation. In 
articulating the errors of consequentualism, he demonstrates the formative role of intention.  
b. M. Cathleen Kaveny’s Appropriation of Evil 
      In Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul II insists that it is immoral to support intrinsically 
unjust laws that permit immoral acts such as abortion or euthanasia.407 However, Gerard Magill 
recalls in “Complicity of Catholic Healthcare Institutions with Immoral Laws,” John Paul II 
permits politicians to support laws that restrict immoral procedures in societies where 
overturning permissive laws entirely is not possible, a notion that John Finnis articulates in 
“Helping Enact Unjust Laws without Complicity in Injustice.”408 In “Voting and Complicity in 
Wrongdoing,” M. Cathleen Kaveny notes that Joseph Ratzinger, unlike several United States 
Bishops and clergy, with moderation applies Cooperation to citizens voting for politicians who 
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support laws that permit immoral acts.409 She contends that individuals who highjack 
Cooperation to mobilize for pro-life politicians misuse the principle, which traditionally helps 
one identify and avoid sinful acts that support other sinful acts.410 Just like the lack of integrity in 
the analogy between slavery and abortion, so the lack of integrity in the use of material 
cooperation to mobilize voters to support pro-life politicians does more damage to the cause than 
good.411   
      In “Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image,” Kaveny argues for a mirror 
principle to Cooperation, appropriation of evil, what I call the Principle of Appropriation that 
accounts for dilemmas where agents must decide whether or not to utilize the fruits or 
byproducts of another’s evil act.412 In Cooperation, the morally conscientious cooperator 
deliberates to what extent one’s acts may licitly contribute to a principal agent’s evil act.413 
Alternatively, in Appropriation the morally conscientious agent (the appropriator) considers 
whether one may appropriate the evil results of another agent’s (auxiliary agent) evil act to 
complete one’s end.414 Kaveny indicates that the similarity between the two consists in an 
auxiliary agent performing an action that facilitates or supports the principal agent’s efforts in 
performing his or her own act.415  
      In short, Kaveny sees the development of Appropriation as consistent with the 
reemergence of a Thomistic virtue theory that focuses on morality of action from the first-person 
perspective since it proceeds from intention and forms character.416 Intent on forming well-
equipped confessors, under the manualists, morality becomes increasingly extrinsic with 
increasing emphasis on the objective causality of action and less attention to how intention forms 
character.417 With such a prospective focus, manualists simply do not adequately account for 
how the appropriation of other’s evil acts impact character.418 The retrieval of the first-person 
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perspective of morality, true to Aquinas, opens the door to considering not only how one’s 
actions may contribute to another’s evil actions or goals, as in Cooperation, but also how 
another’s evil may contribute to one’s own actions or goals, as in Appropriation .419 Essentially, 
Kaveny identifies an irreducible difference between Cooperation and Appropriation that is the 
difference between the first-person perspective of the auxiliary agent and the first-person 
perspective of the principal agent, respectively.420 
     In practice, moral analysis consists of a snapshot of a scenario. For Kaveny, Cooperation 
and Appropriation constitute two unique perspectives for moral analysis that explain some 
dilemmas. Their irreducibility means that one or the other is a better fit for a given situation, the 
determination of which boils down to whether the decision maker is using or contributing to 
another’s bad action.421 To illustrate, Kaveny deconstructs Russell E. Smith’s use of Cooperation 
to explain why researchers ought not to use aborted fetuses in research.422 Although Smith 
identifies the use of electively aborted fetuses for research as proximate, mediate, contingent, 
material cooperation, his objection to their use in research has to do with the further denigration 
of the lives of the aborted children insofar as researchers treat them merely as instruments for 
medical progress.423 Moreover, he argues that research on electively aborted fetuses gives 
scandal insofar as it gives the impression of formal cooperation in evil.424 For Kaveny, the 
weakness of Smith’s argument is that the primary ethical dilemma is a problem of appropriation, 
not cooperation.425  
     Kaveny holds that the difference between intention—purposeful causality,426 wishing—
desire uncoupled from causation,427 and prediction—a judgment that an event will happen,428 
illustrates exactly who is morally culpable for which action. Agents are responsible for the 
means that they intend, less for what they wish, and not at all for what they predict.429 Kaveny 
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exemplifies the uniqueness regarding the moral scrutiny for wishing by explaining that parents 
wishing for an organ for their dying child do not necessarily wish for the death of a would-be 
donor.430 In wishing, one may pick and choose which mean lead to desired ends, without regard 
for causation.431 Intending, on the other hand, according to Kaveny includes the choosing of 
specific causal means to achieve one’s end.432 Unlike intending or wishing, predicting only 
involves the intellect, which judges based on evidence the likelihood that a particular event may 
happen.433   
      In light of these distinctions, Kaveny illustrates the dilemma of using electively aborted 
fetuses for research.434 First, she insists that the problem is one of appropriation, not cooperation. 
Second, although the researchers predict the availability of the fetuses for research, they do not 
necessarily intend the abortion.435 Moreover, she asserts that they certainly wish for and predict a 
successful outcome for their research, which depends on a steady supply of fetal tissue, but this 
does not constitute intending the fetuses’ death, since wishing is uncoupled with causality.436   
      Kaveny presents two other concepts for Cooperation and Appropriation that account for 
contamination: seepage and self-deception.437 Seepage occurs when the description of one’s act 
by another influences the self-concept of one’s own acting.438 For instance, if an abortionist 
presumes that a researcher making use of fetal tissue approves of his immoral act, and the 
researcher begins to approve of abortion. Self-deception occurs when one deceives oneself into 
accepting the immoral intentions of the other.439 For example, if a researcher begins to intend 
more abortions to increase the stock of fetal tissue for research.   
c. Double Effect and Appropriation 
     If Appropriation is similar to Cooperation, then the conditions of Double Effect that 
apply analogously to Cooperation should apply to Appropriation.   
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      The first two conditions of Double Effect and Cooperation pertain to intention, as Moral 
Object and remote end. First, for Double Effect the Moral Object in question must be either good 
or indifferent.440 For Cooperation, the cooperator’s act must be morally good or indifferent.441 
Therefore, for Appropriation the appropriator’s act must be morally good or indifferent. Second, 
for Double Effect the agent must intend the good effect and not the bad effect.442 For 
Cooperation, the cooperator must not intend the evil of the principal agent.443 For Appropriation, 
the principal agent must not intend or ratify the act of the auxiliary agent.444 In Cooperation, a 
cooperator intending the evil of the principal agent constitutes formal cooperation, just as an 
appropriator ratifying the evil act of an auxiliary agent constitutes formal appropriation, both of 
which are unquestionably immoral.445   
     The third condition of Double Effect is that the bad effect must not cause (or be the 
means to) the good effect.446 In Cooperation, the principal agent, not the cooperator, must be the 
primary cause of the evil act, which she appropriates from the cooperator.447 In Appropriation the 
principal agent utilizes the evil act or byproduct to accomplish one’s goal. Accordingly, the 
principal agent must not depend on the auxiliary’s evil act in an inexorable way to accomplish 
his task. Just as the third condition for Cooperation rules out immediate material cooperation, so 
it should rule out immediate material appropriation. 
      The fourth condition for Double Effect necessitates that one have a proportionate reason 
to permit the foreseen, yet unintended evil effect.448 Similarly, for Cooperation, the more serious 
the evil of the principal agent, the more serious the justification for accepting the mediate 
material cooperation, of which distance and dispensability play a crucial role in determining. 
Consequently, for Appropriation, the principal agent must have a proportionate reason for 
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appropriating the immoral act of an auxiliary agent. Just as distance and dispensability play a 
role in justifying cooperation, it ought to play a role in appropriation.   
d. Appropriation Fetal Tissue Remains of Elective Abortion 
     Insofar as the bishops unequivocally forbid any form of material cooperation in abortion, 
it is very likely that they would forbid any form of appropriation as well, including the use of 
fetal tissue remains of electively aborted children.449 Regardless, the topic illustrates how 
Appropriation works. First, in principle, doing research on fetal tissue is a morally indifferent 
act. Second, so long as the researchers do not intend the evil of the auxiliary agent, that is, the 
death of the child, they are not guilty of formal appropriation. Third, so long as the auxiliary 
agent’s act of abortion does not connect inexorably to the object or goal of the researcher, the 
principal agent avoids both formal cooperation and immediate material appropriation. Finally, 
the researcher must have a proportionately justifiable reason to use electively aborted fetuses for 
research, such as a severe shortage of other sources or an extremely high cost. Moreover, the 
foreseeable good must be great as well, such as a cure for the flu. Practically speaking, however, 
I agree with Kaveny that such a justifiable scenario is most unlikely.450   
      This section articulates the Principle of Cooperation, comparing, yet differentiating it 
from Double Effect. This chapter discusses proficiencies in health care ethics consultations, the 
benefits and limitations of principlism, and the complexities of the Principle of Cooperation. The 
following chapter applies the preceding to the use of prophylactic, sterilizing procedures and 
emergency contraception in victims of sexual assault.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – OOPHORECTOMIES AND EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION 
     This chapter uses Natural Law, the Moral Object, and the Principle of Double Effect to 
ethically justify procedures that physically defined are sterilizing and contraceptive, respectively. 
5A. Risk Reducing Bilateral Salpingo-Oophorectomies 
      This section explores the ethical decision-making regarding prophylactic operations that 
both preempt the development of cancer in patients carrying the breast-cancer susceptibility gene 
1 (BRCA1) or BRCA2 mutations, and has an unintended, yet foreseen sterilizing effect. The first 
subsection explores the history, clinical context, and medically indicated procedures for BRCA1 
and BRCA2 mutation carriers. The second subsection uses the Principle of Totality and the 
Principle of Double Effect to justify risk-reducing bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies in BRCA 
mutation carriers. The third subsection explores factors that health care ethics consultants may 
encounter concerning confidentiality and genetic discrimination, especially in light of the 
complexity of genetic testing. Finally, the fourth subsection utilizes the organizational ethics 
paradigm to elucidate how Catholic health care institutions that prohibit sterilizations may 
nonetheless permit bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers.   
i. Clinical Explanation  
 
      Both BRCA1 and BRCA2 are tumor suppressor genes, some mutations of which 
significantly increase one’s risk for developing breast, ovarian, or prostate cancer.1 Not all 
mutations of these genes have the same effect; some are more deleterious than others.2 The 
following subsection elucidates the history of identifying the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
responsible for increasing one’s susceptibility to the abovementioned cancers. Then, it articulates 




a. Discovering BRCA1 and BRCA2 
       According to Joi L. Morris et al., physicians knew as early as the mid-nineteenth century 
that breast cancer had a heritable connection because of its devastating impact on certain 
families.3 In the 1970s Mary-Claire King began researching heritable links in breast cancer.4 By 
the 1980s, she uses statistical analysis of women with breast cancer to demonstrate an autosomal 
dominant link to some cases, which counters the dominant theory at the time, namely that 
multiple genes and environment cause cancer.5 She focuses on discovering one gene responsible 
for engendering breast cancer, which she dubs BRCA1 for breast cancer gene 1.6 Using Southern 
blotting, King’s team genotyped 173 different markers from family members of breast cancer 
patients.7 By 1990, she narrows the location of BRCA1 to chromosome 17—an enormous 
accomplishment before the completion of the Human Genome Project.8   
      After King announces this achievement, scientists throughout the world set out to 
discover BRCA1’s precise location on the chromosome and to sequence the gene.9 In 1994, 
Mark Skolnick and his team of researchers at Myriad Genetics and the National Institute of 
Health successfully sequenced BRCA1.10 In the early 1990s, scientists know that BRCA1 
explains some cases of breast cancer, but not all, which sparks another race to discover the 
BRCA2 gene.11 In September 1994, Michael Stratton and Richard Wooster narrow its location to 
chromosome 13.12  In October 1994, Yoshoi Miki identifies several mutations that engender 
breast cancer in its carriers.13 In 1996, Myriad Genetics begins providing genetic testing for 
which it receives a patent in 1998.14  In 2013, however, the United States Supreme Court 





b. Cancer Inhibition 
      In the abstract of their review article, “Role of BRCA1 and BRCA2 as Regulators of 
DNA Repair, Transcription, and Cell Cycle in Response to DNA Damage,” Kiyotsugu Yoshida 
and Yoshio Miki explain that for one to understand the damaging role mutations to the BRCA1 
and BRCA2 gene, it is important first to know what these respective proteins do as tumor 
suppressors.16 They elaborate on the respective functions that BRCA1 and BRCA2 play in DNA 
repair, transcriptional response to DNA damage and cell cycle check pointing.17 Many types of 
damage occurs to DNA, but one of the most destructive to life is Double Strand Breaks, which 
consists of a complete break in both chains of a helical strand of DNA.18 This poses a serious 
risk, since no template remains to guide either end’s repair process.19 When this occurs, DNA-
damage binding protein triggers a protein kinase cascade that initiates several processes to 
correct the error.20 In mammals, the protein kinase ATM phosphorylates (adds a phosphate) 
several substrates including BRCA1 that initiates homologous recombination, which is one of 
two mechanisms for repairing the DNA.21 According to Yoshida and Miki, evidence indicates 
that BRCA1 plays an important role in regulating the Rad50-Mre11-NBS1 complex, while 
BRCA2 regulates the Rad51 protein, both of which play an important role in homologous 
recombination.22 
      In addition, BRCA1 and BRCA2 regulate transcription when DNA damage occurs.23 
Transcription consists of the complex process whereby RNA polymerase uses a DNA template 
to produce a strand of messenger RNA, which functions as a template for protein synthesis. 
When DNA damage occurs, it is important to limit the transcription of messenger RNA so that 
the cell does not produce faulty proteins. When DNA damage occurs, BRCA1 regulates the 
activity of RNA polymerase II, the complex responsible for messenger RNA transcription.24 In 
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addition, BRCA1 is a co-activator of the cell cycle inhibitor p53.25 BRCA2’s role is less clear, 
but nonetheless present, and important.26   
      Finally, BRCA1 and BRCA2 provide checkpoints for cellular responses to DNA damage 
during the cell cycle.27 The cell cycle consists of the entire process of DNA replication and 
mitotic cellular division.28 DNA replication occurs during the S-phase of interphase. The G2-
phase consists of a repair phase for mistakes that occur during replication. When DNA damage 
occurs, the ATM phosphorylation of BRCA1 plays an important role in arresting the cell cycle 
during the G2-phase just before mitosis begins.29 Again, BRCA2’s role is less direct, but still 
important for the arresting the cell cycle when DNA damage occurs.30 
     Yoshida and Miki indicate that scientists identify over 200 deleterious germ line 
mutations to the BRCA1 gene alone.31 The three-abovementioned functions represent only a few 
of the roles that such mutations may interrupt giving rise to cancer in its carriers. Undoubtedly 
more processes remain to be discovered.   
c. Prophylactic Treatments 
      In the general population, 12 percent of women develop breast cancer in their lifetime, 
while 55 to 65 percent of women with a deleterious BRCA1 mutation and 45 percent of women 
with a harmful BRCA2 mutation develop breast cancer by the age of 70.32 Moreover, studies 
suggest that while 1.3 percent of women in the general population develop ovarian cancer in 
their lifetime, 39 percent of women who inherit a BRCA1 mutation and 11 to 17 percent of 
women who inherit a BRCA2 mutation develop ovarian cancer by the age of 70.33 With such an 
increase in risk, some physicians perform risk-reducing bilateral mastectomies and risk-reducing 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies—the removal of the ovaries and Fallopian tubes.34 While such 
operations reduce the risk of developing breast and ovarian cancers, they do not eliminate the it 
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altogether.35 It is still possible for cancer to originate in the scar tissue or the remaining primary 
peritoneal.36 This section explores the effectiveness of a variety of prophylactic options.   
      In 2007, the American Cancer Society recommends that women with BRCA1 or BRCA2 
mutations begin a surveillance regimen of alternating breast magnetic resonance imaging and 
mammograms every six months.37 The American Cancer Institute recommends that women 
testing positive for the abovementioned mutations begin this surveillance regime at 25 years of 
age.38 Some suggest women begin ten years before the age of a diagnosed family member, but no 
earlier than age 20.39 Even surveillance comes with a risk, since mammograms utilize X-rays that 
expose women to radiation.40 Because of this, some recommend using mammograms at 35, 
utilizing magnetic resonance images only until then.41 Unfortunately, surveillance is not 100% 
accurate in catching and preventing lethal cases of breast cancer; as such, many physicians 
recommend other means of risk-reduction.42   
      Women with the BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation who get breast cancer have a 30% chance 
of developing cancer in the other breast—contralateral breast cancer—in the ten years following 
the initial diagnosis.43 Yet not all carriers with breast cancer opt for bilateral mastectomy or even 
unilateral mastectomy for the affected breast.44 In fact, only 50% of North American carriers opt 
for bilateral mastectomy when diagnosed with breast cancer, even though it reduces one’s risk of 
developing breast cancer by 97% in the other breast.45 Morris et al, indicates that the decision to 
remove one’s breasts is highly personal, and depends on many factors.46   
      The BRCA1 mutation not only increases one’s chance of getting cancer, but of acquiring 
a higher-grade as well.47 For instance, 75% of cancers in BRCA1 carriers are estrogen-receptor-
negative, and 69% are triple negative or estrogen receptor-negative, progesterone-receptor-
negative and human epidermal growth factor receptor 2-negative.48 BRCA2 carriers, on the other 
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hand, have the increased risk of developing cancer, but not the higher proportion of high-grade 
cancers; rather, their proportion is comparable to the general population (77% ER-positive and 
16% triple negative).49   
      Surveillance and risk-reducing surgery are not the only options for reducing cancer risk. 
It is also possible for one to take tamoxifen, which when digested by the cytochrome P450 
enzymes isoform CYP2D6 and CYP3A4, produces high affinity metabolites, afimoxifene and 
endoxifen, for the estrogen receptor,50 to which it antagonistically binds, inhibiting the 
transcription of genes.51 Since tamoxifen reduces one’s risk of developing estrogen receptor-
positive cancer, it is medically-indicated for BRCA2 mutation carriers, but not for BRCA1 
mutation carriers.52 Still, it only reduces one’s risk of getting estrogen receptor-positive breast 
cancer by 50% in BRCA2 mutation carriers.53 In addition, oral contraceptive use for five years 
reduces one’s risk of developing ovarian cancer by at least 40%.54 Current research does not 
indicate that oral contraception either reduces or increases one’s chances of getting breast 
cancer.55 
      For BRCA-mutation carriers, as the abovementioned statistics indicate, the number one 
risk factor for cancer is age.56 Consequently, current guidelines recommend risk-reducing 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA-mutation carriers between the ages of 35 and 40 
after completing childbearing.57 In an effort to stave off surgical menopause, and in light of the 
serous origin of ovarian cancer in the Fallopian tubes, some physicians are opting for bilateral 
salpingectomies alone, followed later by oophorectomies.58 This practices is not, however, 
considered standard of care by the National Comprehensive Cancer Network.59 Lynn M. 
Hartmann and Noralane M. Lindor in “The Role of Risk-Reducing Surgery in Hereditary Breast 
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and Ovarian Cancer,” say the jury is out as to whether or not bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies 
before menopause actually reduces BRCA-mutation carriers’ risk for breast cancer.60   
      According to the United States Preventative Services Task Force risk-reducing bilateral 
mastectomies decreases a mutation carrier’s chances of getting breast cancer by 85-100% and 
breast cancer mortality by 81-100%.61  Bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies reduce a mutation 
carrier’s chance of getting ovarian cancer by 69-100% and of getting breast cancer by 37-
100%.62 While no option is perfect, clearly the risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy and bilateral 
salpingo-oophorectomies have the best statistical results. The following subsection considers the 
ethics surrounding such prophylactic procedures.  
ii. Double-Effect Reasoning 
      Ethically, bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies pose several dilemmas. The surgeon not 
only removes healthy organs, but also renders the patient sterile; both of which seems to violate 
important Catholic ethical principles—the Principle of Totality and prohibition against direct 
sterilization.63 The following demonstrates that Totality justifies bilateral salpingo-
oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers. Moreover, Double Effect justifies bilateral 
salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers, even though it renders the patient sterile. 
This justification depends on Pope John Paul II’s understanding of intention and the Moral 
Object in Veritatis Splendor.64   
a. Totality 
      In his Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas articulates his formulation of the Principle of 
Totality in response to the question as to whether or not it is ever possible to maim or mutilate 
another person.65 He argues that certain conditions warrant maiming the body, but this is 
permissible since the parts of the body are for the sake of the whole.66 To explicate, he uses an 
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example from a previous question concerning members of a state.67 Just as it may be necessary 
to remove a person from a community for the good of the whole—keeping that individual from 
sinning and harming others—so it may be necessary to remove a decaying bodily member for the 
good of the whole person.68 This justifies amputation of diseased limbs, but not health organs. 
      Pope Pius XII develops Aquinas’s articulation of Totality. In his “Address to the First 
International Congress on the Histopathology of the Nervous System,” he highlights an 
important distinction between the analogy of the community and the physical human person.69 In 
“Pope Pius XII and the Principle of Totality,” Gerald Kelly observes that Pius XII distances 
himself from Aquinas’s analogy of the community, because he does not support the totalitarian 
governments that subjugate the individual for the whole.70 Unlike living organisms, communities 
do not have a unity subsisting in them; therefore, Pius XII argues that they constitute moral 
entities, rather than, physical entities.71 Therefore, in deference to their natural finality, physical 
entities that possess a subsisting unity may dispose of their members, integral parts, and organs 
immediately and directly.72 This, however, is not true for authority regarding members of state.73   
      In 1953, Pius XII addresses the 26th assembly of Italian Urologists defending the removal 
of healthy organs that exacerbates an unhealthy condition.74 He argues that three conditions must 
exist for one to justifiably remove a healthy organ that aggravates another condition: 1) the 
healthy organ’s presence causes harm or threat to the whole person; 2) the damage or threat can 
only be avoided by removing the healthy organ and its effectiveness is certain; and 3) one can 
reasonably expect the benefit to compensate for the negative effect.75 He emphasizes that the 
healthy organ does not constitute the threat, but its functioning directly or indirectly causes for 
the whole body a serious threat.76 For such cases, he advances the application of Totality not 
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only for the removal of diseased organs that threaten the whole, but also the removal of healthy 
organs that harm or threaten the whole.   
      To illustrate, Pius XII argues that a surgeon may licitly remove healthy testicles from a 
man suffering with prostate cancer, even though it renders him sterile, because the removal of 
the testicles indirectly slows the growth of cancer by reducing the presence testosterone, which 
accelerates the cancer’s growth.77 This case meets the three-abovementioned criteria. First, the 
presence of the healthy testicles accelerates the growth of prostate cancer by producing 
testosterone. Second, the only effective way to remove the threatening presence of testosterone—
at that time—was to perform an orchiectomy, removing the testosterone producing testicles. 
Third, the positive effects—slowing the growth of life-threatening cancer—outweigh the 
negative, sterilizing effects of losing one’s testicles.    
      In contrast, Pius XII argues that the abovementioned criteria do not justify a surgeon 
removing a woman’s oviducts to prevent pregnancy in one who has a condition that worsens 
during pregnancy.78 First, the healthy Fallopian tubes do not contribute either directly or 
indirectly to the condition in question. Second, removing the Fallopian tubes is not the only way 
to prevent the dangerous condition of pregnancy from occurring. Third, although one may argue 
that one’s life is more important than one’s openness to life in the marital act, the inability to 
satisfy the first two criteria renders this point feeble for defending the act by Totality.   
      Bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers meets the three criteria 
that Pius XII offers in his address to the urologists. Even though one may argue that the organ is 
cancer free and healthy at the moment, the statistical likelihood of it becoming cancerous in 
BRCA mutation carriers constitutes a genuine threat to the whole person, especially considering 
how deadly ovarian cancer is.79 Because of the significant, increased risk of developing ovarian 
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cancer and the lack of reliable surveillance, following the recommended guidelines of having 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies between the age of 35 and 40 constitutes the best method of 
preventing ovarian cancer.80 Although bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies render patients sterile, 
the lifesaving positive certainly outweighs the negative.   
b. Double-Effect Reasoning 
     Aquinas is the first to formulate an argument using Double-Effect Reasoning in his 
Summa Theologica.81 In II-II, q. 64, a. 7, he explains how one may justifiably kill another person 
in self-defense.82 He begins with the premise that an act may have more than one effect, not all 
of which one intends.83 In morally licit, lethal self-defense, he maintains with Augustine that one 
must not actually intend to kill one’s assailant; rather, one must intend self-defense.84 The death 
of the assailant is praeter intentionem, beside intention.85 In addition, he contends that one’s 
action must be proportionate to the assailant’s assault.86   
      From an appropriate understanding of several key terms one may derive a set of criteria 
that configures a contemporary formulation of the Principle of Double Effect. First, one must 
understand what Aquinas means by intention. In Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, 
John Finnis indicates that Aquinas uses intention in both a broad sense and a narrow sense.87 
Broadly speaking, intention concerns ends.88 In On Evil, Aquinas makes a distinction between 
intending something as a remote (ulterior) end (finis operantis) versus as a proximate end (finis 
proximus).89 Intention, as the proximate end forms the act’s species, which Aquinas identifies as 
the Moral Object.90 In the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica, he highlights an important 
distinction between the proximate end (means) and the remote end, namely that one chooses 
(electio) a means for an end,91 while one intends (intentio) a remote end.92 The latter constitutes 
the narrower sense of intention, while the broader sense includes intention as choice of the will.93 
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To illustrate, Finnis refers the reader to Aquinas’s On Evil, where Aquinas offers the example of 
one wanting to steal in order to give alms.94 Narrowly speaking, the person has a good intention, 
to give to the poor, but the act is evil because the means chosen is evil—stealing; therefore, 
broadly speaking, the intention is evil. Finnis insists that Aquinas is using the broad sense of 
intention in his discourse on self-defense.95 As such, both the proximate end and the ulterior end 
must be good for the act to be good.   
      Another important concept for Aquinas that relates to intention is praeter intentionem.96 
In “Per se and Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas,” Duarte Sousa-Lara identifies three distinct uses 
of praeter intentionem in Aquinas’s works: 1) to indicate that one does not will a moral evil per 
se; 2) to identify unforeseen outcomes that may affect an action; and 3) to refer to foreseen, but 
unintended effects of action that, in turn, do not specify the act.97 Sousa-Lara contends that 
Aquinas uses the third form for Double-Effect Reasoning in his discussion of killing in self-
defense.98 Insofar as the agent does not intend to kill the assailant, but merely to defend oneself 
from an unjust aggressor using lethal force, the evil effect of the death of the attacker remains 
outside one’s intention. Foreseeing the death of the assailant by means of lethal defense does not 
change the Moral Object. It does not affect the species of the act since it remains outside of 
intention. This builds on the principle that knowing (foreseeing) does not entail causing.     
      Concerning Aquinas’s understanding of intention, one may derive two or three of the 
conditions of Double Effect. First, the Moral Object of the Act must be good or neutral.99 
Second, one must not intend the evil effect, but the good effect.100 Third, from a casuistic 
perspective, for instance, following that of Jean Pierre Gury, the bad effect must not cause the 
good effect.101 From a Thomistic perspective, however, the third is simply a restatement of the 
first, namely, that one must not choose evil means for a good end.   
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     Finally, Aquinas has a proportionality clause in his argument for self-defense: one’s use 
of self-defense ought to be proportionate to the force that the attacker uses in the assault.102 
Double Effect does not justify the use of lethal force to counter non-lethal threats.  Causally, one 
must have a serious reason for causing the evil effect; that is, the good must outweigh the bad.103    
      Having summarized an account of Principle of Double Effect that adequately accounts 
for intention from a Thomistic perspective, I now apply it to bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies 
for BRCA mutation carriers. First, I argue that this procedure is not evil in its species but 
depends on the broad interpretation of intention of the will that includes both the proximate end 
and the ulterior end. Accordingly, it meets the first three conditions of Double Effect. Finally, the 
lifesaving risk-reduction satisfies the proportionality condition of Double Effect.    
c. Object of the Act 
      The first, and arguably most important condition for the Principle of Double Effect is that 
the Moral Object of the Act must be good or indifferent.104 Using the broad sense of intention, 
Aquinas maintains that the intention morally specifies an act.105 Recall that the proximate end of 
an act determines the Moral Object.106  Therefore, above all, one must determine whether the 
means chosen in the act is good or evil.   
      For Aquinas, morality centers on the will.107 In particular, the will intends goods that the 
intellect rationally configures.108 Regarding species of acts, it is possible to consider actions from 
the perspective of their voluntariness, that is, on the moral order (genus moris); and 
independently thereof, that is, purely as physical acts on the metaphysical order (genus 
naturae).109 Insofar as the orders differ, so the ends differ, and consequently, the objects differ.110 
As such, one act may have two species, one of the moral order and the other of the physical 
order.111 For example, on the physical order, an act may be killing, but on the moral order, that 
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is, in its voluntariness, the act is one of self-defense. The physical species of the act is evil 
insofar as it results in the death of another, but morally, the act is good insofar as the agent 
intends something good, self-defense. Although distinct in nature from the ontological order, 
human actions, constitutive of the moral order, by analogy have a fullness of being that 
corresponds both to reason and being.112 It is precisely the Moral Object’s correspondence to 
reason, or the lack thereof, which renders it good or evil.113 In self-defense, the agent intends 
(intentio) a good end—preservation of one’s life. At the same time, regarding the proximate end, 
the will chooses (electio) a particular means to this end, hitting an attacker on the head with a 
bat. The intellect rationally configures the good such that the will may choose and then command 
(praeceptum) a particular action.114 Consequently, a human action is only good or evil insofar as 
reason configures it; otherwise it is morally indifferent.115  
      Purely from the perspective of the physical order, bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies 
constitute the removal of organs, which renders the patient sterile. If one conflates the moral and 
the physical order, one may conclude that bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies under any 
circumstance are immoral insofar as they render patients sterile. This reduction of orders 
constitutes the Naturalistic Fallacy.116 The above demonstrates that a morality true to the 
Thomistic tradition maintains the distinction of orders.117 As such, morally, it is not enough to 
merely consider the physical act alone. Rather, one must take into account the will and more 
specifically intention, both as the ulterior end and proximate end.118 For BRCA mutation carriers, 
the ulterior end is the preservation of one’s life. The means chosen (finis proximus) is the 
removal of organs that have a high likelihood of becoming cancerous—the Fallopian tube and 
the ovaries. As such, ethically, from the perspective of the proximate end chosen, bilateral 
salpingo-oophorectomies are good because they constitute a means that greatly diminishes one’s 
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chance of getting ovarian cancer.119 Furthermore, this satisfies the first condition of Double 
Effect, which necessitates that the Moral Object is either good or neutral.120   
     The ulterior end—the preservation of one’s life—is good, and with the addition of a 
corollary—one does not intend the evil of sterilization—this satisfies the second condition, that 
one intends the good effect and not the bad.121 In other words, so long as one does not intend the 
bad effect, it is outside of one’s intention, even if foreseen.122 Bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies 
for BRCA mutation carriers satisfies the third requirement that the bad effect not cause the good, 
since it is not the sterilization that diminishes one’s risk of getting cancer, rather, it is the 
removal of the potentially cancerous organs that causes both. Finally, it meets the fourth 
condition of proportionality insofar as the good of foreseeably preserving one’s life from the 
likelihood of developing deadly ovarian cancer outweighs the negative effect of sterilization. 
Moreover, since no viable alternative exists for either preventing ovarian cancer or catching it 
early, it is not only the best, but also the only medically-indicated option.123 
     This subsection demonstrates that the Principle of Double Effect does justify bilateral 
salpingo-oophorectomies in BRCA mutation carriers. The next subsection considers other ethical 
challenges for BRCA mutation carriers and their clinicians.   
iii. Health Care Ethics Consultations  
     Genetic testing is a relatively new development in medicine with several important 
ethical implications. Antonella Surbone, in “Social and Ethical Implications of BRCA Testing,” 
defines genetic testing as “any analysis to detect genotypes, genetic mutations, or chromosomal 
changes, not including analysis of proteins or metabolites directly related to a manifest disease,” 
which can lead to genetic exceptionalism, that is, treating patients with genetic disorders 
differently than patients with other diseases.124 As the above demonstrates, genetic testing for 
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BRCA mutations plays an important role in testing for heritable cancer mutations. At the same 
time, it raises questions about reliability of testing, genetic discrimination, and sharing of 
information with third parties, including family members. The following addresses these ethical 
issues.   
a. Genetic Testing 
       Genetic testing, even for a well-known and relatively straightforward condition like 
BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations does not always provide a simple answer. In fact, testing for 
genetic mutations is quite complex. In 2004, Kiyotsugu Yoshida and Yoshio Miki, in their 
review article, “Role of BRCA1 and BRCA2 as Regulators of DNA Repair, Transcription, and 
Cell Cycle in Response to DNA Damage,” identify no less than 200 possible mutations that have 
potentially deleterious effects in BRCA1 alone.125 In 2010, Ake Borg et al., in “Characterization 
of BRCA1 and BRCA2 Deleterious Mutations and Variants of Unknown Clinical Significance in 
Unilateral and Bilateral Breast Cancer: The WECARE Study,” detect 470 unique sequence 
variants in both unilateral and contralateral breast cancer patients, of which they contend 113 are 
deleterious, 57 on BRCA1 and 56 on BRCA2, reducing the estimate significantly.126 Borg et al. 
categorizes the 357 other variants as variants of unknown clinical significance.127 These account 
for some of the ambiguous results that 10% of test-patients receive, but not all.128 Although 
patients with negative results tend to develop cancer at the same frequency as those with 
ambiguous results, the latter tend to experience greater frustration and anxiety.129 Genetic 
counseling fills a void for those seeking guidance, especially with unclear results. 
b. Genetic Discrimination 
     More than a lack of clarity concerning results and their implications, genetic 
discrimination deters some women with a family history of breast cancer from receiving genetic 
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testing, especially when they plan on using insurance to cover the cost.130 Women fear 
discrimination from employers or insurance companies, because of implications of a pre-existing 
condition for insurance acceptance.131 In addition, some women fear living with the looming risk 
of getting cancer, or being seen as less than ideal marital partners.132 This not only puts many at-
risk women at greater risk, because they are not engaging in meticulous surveillance or 
prophylactic treatments, but this hurts research too, since fewer women are willing to participate 
in studies.133   
      In 2008, the United States Congress passed the Genetic Information Non-discrimination 
Act.134 This law specifically addresses discrimination from health insurance companies and 
employers.135 Title I, concerning insurance companies, prohibits insurers using genetic 
information to make decisions about eligibility, coverage, underwriting, or premiums.136 In 
addition, insurers may not request or require individuals or family members to provide genetic 
information.137 Title II, concerning employment, prohibits employers from using genetic 
information to make decisions regarding hiring, firing, promotions, pay, or job assignments.138 
While legislation addresses some discrimination, it does not deal with social discrimination or 
the spiritual or psychological impact. In fact, because of the deep impact such personal 
knowledge may have on individuals’ self-concept, and because of little that can be done 
clinically before the age of 25, many experts advice not performing genetic testing on minors or 
sharing one’s genetic status until later.139   
c. Confidentiality 
      This raises an important issue regarding confidentiality and the ethical dilemma of 
sharing important information that may impact other family members, especially regarding 
genetic information. Legally, in the United States, the Health Insurance Portability and 
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Accountability Act of 1996 delimits confidentiality in healthcare.140 If healthcare workers do not 
respect patient’s confidentiality, the trust between patient and caregiver will undoubtedly erode. 
Confidentiality is important and strict, but not unlimited.141 Albert Jonsen et al, in Clinical 
Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine maintains that when the 
patient’s health depends on sharing information, the principle of beneficence justifies an 
exception to confidentiality.142 In addition, the principle of non-maleficence demands that if 
withholding information poses a threat or harms to a third party, one must not withhold it.143   
      Clint Parker, in “Disclosing Information about the Risk of Inherited Disease,” presents a 
vignette of a physician in an ethical dilemma with two sisters, one of whom has been diagnosed 
with a BRCA mutation and the other who has an increased risk.144 Mrs. Durham, the sister 
diagnosed with the BRCA mutation is estranged from her sister, Mrs. Weir, and does not want to 
tell her sister that she has cancer.145 Parker insists that the physician must not violate 
confidentiality, by telling Mrs. Weir about Mrs. Durham’s diagnosis, nor should he do 
nothing.146 Instead, if after persistently trying to convince Mrs. Durham to disclose the 
information to her sister does not work, Parker contends that the physician should advise Mrs. 
Weir that it is in her best interest to have genetic testing for a BRCA mutation.147 He contends 
that this approach maintains the confidentiality of Mrs. Durham, and also provides for the needs 
of her estranged sister, Mrs. Weir.148   
     Parker blurs the lines of confidentiality to solve a dilemma between confidentiality and 
the potential threat to a third party. If this were the sacrament of reconciliation, such an act 
would constitute an indirect violation of the seal—using confidential information outside the 
confessor-penitent relationship. Needless to say, the patient-physician relationship is 
qualitatively different, but the example nonetheless highlights the use of confidential information 
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from one patient for another does constitute an exception to confidentiality. The principle of non-
maleficence demands such an exception for the third party.149 To be sure, the threat that 
exceptions to patient-physician confidentiality poses means that sharing personal information 
will always be tenuous.  
     While this subsection highlights the complexity of ethical implications of genetic testing, 
the following explains the ethical consistency of a Catholic hospital that prohibits sterilizations, 
but allows prophylactic, but physically sterilizing procedures.  
iv. Catholic Health Care Policy 
      Gerard Magill and Lawrence Prybil, in Governance Ethics in Healthcare, develop a 
paradigm for organizational ethics rooted in skills for health care ethics consultations and 
professionalism.150 The first component is foundational, embodying the concept of identity, it 
focuses on the organizational stewardship of the mission of the organization answering the 
leitmotif question: “Who are we?”151 The second component is process, focusing on decision-
making that is participative deliberation and in the executive oversight context, answers the 
leitmotif question: “How we function?,” which concerns the concept of accountability.152 The 
third component is practical, focusing on best practices for standards of conduct, in the context 
of organizational culture, it answers the question, “What we do?,” thereby embodying the 
concept of quality.153 In the following, I utilize the three-abovementioned components of 
organizational ethics to articulate a consistent application of the prohibition on sterilizations and 
the use of bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers in Catholic Health Care 





a. Prohibiting Sterilization 
      Again, the first component of the organizational ethics paradigm concerns the 
institution’s identity.154 The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Ethical and 
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, defines mission of every Catholic health 
care institution in the United States.155 For the Church, health care is a constitutive part of the 
healing mission of Christ.156 The Ethical and Religious Directives “reaffirm the ethical standards 
of behavior that flow from the Church’s teaching about the dignity of the human person.” 157 The 
United States Bishops base these ethical standards on the Revelation of Jesus Christ and the 
Natural Law, which the Church authoritatively interprets.158   
      The Catholic Church deeply roots its prohibition on sterilization in its teaching on 
marriage and the human person that corresponds to the prohibition on contraception.159 Many 
conflate the Church’s prohibition of contraception with its prohibition of abortion, attempting to 
identify both as violations of the fifth commandment “thou shall not kill.”160 Martin Rhonheimer, 
in Ethics of Procreation and the Defense of Human Life: Contraception, Artificial Fertilization, 
and Abortion, argues that contraception primarily violates the virtue of chastity.161 He attributes 
the misconception to John Paul II’s connection of contraception with abortion in Evangelium 
Vitae, where he notes that abortion acts as a failsafe for contraception, both of which thereby 
contribute to the so-called culture of death.162   
      In the same paragraph, however, John Paul II says that contraception “contradicts the full 
truth of the sexual act as the proper expression of conjugal love…[and] is opposed to the virtue 
of chastity in marriage.”163 This is precisely what Rhonheimer, argues Pope Paul VI teaches in 
Humanae Vitae.164 Although Paul VI connects the Church’s prohibition to contraception with the 
Inseparability Principle—that the unitive and procreative significance of marriage are 
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inseparable and ought to remain so in every act—this alone does not suffice.165 Rhonheimer 
insists that periodic continence, a constitutive part of responsible parenthood, also provides a 
means for growing in chastity; that is, virtuously integrating the sexual drives under the domain 
of reason and will.166 This integration of the bodily with the spiritual is precisely what raises 
sexual drive to the order of personal love.167 Insofar as contraception eliminates the need for 
periodic continence—a natural means for growing in chastity—it violates the virtue of 
chastity.168 This explanation avoids the reduction of contraception to merely the physical act of 
taking an anovulant. Rather, it takes into account intention, the human person, and virtue.   
      Therefore, for Paul VI, John Paul II and Rhonheimer, the use of contraception is wrong 
insofar as the intention, understood as the Moral Object, consists in a vicious choice against 
chastity.169 When, however, the agent’s intention changes, for example, a victim of sexual assault 
preventing conception, the Moral object changes to one of self-defense, which is clearly not a 
means to circumventing chastity.170 Although the physical act of taking an anovulant is the same, 
the intention—as the proximate end—is very different. One is to circumvent chastity, the other to 
defend oneself from conceiving through an unjust sexual assault.   
     That the same physical act can have two different Moral Object demonstrates the 
importance of intention for determining the morality of the act, both as proximate end and 
ulterior end. As the above indicates, there are exceptions to the rule prohibiting operations that 
render one sterile.171 For this reason, the United States Bishops, in the Ethical and Religious 
Directives while prohibiting direct sterilization, permit procedures that induce sterility “when 
their direct effect is the cure or alleviation of a present and serious pathology and a simpler 
treatment is not available.”172 One must go beyond the mere physical act to the intention of the 
person. As the above demonstrates, when physicians use bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies in 
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BRCA mutation carriers to remove organs that will very likely become cancerous, they intend to 
maintain the health of the patients, not to sterilize for the purpose of responsible parenthood.   
b. Non-BRCA Mutation Carriers 
     Becket Gremmels et al., in “Opportunistic Salpingectomy to Reduce the Risk of Ovarian 
Cancer,” argue that a patient and physician may opt for bilateral salpingectomies, even though 
the risk of developing ovarian cancer is low in non-BRCA mutation carriers, because the 
screening options for ovarian cancer are so poor.173 On June 7, 2016, the National Catholic 
Bioethics Center, the publishers of the article, released a statement indicating their disagreement 
with the views of the authors on this topic.174 They argue that without a heightened risk for 
cancer, the average risk of developing ovarian cancer is not proportionate to the irreversible loss 
of fertility.175 Such a statement does not limit the use of bilateral salpingectomies or bilateral 
salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers only; in fact, they admit that genetic 
testing, family history, and other means may justify such a decision to pursue bilateral 
salpingectomies, but average risk does not suffice.176 I concur with their statement for two 
reasons. First, current medical guidelines do not medically-indicate bilateral salpingectomies or 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for women with an average risk for developing ovarian 
cancer.177 Second, physicians and patients may use this procedure as a means to circumvent the 
Church’s prohibition on sterilizations. Using bilateral salpingectomies to sterilize women not 
only violates the mission of a Catholic hospital, it defies medically-indicated guidelines. 
Moreover, such an abuse gives scandal and renders institutions vulnerable to lawsuits of 
malpractice and discrimination.   
      The Church’s teaching against sterilization relates deeply to its mission, but is also a 
source of conflict with other providers that see contraceptive services as a vital part of women’s 
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healthcare.178 Moreover, opponents level seemingly countless lawsuits against Catholic 
healthcare institutions, claiming that they do not provide adequate care by denying contraception, 
including sterilization to its patients.179 Rather than caving to popular opinion, I suggest that 
Catholic institutions use this as an opportunity to re-evangelize regarding its teaching. In fact, 
one of the benefits of health care ethics boards is the education of hospital directors and staff. 
Paul VI indicates that the prohibition against contraception is not a prohibition against 
responsible parenthood.180 For this reason, Catholic Healthcare Institutions ought to provide 
effective alternatives to contraception as a means for responsible parenthood that includes 
training for staff, patients and the community in acceptable methods for responsible 
parenthood.181 For some opponents, no alternative to contraceptive services suffices, but failing 
to offer any alternative renders one vulnerable to false criticism, namely, that the Church is 
against all forms of birth control.   
      This section orients the use of bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies in BRCA mutation 
carriers in the context of the Church’s prohibition of sterilization, advising against the use of 
bilateral salpingectomies for women with an average risk for ovarian cancer, since it contradicts 
current medical guidelines and may be subject to abuse. In the face of opposition, I contend that 
Catholic health care providers ought to use ethics boards to re-evangelize staff and directors and 
to implement practices amenable to Church teaching regarding responsible parenthood.   
     Using the ethical Principle of Totality and Double Effect, this section evaluates the use of risk 
reducing bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies in BRCA mutation carriers. Keeping the Moral 
Object in the moral order, this section demonstrates the liceity of such procedures. The following 
section holds that a non-consequentialist definition of the Moral Object of self-defense from 




5B. Emergency Contraceptive for Victims of Sexual Assault 
      In the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, 6th edition, the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops assert that women have the right to defend 
themselves from conception in cases of sexual assault.182 Because of the Church’s strict 
prohibition of abortion,183 which begins from the moment of fertilization, the United States 
Bishops insists that the method must not remove, destroy, or interfere with a conceptus.184 This 
section explores the ethical principles that justify such a position. In particular, it articulates the 
Moral Object of self-defense, of which the use of emergency contraception constitutes for 
victims of sexual assault. Second, it illustrates how the Principle of Double Effect is not 
necessary to defend such a stance, so long as one does not define the object consequentially.   
i. Clinical Analysis 
      This subsection elucidates the complex physiological events that constitute the ovulatory 
cycle in women and the impact that emergency contraceptives such as levonorgestrel have on it.   
a. Menstrual-Ovulatory Cycle 
      The ovulatory cycle consists of the recurrent process whereby the female body undergoes 
physiological changes in anticipation of fertilization and implantation. This involves three 
primary organs, 1) the brain—hypothalamus and the pituitary gland, 2) the uterus, and 3) the 
ovaries, in response to complex interactions of hormones. Marc A. Fritz and Leon Speroff, in 
Clinical Gynecologic Endocrinology and Infertility, articulate the process in three phases: 1) 
follicular, 2) ovulation, and 3) luteal.185 Similarly, they breakdown the events in the uterus to five 
phases: 1) menstrual emdometrium, 2) proliferative, 3) secretory, 4) anticipation of implantation, 
and 5) endometrial breakdown.186 This subsection discusses each of these in detail.   
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      Ovulation begins in the ovaries when females reach puberty.187 At puberty, the germ cell 
mass consists of between 300,000 to 500,000 cells, of which only 400 to 500 ovulate.188 
Apoptosis or programmed cell death in follicles, also called atresia, begins even before birth, 
when the number of follicles exceeds 6 million and continues until menopause.189 The body 
rescues a few follicles from atresia, which mature to ovulation. Although several follicles grow 
only one dominant follicle matures to ovulation per cycle in a process called folliculogenesis, 
that is, the development of a primary follicle into a mature oocyte, which takes 85 days.190 The 
development of a primordial follicle right up to the point of ovulation is the follicular phase of 
ovulation in the ovaries.191   
      Within the brain, the hypothalamus releases gonadotropin releasing hormone in a 
pulsating manner.192 With a half-life of just 2-4 minutes, the body can regulate gonadotropin 
releasing hormone with a high degree of specificity.193 Gonadotropin releasing hormone induces 
the anterior pituitary to release both luteinizing hormone and follicle stimulating hormone.194 
Under the influence of follicle stimulating hormone, the number of granulosa cells around 
primordial follicles increases and form an intragranulosa cavity, which Emma Call and Sigmund 
Exner discover and name Call-Exner bodies.195   
      The primordial follicle becomes a primary follicle when the granulosa cells, that is, the 
cells which surround and nourish the oocyte become cuboidal and multiply to at least 15 in 
number.196 The basal layer separates the granulosa cells from the stromal cells that differentiate 
into theca interna and theca externa depending on their proximity to the oocyte.197 Once the 
intragranulosa cavity, also called an antrum appears, the follicle enters the antral phase. During 
the preantral phase, however, follicle stimulating hormone induces the production of an 
aromatase enzyme system that converts androgen to estrogen in granulosa cells.198 
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Synergistically, follicle stimulating hormone and estrogen increase the production of follicle 
stimulating hormone receptors in granulosa cells that increase the number of granulosa cells and 
the production of estrogen.199 This increases the production of follicular fluid, which generates 
the production of the antrum, thereby pushing the follicle from the preantral phase to the antral 
phase.200    
      Early in the antral phase, the granulosa cells only have follicle stimulating hormone 
receptors and luteinizing hormone receptors are only on the theca interna cells.201 There, 
luteinizing hormone induces the production of androgen, which feeds the production of estrogen 
by aromatase in the granulosa cells, thus producing a higher proportion of estrogen.202 All 
follicles do not develop, because there is a tendency for granulosa cells to produce a more potent 
molecule, 5 reduced androgen, which inhibits aromatase’s activity, thus reducing the presence 
of estrogen and inhibiting follicular development.203 Another inhibiting factor is estrogen that 
provides a negative feedback loop with the hypothalamic-pituitary gland, reducing the amount of 
follicle stimulating hormone available to other follicles.204 Consequently, only the follicle that 
has the most number of follicle stimulating hormone receptors and the highest amount of 
estrogen matures to ovulation. Eventually, the granulosa cells of the mature antral follicle 
acquire luteinizing hormone receptors, which enables the corpus luteum to function after 
ovulation.205 In fact, follicle stimulating hormone induces the growth of luteinizing hormone 
receptors in the granulosa cells.206   
      Primates regulate folliculogenesis through peptide members of the transforming growth 
factor- family, including activin and inhibin, which the granulosa cells produce.207 Inhibin 
inhibits follicle stimulating hormone, but not luteinizing hormone secretion, while activin 
increases the secretion of follicle stimulating hormone.208 In theca cells, inhibin and activin 
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regulate androgen synthesis.209 Activin increases the activity of aromatase in granulosa cells.210 
Follistatin, a peptide secreted by the pituitary cells, suppresses follicle stimulating hormone 
synthesis and secretion. 211 Moreover, it binds to activin, decreasing its activity.212 Researchers 
have yet to complete the full picture regarding the impact that these and other growth factors 
have on ovulation in humans.   
      In the late follicular phase, estrogen increases according to an exponential growth 
curve—slow at first then rapid—peaking at 24-36 hours before ovulation.213 The elevation in 
estradiol triggers the luteinizing hormone surge.214 The average luteinizing hormone surge lasts 
48-50 hours, but 14-27 hours suffice to fully mature the oocyte.215 Ovulation typically occurs 10-
12 hours after the luteinizing hormone peak.216 Luteinizing hormone, not estrogen, stimulates 
both the production of progesterone and the expression of progesterone receptors in the 
granulosa cells of the dominant follicle.217 In addition, luteinizing hormone instigates 
luteinization, that is the process by which the postovulatory follicle differentiates and becomes 
the corpus luteum.218 Additionally, luteinizing hormone stimulates the resumption of meiosis in 
the oocyte.219 Progesterone levels have to be just right in order for the luteinizing hormone surge 
to occur. If the progesterone levels, which originate endogenously from the adrenal gland before 
the luteinizing hormone surge,220 are too high before the estrogen surge, the luteinizing hormone 
surge does not occur.221  This is how the administration of exogenous progesterone prevents 
ovulation and works as a contraceptive.   
      Follicle stimulating hormone, luteinizing hormone, and progesterone instigate activity of 
proteolytic enzymes in the follicular fluid that degrade the collagen in the follicular wall, thus 
enabling the oocyte along with the cumulus oophorus to escape the ovary.222 Stimulated by the 
gonadotropin surge, granulosa and theca cells produce two plasminogen activators, of which 
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unique inhibitors regulate.223 These plasminogen activators activate plasminogen in the follicular 
fluid to produce plasmin, which generates active collagenase that breaks down the follicular 
wall.224 Inhibitors prevent the activators from being active except at the precise moment of 
ovulation.225 Prostaglandins activate plasminogen activators.226 In addition, they cause smooth 
muscle contractions of the ovary that aid in expelling the oocyte-cumulus cell mass.227 The 
follicle stimulating hormone surge in mice induce granulosa cells in the cumulus mass to release 
hyaluronic acid, which separates the cumulus from the basement membrane of the follicle.228 In 
addition, follicle stimulating hormone stimulates the production of luteinizing hormone receptors 
in the granulosa layer that differentiates into the corpus luteum.229   
     In terms of timing, the luteinizing hormone surge generally occurs on day 14 of the 
ovulatory cycle and ovulation commences between 12 and 36 hours later.230 In general, there is a 
six-day window in which fertilization may occur.231 This is because sperm may survive up to 
five days in the female reproductive tract,232 and the oocyte is fertile for only 24 hours after 
ovulation.233 The extreme window is six days prior and 3 days after ovulation, which makes for a 
nine-day window.234 However, the majority of conceptions happen when coitus occurs within 
three days before ovulation.235 It takes about 3 to 4 days for an ovum to traverse the fallopian 
tube and enter the uterus and implantation ensues about 2-3 days after entering the uterus.236 
Implantation follows as soon as 6 and as late as 12 days after ovulation.237 
      The luteal phase lasts between 11 and 17 days.238 Even before ovulation, granulosa cells 
increase in size developing vacuoles that contain lutein. After ovulation, theca and stroma cells 
become theca lutein cells, even as granulosa cell continue to enlarge, and angiogenesis, that is, 
vascularization of the surrounding tissue occurs.239 The luteinized granulosa cells, in response to 
luteinizing hormone produce vascular endothelial growth factor and angiopoietins, which induce 
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angiogenesis. Vascularization, which peaks by day 8 or 9,240 is essential for transporting low-
density lipoprotein cholesterol to the luteal cells that use it to produce progesterone.241 
Progesterone levels peak 8 days after the luteinizing hormone surge.242 
      The corpus luteum rapidly declines 9-11 days after ovulation, if pregnancy does not 
occur.243  In humans, nitric oxide acts as a luteolytic factor, activating the production of 
prostaglandin F2.244 Matrix metalloproteinases act as proteolytic enzymes and degrade the 
corpus luteum. Pervasively present throughout luteal phase, tissue inhibitors of 
metalloproteinases keep matrix metalloproteinases inactive. Activin-A eventually blocks tissue 
inhibitors of metalloproteinases’ activity, allowing the matrix metalloproteinases to degrade the 
corpus luteum.245 When pregnancy does occur, the blastocyst, even before implantation produces 
human chorionic gonadotropin, which rescues the corpus luteum from luteolytic demise.246 
Human chorionic gonadotropin inhibits the expression of matrix metalloproteinases by 
increasing the production of follistatin, a glycopeptide that binds to activin-A.247   
      Once the corpus luteum deteriorates, steroidogenesis of estrogen and progesterone 
diminishes along with the decrease in inhibin, which permits an increase in follicle stimulating 
hormone in the pituitary.248 This constitutes the luteal-follicular transition. The decrease in 
steroids estrogen and progesterone, remove the negative feedback suppression of gonadotropin 
releasing hormone in the pituitary, thus allowing for an increase in gonadotropin releasing 
hormone.249 The consequent elevation in follicle stimulating hormone saves a dominant follicle 
from atresia.250 
      Concomitant to activity in the ovaries is activity in the uterus. In particular, the most 
active portion of the uterus constitutes the endometrium. The withdrawal of progesterone, due to 
the demise of the corpus luteum triggers menses.251 Upon the completion of menses, the 
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endometrium enters the phase of menstrual endometrium that constitutes a phase of regeneration 
originating in both epithelial and stromal stem cells.252 After 5-6 days the entire uterine cavity is 
re-epithelialized over a stromal fibroblast layer.253  
      Next, the uterus enters the proliferative phase, which correlates with the ovarian follicle 
grow and an increase in estrogen production.254 Although estrogen is not necessary for the early 
proliferative phase, it contributes to the increase in vascular endothelial growth factor, which 
induces angiogenesis in the stromal cells.255 In addition to growth in size, microvillous and 
ciliated cells appear around the openings of glands and aid the distribution of secretions during 
the secretory phase.256 Finally, lymphocytes and macrophages accumulate in the stroma cells.257   
      After ovulation, the endometrium no longer increases in height, but glands and spiral 
vessels continue to grow, increasing the tortuosity of the endometrium.258 Consequently, the 
endometrium secretes glycoproteins, peptides, immunoglobulins, and plasma into the 
endometrial cavity, reaching a peak 7 days after the midcycle gonadotropin surge, just in for 
blastocyst implantation.259   
      During the implantation phase, the endometrium consists of three layers: 1) the basalis, 2) 
the stratum spongiosum, and stratum compactum.260 Endometrial stromal cells, originating from 
primitive uterine mesenchymal stem cells, differentiate into decidual cells, beginning during the 
luteal phase under the influence of progesterone and other factors.261 They have the potential to 
aid the blastocyst in implantation or to breakdown the endometrium with the withdrawal of 
estrogen and progesterone support.262   
      If implantation does not occur, then estrogen and progesterone support wanes with the 
demise of the corpus luteum.263 Lysosomes are ubiquitous in the endometrium and the integrity 
of their membranes depends on progesterone.264 So, when it declines, the lysosomes release 
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enzymes that degrade the endometrium. Vascular endothelial growth factor increases the blood 
flow to the endometrium releasing influencing the expression of matrix metalloproteinases and 
releasing white blood cells.265 Just as tissue inhibitors of metalloproteinases keep the matrix 
metalloproteinases inactive while progesterone is high in the corpus luteum, so it does so in the 
endometrium.266 The breakdown of the endometrium by enzymes and the increase blood flow 
induces menstrual bleeding.267 At the same time, however, vasoconstrictors and estrogen 
promote healing of the remaining tissue in anticipation of the next cycle.268   
      This subsubsection elucidates the complex network of hormones, transcription factors, 
and enzymes emanating from the hypothalamic-pituitary plexus of the brain, ovaries, and 
endometrium to regulate the menstrual-ovulatory cycle.   
b. Physiology of Contraceptives 
 
      This subsection analyzes methods of emergency contraception. Today, there are four 
contraceptive methods available for emergency contraception: copper intrauterine device, oral 
contraceptive pills combining estrogen and progestin, ulipristal acetate, and progestin-only 
levonorgestrel.269 All methods impact the physiological dynamics of the menstrual-ovulatory 
cycle, thereby impeding conception. In addition, copper intrauterine devices unquestionably act 
as an abortifacient by preventing implantation of blastocysts.270   
      In 1984, the United States Food and Drug Administration approves the TCu-380A 
intrauterine device contraceptive.271 Today, CooperSurgical markets the copper intrauterine 
device as Paragard TCu-380A intrauterine device.272 As foreign bodies, non-medicated 
intrauterine devices induce a sterile inflammatory response that causes minor tissue injury to the 
endometrium.273 Copper intrauterine devices release free copper and copper salts that have an 
additional biochemical impact on the endometrium, its secretions and the cervical mucus inhibit 
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the mobility of sperm.274 Martti Ämmälä et al. suggest that an increase in cytokine production 
that copper intrauterine devices induce may account for its antifertility effects.275   
      Maria Elena Ortiz and Horacio B. Croxatto, in “Copper-T Intrauterine Devices and 
Levonorgestrel Intrauterine System: Biological Bases of Their Mechanism of Action,” indicate 
that the ordinary mechanism of action associated with chronic use, is not necessarily the same as 
post-coital insertion.276 Thus it is important to distinguish the usual mechanism of preventing 
pregnancy, which I illustrate in the above paragraph, versus the exceptional, which constitutes its 
mechanism for preventing pregnancy as an emergency contraception inserted post-coitally.277 
Their research indicates that chronic use of copper intrauterine devices prevents fertilization 
from ever occurring by creating an environment that is hostile to both sperm and oocytes.278 
However, as an emergency contraception, copper intrauterine devices prevent implantation, if 
fertilization occurs.279 Although current recommendations restrict insertion of copper intrauterine 
devices to 5 days after implantation, Norman D. Goldstuck insists that this recommendation is 
faulty, because evidence indicates that copper intrauterine device are just as effective at 
preventing pregnancy after implantation occurs.280 He insists that researchers base the 
recommendation on the philosophical position that pregnancy begins with implantation, not its 
clinical effectiveness at preventing or halting pregnancy.281 The indisputable abortifacient quality 
of copper intrauterine device and their prolonged contraceptive function preclude its use in 
Catholic hospitals as an option for emergency contraception. 
     There are three pill options for emergency contraception: 1) combined pills containing 
both estrogen and progestin, 2) ulipristal acetate, and levonorgestrel. Using combined pills for 
emergency contraception is obsolete, however, it involves taking one dose followed by a second 
dose in twelve hours within 120 hours postcoital.282 Ulipristal acetate is a progesterone receptor 
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modulator that suppresses follicular growth and delays endometrial maturation.283 The United 
States Food and Drug Administration approved Ella for emergency contraception in 2010.284 
Another antiprogestin is mifepristone, however, it works as a first trimester abortifacient, and is 
not approved for use as an emergency contraception in the United States.285   
      Today, the most commonly prescribed emergency contraception is the progestin only pill 
containing levonorgestrel.286 The original formulation consists of two .75mg pills of 
levonorgestrel taken 12 hours apart within 120 hours after unprotected sex.287 Studies, however, 
indicate that a single 1.5mg dose is just as effective as two doses of .75mg taken with a 12 hour 
internal.288 Consequently, two-dose levonorgestrel emergency contraception pills are no longer 
available in the United States.289 The United States Food and Drug Administration approved Plan 
B One-Step in 2009.290 Generic forms include Next Choice One Dose, My Way, Take Action 
and AfterPill.291   
      Evidence indicates that levonorgestrel works “primarily by preventing or delaying 
ovulation and by preventing fertilization.”292 Lena Marions et al., in “Emergency Contraception 
with Mifepristone and Levonorgestrel: Mechanism of Action,” conclude that the increase in 
progestin inhibits the luteinizing hormone peak prior to ovulation, thus inhibiting or delaying 
ovulation.293 Donald C. Young et al., in “Emergency Contraception Alters Progesterone-
Associated Endometrial Protein in Serum and Uterine Luminal Fluid,” concludes that at high 
levels progestin alters protein synthesis in the endometrium, lowering the secretory proteins in 
the uterus, thereby affecting sperm mobility.294 After ovulation, progestin appears to have little 
effect on the endometrium.295 When administered before the luteinizing hormone peak, progestin 
levels affect the maturation of glandular and stromal components of the endometrium.296 Insofar 
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as the administration of levonorgestrel after ovulation has little effect on both the ovaries and the 
endometrium, it prevents pregnancy less effectively when administered after ovulation.297   
      Fritz and Speroff, in Clinical Gynecologic Endocrinology and Infertility, assert that 
levonorgestrel does not act as an abortifacient.298 At the same time, they admit that 
levonorgestrel may prevent implantation.299 Norman D. Goldstuck highlights the ambiguity 
regarding the definition of pregnancy and thus the definition of abortifacient versus emergency 
contraception.300 He attributes this to the definition of an emergency contraception by the Centre 
for Disease Control and the World Health Organization as anything that acts before 
implantation.301 Goldstuck argues that since it is difficult to epistemically determine when 
pregnancy occurs or which stage it is in during the first trimester, he sees no inconsistency in 
using an abortifacient like Mifepristone (RU 486) and calling it an emergency contraception.302 
The Church’s understanding of an abortifacient includes anything that deliberately and directly 
kills the human being from conception to birth, which clearly includes the time before 
implantation.303 Consequently, the United States Bishops in their Ethical and Religious 
Directives, prohibit any treatments that directly interfere with implantation.304 Kathleen Mary 
Raviele, in “Levonorgestrel in Cases of Rape: How Does It Work?,” holds a distinction between 
three distinct actions: 1) contraceptive—preventing conception, 2) interceptive—preventing 
implantation, and 3) contragestive—reversing implantation.305 The latter two constitute 
abortifacient actions insofar as they interrupt a conceptus’s normal progression. 
      Consistent with the Church’s understanding of an abortifacient, Marie T. Hilliard,  in 
“Moral Certitude and Emergency Contraception,” argues that clinicians ought to administer a 
test for the luteinizing hormone surge to ensure with moral certitude—as opposed to statistical 
probability or absolute proof—that levonorgestrel acts as an anovulant, not an abortifacient.306 
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She bases this on the premise that once the luteinizing hormone surge occurs emergency 
contraception alone cannot prevent ovulation.307 For this reason, she insists that one ought to 
administer levonorgestrel only before the luteinizing hormone surge occurs.308   
      Although more precise means exist for determining the exact day of ovulation, such as 
administering a serum progesterone test, Hilliard contends that these are not practical because 
many emergency departments do not have them readily available and it does not provide 
sufficient certitude to ensure that fertilization cannot occur.309 She acknowledges one study that 
indicates that administering meloxicam, a cyclooxygenase-2 inhibitor with levonorgestrel 
prevents ovulation after the luteinizing hormone surge.310 More information is available today 
regarding the use of cyclooxygenase-2 inhibitors as an anovulant, including Nicole C. McCann 
et al.’s “The COX-2 Inhibitor Meloxicam Prevents Pregnancy When Administered as an 
Emergency Contraceptive to Nonhuman Primates.”311 McCann et al., determine that meloxicam 
alone is effective at preventing pregnancy when administered to breeding macaques for 5 days 
prior to ovulation.312 They conclude that meloxicam delays, but does not prevent ovulation.313   
      Raviele highlights evidence from Durand et al.’s study on levonorgestrel,314 which 
suggests that it does not effectively prevent ovulation when given 4 days before ovulation.315 
Consequently, levonorgestrel, as an emergency contraception, does not primarily act as an 
anovulant. In another study, Durand et al. determine that levonorgestrel given before the 
luteinizing hormone surge, alters the pattern of luteal phase secretion of glycodelin-A, a natural 
killer cell inhibitor, thus providing a hostile environment for blastocysts attempting to implant in 
the endometrium.316 They conclude that levonorgestrel acts primarily as an abortifacient, or an 
interceptor. Both Durand et al. and Palomino et al.317 determine that levonorgestrel given on the 
 
 267 
day of the luteinizing hormone surge does not prevent ovulation or affect progesterone receptors, 
plasma levels of glycodelin-A or L-selectin ligand or integrin.318   
      Regarding sperm, Raviele cites several studies including Yeung et al.319 and Brito et al.320 
The acrosome reaction is necessary for the spermatozoa to attach to the zona pellucida of the 
egg.321 If the acrosome reaction occurs early, before it reaches the egg, then the sperm loses its 
fertilizing capacity.322 At high concentrations, levonorgestrel acts as a weak agonists to 
progesterone receptors and at high concentrations (200-800ng/ml) it induces the acrosome 
reaction in sperm.323 Yeung et al. determine that levonorgestrel only affects sperm at high 
concentrations.324 Brito et al.’s results verify those of Yeung et al.325 In light of this information, 
Raviele recommends re-evaluating the use of levonorgestrel as an emergency contraception.326  
She advises that clinicians should not give levonorgestrel as an emergency contraception from 
days -4 to -2, because of its probable interceptive impact on the conceptus.327   
      Although against using levonorgestrel as an emergency contraceptive, Raviele contends 
that one could administer meloxicam as an emergency contraception.328 Raviele bases her 
conclusion on evidence that meloxicam prevents ovulation in women even after the luteinizing 
hormone  surge.329 As such, the primary concern is ovulation, that one can rule out with a 
progesterone test. If the result is less than or equal to 2.0ng/ml, then one can administer 
meloxicam with the assurance that it acts as an anovulant.330 A. Patrick Schneider II et al., in 
“Appreciation for Analysis of How Levonorgestrel Works and Reservations with the Use of 
Meloxicam as Emergency Contraception,” point out the practical challenge of attaining a 
progesterone level, which could take as long as four days.331 They contend that because evidence 
indicates meloxicam could act as an abortifacient, an absolute protection for the human embryo 
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from the moment of conception, precludes its use as an emergency contraception.332 I contend 
that Hilliard’s argument invoking moral certitude suffices to supplant this position.333 
      In 2010, Ron Hamel declares the notion that levonorgestrel acts as an abortifacient a 
lie.334 To which Edward J. Furton responses that the debate is not closed; evidence points in both 
directions.335 The above discussion demonstrates that the debate continues. While several 
methods exist, levonorgestrel remains the standard emergency contraception.336 However, the 
above suggests that meloxicam may be a better emergency contraception in the future since it 
acts as an effective anovulant, even when given on or after the luteinizing hormone surge.337 
With the presumption of moral certitude that the contraceptive acts as a contraceptive and not as 
an abortifacient, the following subsection examines the use of the Principle of Double Effect to 
justify such an act. 
ii. Principle of Double Effect 
      After addressing the clinical use of emergency contraception, I now consider its use 
ethically. Some ethicists use the Principle of Double Effect to justify using contraception to 
prevent conception after sexual assault.338 However, the following subsection demonstrates that 
an accurate articulation of the Moral Object dissolves any need for recourse to Double Effect.  
Ethical objections to contraception necessitate a clear delineation between it and defending 
oneself from conception. Since the two acts are physically indistinguishable, it is all the more 
important to provide an adequate account of the difference in Moral Objects of the Acts.   
a. Object of the Act 
      In the Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas, in his explanation for killing in self-defense, 
first devises three criteria that evolve into the Principle of Double Effect.339 Of the three, the 
first, which contemporary ethicists reformulate as a prohibition against willing an act with an 
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evil Moral Object, is by far the most complex and deserving of attention, to which I devote this 
entire subsection.340 The bulk of the argument depends on the precise meaning of the Moral 
Object, the importance of which Pope John Paul II re-emphasizes in Veritatis Splendor.341 In 
accord with Aquinas, John Paul II reaffirms that “the morality of the human act depends 
primarily and fundamentally on the ‘object’ rationally chosen by the deliberate will.”342 
Consequently, having an accurate understanding of the Moral Object and its relationship to the 
will is essential.     
     Aquinas observes that acts sometimes have two effects, one intended the other 
unintended.343 He describes the unintended effect as praeter intentionem, which literally means 
beside the intention of the act.344 In other words, it is outside the realm of intention. To illustrate, 
using force, one may intend to protect oneself from an assailant, but at the same time 
unintentionally kill the attacker. Even though one may foresee the death of an assailant in one’s 
act of self-defense, in accord with Augustine,345 Aquinas insists that one ought never to intend to 
kill another person.346 Cavanaugh highlights the centrality of not intending to kill for both 
Augustine and Aquinas.347 Both object to intending to kill because it violates an exceptionless 
moral norm.348 
     Finnis in Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth, explains that Augustine is 
against any action that violates an exceptionless moral norm;349 a view which he articulates in 
two works concerning lying: De mendacio350 and Contra mendacium.351 In De mendacio, 
Augustine says that it is worse to steal than to suffer murder.352 Finnis calls this an early 
formulation of the Socratic Principle, which Augustine solidifies in the later Contra mendacium, 
contending that it is better to suffer wrong than to do it.353 Democritus of Abdera first formulates 
the argument that it is better to suffer evil than to do it.354 However, Plato attributes this dictum 
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to Socrates, who not only teaches it, but also lives by it.355 Finnis holds that Paul’s maxim from 
Romans 3:8, that one may not do evil that good may come from it, is a reformulation of the 
Socratic Principle.356  Thus Augustine contends that no amount of good justifies performing an 
evil act.357   
      Peter Abelard in his Ethics contends that external physical acts do not constitute sin; 
rather, sin abides in voluntary consent.358 Consequently, for Abelard, the goodness of an act 
depends entirely on intention.359 Accordingly, the physical works that proceed from one’s 
intention are indifferent.360 Abelard is not a relativist; he holds that intention is right or wrong 
according to its conformity with God’s will.361 Servais Pinckaers in “A Historical Perspective on 
Intrinsically Evil Acts,” cautions against accusing Abelard of denying intrinsically evil acts.362 
For Pinckaers, Abelard is responding to the legalism of his time and placing the essence of sin 
back in reason and the will, rather than external action or desires.363 Unfortunately, in accord 
with his famous dictum sic et non, Abelard rejects too completely his adversaries, throwing out 
desire and consequences altogether.364   
      Peter Lombard, in his Sentences responds to Abelard in an attempt to safeguard 
Augustine’s prohibition against certain intrinsically evil acts.365 In most cases, Lombard agrees 
with Abelard that intention is the cause of evil in an action.366 However, he makes an exception 
regarding the per se mala, that is, acts which are evil in themselves including: stealing from the 
poor; falsifying a will; or adultery to save another’s life.367 These acts, which are evil in 
themselves, cannot be done without some transgression; regardless of the disposition of the 
intention.368   
      In his Scriptum super sententiis, Aquinas disagrees with Lombard’s conclusion that per 
se mala are not wrong according to the will, intention, or purpose (finis).369 To the contrary, he 
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says an external act is good or bad according to the will, but not only because of the intention of 
the will (intentio), but also because of the choice of the will (electio).370 The distinction between 
intending and choosing is of supreme importance for Aquinas, but it is not always clear. Recall, 
Finnis indicates that Aquinas speaks of intention broadly and narrowly.371 Broadly speaking, 
intending simply means willing that includes intending and choosing.372 Finnis argues that this is 
how Aquinas uses intention in his discussion regarding Double-Effect Reasoning.373 Narrowly 
speaking, however, Aquinas contrasts intending with choosing.374  In the narrow sense, 
intentions concern ends, while choices concern means—which are actions—ordered to ends.375   
      To distinguish the object of intending from the object of choosing, Aquinas uses the 
proximate end (finis proximus), which he associates with the choice of the will (electio) and the 
ultimate end (finis ultimus), which he associates with the intention (intentio).376 Concerning 
actions, there may be more than one end, hence the distinction between proximate and ultimate 
end.377 However many ends exist, the ultimate end co-ordinates the proximate end.378 The 
goodness of an external act depends on both the goodness of the proximate end or that which the 
will chooses and the goodness of the ultimate end, the purpose that one chooses an act.379   
      In the same commentary, Aquinas identifies the proximate end with the Moral Object of 
the Act.380 Terminologically, he equates the ultimate end with the remote end.381 In addition, he 
insists that the object gives the species to acts. 382 Again, in On Evil, Aquinas holds that acts 
receive their species from the object, not the remote end.383 The more precise meaning of object 
becomes increasingly difficult to pin down not only in the later writings of Aquinas, but 
especially in the commentators that follow, as Duarte Sousa-Lara demonstrates in “Aquinas on 
the Object of the Human Act: A Reading in Light of the Texts and Commentators.”384 In 
particular, a distinction that Aquinas makes between the material and formal element of the 
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object leads some commentators, such as John of Saint Thomas to conclude that the Moral 
Object is a physical object.385 Sousa-Lara demonstrates that for Aquinas, the Moral Object of a 
human act is not a physical effect or thing, but a single object of choice with a quasi-material and 
formal element.386   
      In this case, Aquinas uses the Aristotelian description of matter and form as an analogy 
for the relationship between the object of intention (finis ultimus or finis operantis) and the 
object of the act, that is the object of choice (finis proximus or finis operis). Sousa-Lara, in 
“Aquinas on Interior and Exterior Acts: Clarifying a Key Aspect of His Action Theory,” explains 
that Aquinas differentiates the object of intention from the object of choice by the distinction 
between interior act of the will and external act of the will, respectively.387 Thus, Aquinas 
considers the moral species of the act formally with regard to the object of the interior act.388 For 
example, one who steals for the purpose of committing adultery is more an adulterer than a 
thief.389 Thus, according to the analogy of form and matter, just as form gives shape to matter, so 
the ultimate end qualifies the Moral Object.   
     In using this analogy, Aquinas is not saying that the proximate end is material. Nor is he 
saying that the Moral Object receives its entire intentional content from the ultimate end. Indeed, 
Aquinas is very clear that exterior acts, insofar as they are voluntary not only abide in the moral 
order, but also have their own intentional content. Martin Rhonheimer, in Natural Law and 
Practical Reason: A Thomistic View of Moral Autonomy, shows that for Aquinas this intentional 
content is rational insofar as he attributes this to reason.390 The moral quality of the Moral Object 
depends on its conformity to its proper matter (materia debitae) or proper circumstances 
(materia circumstantiae), which reason derives.391 In The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical 
Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics, Rhonheimer explains at great length the intelligible 
 
 273 
nature of the Moral Object, which he calls basic intentional content.392 As a quick aside, the 
proximate end does not always have to have an intelligible or intentional content associated with 
it, in which case the proximate end is purely instrumental and receives all of it from the ultimate 
end only.393 It is essential to understand that for Aquinas, a practical concept is different than a 
speculative or theoretical concept. 
      To highlight the distinct quality of a moral act, Finnis in draws attention to an important 
distinction that Aquinas makes concerning orders in the prologue to his Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Politics.394 Aquinas argues that there are four irreducibly distinct orders: natural, 
logical, moral, and technical.395 These orders correspond to exclusive sciences or methods of 
knowing: 1) physics and metaphysics; 2) logic and mathematics; 3) moral philosophy; and 4) 
artistic and technical.396 Finnis asserts that the irreducibility of these orders means that principles 
apply uniquely, even if analogically to the respective orders.397 Moreover, each order has a 
distinct object or end.398   
      Knowledge pertaining to the natural order is speculative, while knowledge pertaining to 
action, either moral or technical, is practical.399 David Hume famously formulates the argument 
that ought-statements are not derivative of is-statements.400 This is a way of saying that practical 
knowledge is different from speculative knowledge. This, however, does not mean that ought-
statements are irrational.401 Moreover, it is not a different faculty that formulates practical 
reason, but the same intellect that formulates speculative arguments devises practical arguments, 
but the intellect acts in a distinct manner, by extension.402 Since moral acts are in a different 
order, reason formulates them according to practical syllogisms, rather than theoretical 
syllogisms.403 Practical syllogisms may contain theoretical premises, but the conclusion is a 
statement, or better an act of striving or doing.404   
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      The failure to maintain the distinction between practical knowledge and speculative 
knowledge results in the Naturalistic Fallacy,405 which asserts that the Natural Law is derivative 
of laws of nature.406 Rhonheimer identifies the Naturalistic Fallacy as a physicalism.407 He 
attributes this to the manualist tradition of moral theology, which is casuistic, that is, taught using 
cases.408 Hermeneutically, this approach presumes a third-person perspective regarding morality. 
In other words, it presumes that an observer can identify the Moral Object of the Act simply by 
viewing the person’s external action. Prima facie, this seems to jive with Aquinas’s action 
theory; after all, he does identify the external act with the Moral Object.409 However, if one can 
observe the Moral Object from the third-person perspective, then it is no longer in the moral 
order, but the natural order.   
      In “‘Materia ex qua’ and ‘Materia circa quam’ in Aquinas,” Sousa-Lara observes that 
Aquinas connects the Moral Object with materia circa quam, not materia ex qua.410 In addition, 
in De Veritate, Aquinas identifies the Moral Object with the materia circa quam.411 Sousa-Lara 
equates the materia ex qua as the physical dimension of an act.412 For example, in the natural 
order, the act of marital love is indistinguishable from adultery or fornication. For Sousa-Lara, 
the materia ex qua is the physical act of coitus.413 The materia circa quam, that is, the Moral 
Object, according to the moral order, determines the species of the act.414 The coital act, 
considered materia ex qua has restricted potency for receiving form from the materia circa 
quam. In fact, he observes that the act has potential to be of three different forms specifically: 
conjugal love, fornication, or adultery.415 Thus, from the third-person perspective, although one 
cannot necessarily know the Moral Object or remote end, it nonetheless limits the options. After 
all, a person buying flowers is not driving a car.   
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      Just as Aquinas uses the hylomorphic phenomenon of form and matter to illustrate the 
relationship between the ultimate end and the proximate end,416 so he uses such an analogy to 
illustrate the formal role of the materia circa quam with regard to the material role of the materia 
ex qua.417 Sousa-Lara associates both the materia circa quam and the materia ex qua with the 
external act; however, each signifies something different regarding the external act.418 Recall, 
that for Aquinas, the external act is part of the moral order only insofar as it is voluntary, that is, 
the will configures it.419 Since Sousa-Lara associates the materia circa quam with the Moral 
Object, this constitutes what the will chooses.420 The materia ex qua, on the other hand, 
regarding the external act, constitutes the physical content of the act, which the will 
commands.421 Thus, the materia circa quam, that is, Moral Object in the moral order, morally 
configures the materia ex qua, that is, the object of the commanded act in the natural order.   
      This subsection demonstrates how an accurate account of Aquinas’s Moral Object of an 
Act keeps it in the moral order, rationally formulated and proceeding from the will. The Moral 
Object is clearly distinct from the ultimate end (object of intention) insofar as he understands it 
as the proximate end (Moral Object of a choice). Moreover, regarding the external act he uses 
materia circa quam to identify and distinguish the Moral Object in the moral order, from the 
external act in the physical order that the will commands—the materia ex qua. 
b. Nominalism, Manualism, and Proportionalism 
      After Aquinas, a divide arises between the Dominican emphasis of the experience of 
beatitude through the intellect and the Franciscan emphasis of beatitude through the will in 
love.422 In the wake of this divide William of Ockham introduces nominalism, which rejects 
universals.423 This subsubsection demonstrates the influence that nominalism has on the 
methodology of moral theology, especially regarding manualism and proportionalism. 
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      For Ockham, the only thing that exists is the reality of individual beings. Forms or 
natures exist in name only. In the Platonic sense universals are forms. In the Aristotelian sense, 
the form inheres in beings. In turn, the universal constitutes the nature of individual beings. 
Regarding action, natures influence inclinations.424 In humans, the object of practical reason is 
the good that they naturally incline to.425 Because human nature is universal—shared by all 
individuals of the same species—it is possible to formulate Natural Laws that articulate good for 
human behavior.   
      Insofar as God creates and providentially governs humanity according to the eternal law, 
the natural law constitutes a human participation in the eternal law.426 Finnis, in Natural Law and 
Natural Rights explains that for Aquinas participation conjoins two concepts: causality and 
similarity.427 God causes humans to share in the light of reason, in a manner that is similar to the 
divine.428 In this regard there is a difference between the intelligible nature of other animals and 
the intelligent nature of humans.429 Animals participate in the divine law passively insofar as 
they follow their inclinations,430 whereas humans take an active role in the divine providence 
insofar as they use reason to formulate ends and their will to achieve them.431  Since law itself 
constitutes a measure according to reason for action, only rational beings truly participate in 
law.432 The illuminating power of reason enables one to grasp the good in actions, including 
desires and inclinations.433 Moreover, the voluntary nature of human action entails freedom and 
the possibility for self-mastery.434 Thus, Rhonheimer describes this participatory role of the 
humans in the eternal law as participated autonomy.435 Accordingly, Pinckaers indicates that for 
Aquinas, freedom proceeds from both reason and the will.436 Consequently, nature, which 
includes the restrictions of inclinations, desires, bodily nature itself, and reason limit freedom.   
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      Contrary to Aquinas’s limited autonomy, Ockham argues for a freedom of 
indifference.437 Again, influenced by the Franciscan emphasis on the will, Ockham understands 
freedom to proceed entirely from the will.438 Since there are no universals, for Ockham, each 
individual stands in absolute freedom from the influence of natures.439 Since each choice stands 
in complete freedom, there is no longer any need to stress growth in virtue.440 Just as human 
freedom is absolute, so God’s freedom is omnipotent.441 In fact, for Ockham, the veracity of all 
laws depends on nothing other than its divine command.442 No rational foundation grounds them. 
The absolute freedom of God means that God could change them at any moment. Consequently, 
under the influence of Ockham, the emphasis of moral theology becomes law and obligation.443 
Moreover, Natural Law is no longer based on human nature and its inclinations, but entirely on 
divine command.444 In this sense, it is entirely extrinsic to the human person.   
     Ockham’s nominalism continues to influence moral theology right up to the present day. 
In the manualist tradition of the seventeenth through the early twentieth century, the 
hermeneutical method is casuistic, that is, case-based.445 The conscience has a central role in 
discerning proper courses of action that stand in the void between freedom of indifference and 
moral obligation that God externally imposes.446 The manualists not only blur the line between 
the internal and external act, but seem to eliminate any real consideration for the internal at all in 
favor of a morality that is entirely discernable from the third-person perspective.447 Thomas Petri 
in Aquinas and the Theology of the Body: The Thomistic Foundation of John Paul II’s 
Anthropology, quotes John McHugh and Charles Callan’s manual highlighting the extrinsic 
nature of morality.448 McHugh and Callan hold that morality is “the agreement or disagreement 
of a human act with the norms that regulate human conduct with reference to man’s last end.” 449   
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      The casuistic approach of the manuals to morality is underequipped to deal with the 
complex dilemma of contraception. For example, John T. Noonan, Jr., in Contraception: A 
History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists, observes that the most 
popular manual, Jean-Pierre Gury’s Compendium of Moral Theology, addresses contraception 
purely from the physical dimension, objecting to it merely on the basis that it violates the 
prohibition of onanism—extra-vaginal ejaculation.450   
     Peter Knauer attempts to breathe new life into moral theology with his article, “The 
Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect.”451 Like Abelard and Aquinas, Knauer 
refocuses moral theology on intention and the will. Unfortunately, he identifies moral evil with 
intending or causing physical evil, without a commensurate reason.452 Josef Fuchs calls this 
physical evil pre-moral evil453 and Louis Janssens calls it ontic evil.454 In part, because moral 
acting involves causing physical evil, Knauer uses the criteria of proportionality in the Principle 
of Double Effect to argue for what Richard McCormick calls an “extended notion of the 
object.”455 Knauer, understands both the finis operis and the finis operantis as ends, however, he 
understands the first to have a causal relationship to the second.456 In other words, the Moral 
Object of the Act (finis operis) causes the remote end (finis operantis).  Moreover, the Moral 
object is good if there is commensurate reason to justify it, that is, if the remote end is good 
enough.457 For Knauer, such a statement is not the same as saying the ends justify an evil means, 
because presumably one has not yet determined that the means is good or evil yet, since one 
cannot know this without a consideration of the end.458   
      Rhonheimer in “Intentional Actions and the Meaning of Object: A Reply to Richard 
McCormick,” objects to the proportionalist methodology, because it weighs the consequences of 
actions, not actions themselves.459 Put another way, proportionalism reduces moral decision-
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making to discerning whether or not to cause certain effects. This makes morality eventistic, 
since an action’s value rests on its effect and has no use for the perspective of the acting 
person.460 The object of intention swallows the Moral Object, totally neglecting its inherent 
intentional character, which Rhonheimer calls the basic intentional content.461 Rhonheimer 
explains that the Moral Object has an intention, formed by reason, which he and Aquinas 
describe as the object of choice.462  For Rhonheimer, the basic intentional content of the Moral 
Object is precisely what keeps it in the realm of the moral order.463   
      In accord with a proportionalistic understanding of the Moral Object, Knauer contends 
that a couple might discern that using contraception is a viable option for them, so long as they 
have a commensurate reason, such as economic or health reasons.464 Since the Moral Object has 
no rational or intentional value itself, choosing to contracept is indistinguishable for Knauer from 
choosing to periodically abstain.465 Accordingly, the expanded notion of the object, essentially 
amounts to saying that the intentional content of the object comes from the remote end (object of 
intention).466 Unfortunately, as Rhonheimer indicates, this relegates moral decision-making to 
the purely physical realm, rendering it eventistic.467 So, moral decision-making has little to 
nothing to do with a deliberate will choosing a certain kind of behavior,468 that is, a human action 
with a basic intentional content,469 what Aquinas calls the forma a ratione a concepta.470    
c. The Object: Contraception and Self-Defense 
      In accord with Aquinas’s action theory, John Paul II’s understanding of the Moral Object, 
and Paul VI’s argument against contraception,471 Rhonheimer carefully identifies the Moral 
Object of contraception.472 This subsubsection follows Rhonheimer’s articulation of the Moral 
Object of contraception and how he distinguishes it from one of self-defense, which using 
emergency contraception to prevent conception after sexual assault constitutes. 
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     First, Rhonheimer explains Paul VI’s argument in Humanae Vitae that the contraceptive 
choice violates the natural law.473 According to the Natural Law, the two fundamental meanings 
of human sexuality, the unitive and the procreative, are inseparable.474 This is the Inseparability 
Principle, which Paul VI refers to in Humanae Vitae.475 In other words, humans, on their own 
initiative may not break this connection, which contraception does.476 The Inseparability 
Principle builds on an adequate anthropology,477 one that accounts for the bodily and spiritual 
dimensions of the human person.478 Consequently, for Rhonheimer, the human body is not 
merely the object of human action, but part of the subject.479  Therefore, the bodily reality of 
procreation receives its full human specification from spiritual love.  Moreover, the spiritual love 
specifies the procreative dimension of the body.480  
      Precisely because this concerns a choice, which abides on the moral order, each choice 
for the marital act must be open to the procreative significance, not its procreative functionality, 
that is, physically intending to conceive.481 Consequently, sterile couples may engage in the 
marital act and still be open to the procreative dimension of the marital act.482 Likewise, fertile 
couples, in accord with the call to responsible parenthood, may choose to practice periodic 
continence, abstaining from the conjugal act, except during the infertile times, without violating 
the Inseparability Principle.483 Thus, Rhonheimer identifies the Moral Object of the marital act as 
loving bodily union, which serves procreation by its very nature.484   
      To identify the Moral Object of contraception, Rhonheimer does not have recourse to the 
Inseparability Principle, but the virtue of chastity.485 He argues that periodic continence is a 
constitutive means for growth in chastity for married couples insofar as it helps them to grow in 
self-mastery.486 This is what Pius XI says in Casti Cannubii487 and Paul VI says in Humanae 
Vitae.488 By implication, not only a couple’s engagement in the marital act constitutes a conjugal 
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act, but their intentional abstinence also forms a conjugal act, that is an act of mutual love.489 The 
contraceptive choice, on the other hand, renders needless the specific sexual behavior—periodic 
continence—that responsible parenthood entails.490 Moreover, it is a choice against virtuous self-
control by abstaining from the sexual act.491   
      Precisely because Rhonheimer places the contraceptive choice in the moral order, he is 
able to morally qualify its use as an emergency contraceptive in an act of self-defense, in cases of 
sexual assault.492 Rhonheimer recalls the response of three theologians regarding whether or not 
a woman could have recourse to contraception in the face of rape, including for example 
Congolese nuns in the war-torn Congo.493 Rhonheimer finds their arguments tending toward 
physicalism insofar as they focus the debate on the physical effect of contraception, namely, 
temporary sterilization.494 According to Rhonheimer, Francesco Hürth considers the physical act 
one of sterilization in the absolute sense, but on the moral level, that is, in the relative sense, it is 
not an act of contraception, but self-defense, since the woman does not both freely and 
deliberately desire or will sexual intercourse and to deprive the act of its reproductive 
potential.495 Palazzini and Lambruschini use Double Effect and Totality to justify the woman’s 
recourse to contraception.496 Rhonheimer objects to this, because of its casuistic formulation.497  
Just like Knauer, they are formulating the argument in such a way that one needs sufficient 
reason to choose an immoral act—contraception.498 
      Rhonheimer, however, insists that since the act in question is not merely on the natural 
order, it is not a question of finding sufficient reason to choose an act that is per se immoral, but 
a matter of accurately formulating the Moral Object as one of self-defense on the moral order.499 
Again, the proportionalists’ expanded notion of the object amounts to rendering the intentionality 
of the object indistinguishable from the ulterior intentions.500 Consequently, the formulation of 
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the object by proportionalists is just as casuistic as that of the manualists. In particular, the 
eventistic and physicalistic formulation of the object demonstrates this.501 Insofar as force 
removes the sexual act, on the woman’s part, from the realm of freedom, the choice to use 
contraception constitutes an act of self-defense from the unwanted effect of conceiving.502   
d. Genus Moris 
      I now discuss the derivation of the other criteria of Double Effect. Just as Ockham’s 
nominalism and the casuistic methodology of the manualists and the proportionalists obscures 
the Thomistic meaning of the Moral Object, so it obfuscates Double Effect. This subsubsection 
demonstrates this. Moreover, it contrasts the consequentialist and Thomistic formulation in its 
application to emergency contraception for sexual assault victims.   
      In the Secunda Secundae of the Summa Theologica Aquinas uses Double-Effect 
Reasoning to explain how one may use self-defense to unintentionally kill an assailant.503 An 
action may have two effects one intended and the other unintended (praeter intentionem).504 
Praeter intentionem means accidental.505 Sousa-Lara explains that Aquinas is asserting that the 
evil effect must not constitute the Moral Object.506 This jives with Aquinas’s agreement with 
Augustine that one must not intend to kill the assailant.507 Moreover, this agrees with Finnis’s 
assertion that Aquinas is using the broad sense of intention here, which includes both intending 
as choosing the Moral Object (proximate end) and intending the ultimate end.508   
      Ethicists often use the example of performing a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman with 
a cancerous uterus.509 Insofar as cancer constitutes a grave threat to the mother’s life, the 
situation necessitates a hysterectomy. Ethically, this procedure entails a choice to save the 
mother’s life, by removing a grave threat. Unfortunately, the surgery foreseeably results in the 
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death of the child. Using this example, I illustrate the difference between the consequentialist and 
the non-consequentialist formulation of Double Effect. 
      Cavanaugh contends that Gury’s version of Double Effect,510 which Joseph T. Mangan 
reproduces in his “An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect,”511 represents a 
contemporary formulation.512 Under the influence of nominalism and the casuistic hermeneutic, 
Gury adopts a cause-effect articulation of Double Effect.513 For Gury, the criterion pertaining to 
the Moral Object identifies it as a cause. 514 Thus, he indicates that the cause itself must be good 
or indifferent.515 In non-consequentialist terms, the Moral Object must be good.516 Put another 
way, the Moral Object must not be an intrinsically evil act.   
      In the case of a pregnant woman with a cancerous uterus, the procedure in question is the 
hysterectomy. Using cause-effect terminology, it is difficult to distinguish the physical act of the 
hysterectomy from the Moral Object that one chooses in performing a hysterectomy. For this 
reason, Rhonheimer claims that by using causal language consequentialists reduce actions to 
events.517 Understanding the Moral Object as a cause removes the personal perspective.518 
Consequentially, one is simply performing a physical procedure: a hysterectomy. In purely 
physical terms, one is removing a cancerous, gravid uterus.   
      A non-consequentialist formulation of the Moral Object takes into account the 
perspective of the acting person.519 In other words, it describes in terms of striving or willing 
what the acting person chooses.520 At the same time, it avoids the pitfalls of so narrowly defining 
the Moral Object that it does not account for its physical consequences.521 For example, 
Cavanaugh accuses John Finnis, Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle in “‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’: A 
Reply to Critics of our Action Theory,”522 of so narrowly defining the object of a craniotomy that 
it conceptually excludes the death of a child.523 Cavanaugh contends, however, that it is 
 
 284 
impossible to define a craniotomy without the death of a child.524 Therefore, taking into account 
the consequences of the act, which include the unintended, yet foreseen death of a child, one may 
say that the physician and patient choose to remove the grave threat of a cancerous, gravid uterus 
using a hysterectomy, foreseeing, but not intending the death of a child. This non-consequential 
formulation accounts for what the acting person chooses with due regard for the foreseen, but 
unintended consequences.        
      The next two criteria derive from the same statement. Since Aquinas uses intention in the 
broad sense, one may conclude that he not only prohibits intending the evil effect as a means, but 
also as a remote end. Casuistically, one must only intend the good effect, not the bad.525 Non-
consequentially, this means that the evil effect must not be the ultimate end of one’s intention.526 
Moreover, insofar as praeter intentionem means accidental, it does not mean unforeseen as in a 
mishap.527 To the contrary, Aquinas presumes that one foresees the unintended evil. For this 
reason, Cavanaugh stresses the intended/foreseen distinction.528 Concerning the abovementioned 
example, one must not intend the death of the child. Rather, foreseeing the death of the child, one 
intends the restoration of health to the mother.   
      The third criterion, casuistically, insists that the evil effect must not cause the good 
effect.529 This articulation highlights the non-personalistic formulation of action, which 
Rhonheimer criticizes as being physicalistic and eventistic.530 According to such a construction, 
effects cause effects. Since Aquinas only understands morality in terms of persons in action, he 
has no analogous criterion. However, Thomistic ethicists often describe this criterion as one must 
not choose an evil means to attain a good end.531 This, however, is indistinguishable from the 
first criterion that insists one’s Moral Object must not be evil.   
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      Consequentially, ethicists often maintain that a hysterectomy is distinct from a direct 
abortion, because one performs the physical procedure on the uterus, rather than the child.532 The 
above discussion concerning the definition of contraception demonstrates that a physicalistic 
definition of the Moral Object does not suffice. Rhonheimer, for example, observes that although 
the physical act of a female athlete taking an anovulant to prevent menstruation to compete in a 
sporting event is the same as a woman taking an anovulant to prevent conception, the Moral 
Objects differ.533 The former is indifferent, while the latter is immoral, because it constitutes an 
alternative to an act of continence, which is constitutive of responsible parenthood and an 
inherent means to growth in chastity.534    
      Finally, Aquinas insists that one’s means must be proportionate to one’s end.535 Once 
again, the consequentialists use cause-effect language to articulate this criterion. Therefore, in 
consequential terms, the final criterion insists that one must have a proportionately serious reason 
to cause an evil effect.536 Insofar as removing the cancerous uterus saves the mother’s life, this is 
proportionate to the negative effect, the death of the child.   
      For Aquinas, disproportionate means imply a change in the Moral Object.537 For 
example, if one uses deadly force to repel an attacker who clearly does not use deadly force, it is 
difficult to say that one is really defending oneself, rather than intending to kill another person. A 
corollary to the fourth criteria is that one must have no alternative.538 Presumably, the only 
medically indicated procedure is a hysterectomy for a woman with a gravid, cancerous uterus. 
     Thus, a casuistic argument in favor of using a contraceptive is as follows. First, the act in 
question must be either good or indifferent. Rhonheimer indicates that unless one maintains the 
moral character of the Moral Object, it is impossible, to distinguish it from a contraceptive 
choice, physically defined.539 Thus, Palazzini and Lambruschini cannot get past the physicalistic 
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notion that the choice is inexorably one to sterilization.540 As such, it is difficult to avoid the 
proportionalistic trap of finding commensurate reason to justify one’s means.541 In this sense, the 
whole argument stands or falls on the re-defined proportionate criteria. Regarding the second and 
third criteria, it is hard to see how the evil effect does not cause the good effect—no conception, 
or that the one does not intend the evil effect—physically defined as sterilization.   
      Rhonheimer’s definition of the Moral Object as self-defense resolves the tension in the 
argument and renders it unnecessary to use Double Effect. By defining the Moral Object as self-
defense, one avoids the need to justify evil. One is simply using the means available to prevent 
conception from taking place without a loving bodily union. Only when one does not clearly 
differentiate the Moral Object from a physical event, does it become difficult to justify or find a 
commensurate reason to use a contraceptive method to prevent conception.   
      This section shows that a non-consequentialist description of the Moral Object—one that 
clearly distinguishes the object of choice from intention and keeps it in the moral order—of self-
defense from sexual assault excludes any necessity of recourse to Double Effect.  
      This chapter uses a non-consequentialist definition of the Moral Object and the Principle 
of Double Effect to justify risk reducing bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies in BRCA mutation 
carriers and the use of emergency contraception to prevent conception in victims of sexual 
assault. The following chapter considers ethical justifications for sex reassignment surgery in 
patients with gender dysphoria and using contraception for non-contraceptive benefits.   
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CHAPTER SIX – SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY AND CONTRACEPTION 
     This chapter considers the ethics surrounding sex reassignment surgery for gender 
dysphoria and the use of contraceptives in Catholic hospitals for non-contraceptive benefits. 
6A. Sex Reassignment Surgery for Gender Dysphoria 
     Two recent articles in Health Care Ethics USA: A Quarterly Resource for the Catholic 
Health Ministry argue that the Principle of Double Effect and the Principle of Totality and 
Integrity justify the use of sex reassignment surgery in patients diagnosed with gender 
dysphoria.1 This section demonstrates how Catholic theological anthropology not only precludes 
the so-called ideology of gender—that underlies justifications for sex reassignment therapies—
which Pope Francis along with his predecessors condemn,2 but also does not admit justification 
for sex reassignment surgery by means of Double Effect or Totality, especially in light of an 
accurate articulation of the Moral Object.   
      The first subsection explicates the definition of sex, gender, gender dysphoria, and 
current therapies. The second subsection examines three categories that the Church uses to reject 
gender ideology: medical, philosophical, and theological. The third subsection demonstrates how 
an accurate understanding of Totality and Double Effect, which includes a Thomistic 
understanding of the Moral Object, excludes the possibility of sex reassignment surgery for 
gender dysphoria.  
i. Sex, Gender, and Gender Dysphoria 
      This subsection explains the complex categories of sex, gender, and gender dysphoria. 
The first subsubsection explicates the multivariable definition of biological sex utilizing intersex 
conditions to clarify and highlight its complexity. The second subsubsection discusses the origins 
and development of the concept of gender. The third subsubsection reveals the evolution of the 
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concept of gender dysphoria, especially as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Edition3 and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth 
Edition4 reflect it. Finally, the fourth subsubsection briefly discusses sex reassignment therapies.   
a. Defining Sex 
      Defining sex biologically as male or female is not as easy as it may at first appear. This is 
true not only because of the variance of terminology, but also because of the many factors that 
contribute to even a somatic definition. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fifth Edition identifies sex with the biological indicators of male and female, which I 
further elucidate in this subsubsection, whereas it identifies the lived experience of man or 
woman as gender, which I discuss in the following subsubsection.5   
      Several physiological criteria exist for defining sex, including: genetic, gonadal, ductal, 
and phenotypic or genital.6 Genetically, in its most unambiguous form, the male and female 
karyotypes consist of 46,XY and 46,XX, respectively. There may, however, be several unique 
combinations of sex chromosomes including, but not limited to: 45,X (Turner Syndrome), 
47,XXX, 47,XXY (Klinefelter Syndrome), 47,XYY. In addition, early in embryonic 
development, mitotic errors may give rise to cell populations with unique chromosomal 
complements, called mosaicism.7 For instance, it is possible to have a 46,XX/46,XY karyotype, 
which constitutes 50% of cases of true hermaphroditism.8 Strictly speaking, however, one is 
genetically male if one has a Y chromosome and female if one does not, regardless of the 
number of X chromosomes one may have additionally.9   
      The variety of genotypes, including mosaics, gives rise to the various expressions. 
Klinefelter syndrome, for instance consists genetically of one or more Y chromosomes in 
combination with one or more X chromosomes, which results in male hypogonadism 
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(underdeveloped male sex organs). Turner syndrome is a partial or complete monosomy of the X 
chromosome that engenders hypogonadism in phenotypic females.10 In both Klinefelter 
syndrome and Turner syndrome, the sexual identity is less ambiguous, but simply 
underdeveloped.   
      Alternatively, there are forms of hermaphroditism—true and pseudo—that make sexual 
identity externally more difficult to pinpoint. The gonads refer to the germ cells that migrate, 
becoming testes in males and ovaries in females. Although initially neutral, the gonads have an 
inherent tendency to develop femininely, “unless influenced by Y chromosome-dependent 
masculinizing factors.”11 In terms of ductal development, females develop Müllerian ducts and 
males develop Wolffian ducts. Phenotypic or genital sex refers to the respective external sex 
organs. Hermaphroditism consists of a combination of almost any variety of the above-
mentioned structures.   
      True hermaphroditism occurs when one has both testicular and ovarian tissue. This 
phenomenon is very rare. Genetically, half are mosaics, while the other half have a 46,XX 
karyotype with an active SRY gene that has either translocated to an autosomal chromosome, or 
one of the sex chromosomes has a cryptic chimerism.12 Pseudo-hermaphroditism, on the other 
hand, occurs when one has sexually the opposite genitals of the gonads. For instance, a female 
pseudo-hermaphrodite has ovaries, but male genitalia; and a male pseudo-hermaphrodite has 
testes and female genitalia. Female pseudo-hermaphrodites are genetically female, 46,XX, but 
have ambiguous or virilized (masculinized) genitalia caused by excessive exposure to androgen 
steroid during gestation, which originates from congenital adrenal hyperplasia.13 Male pseudo-
hermaphrodites are genetically male, but due to problems with either androgen synthesis or 
androgen insensitivity, the male ducts and/or external genitalia do not fully develop.   
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     As complex as disorders of sex development are, there is less disagreement about its 
treatment than conditions relating to gender, despite the variety of historical approaches.14 
Perhaps this is because it is evident that these conditions are largely somatic, rather than, 
psychosocial. In 2006, several groups wrote “Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex 
Disorders.”15 The move is to classify intersex conditions genetically, even though they present 
somatically differently.16 The above analysis demonstrates that while intersex conditions 
manifest in the gonads, ducts, and genitals, they originate genetically. Thus, even in intersex 
conditions, the genetic classification of individuals according to a binary sexual classification is 
possible.   
b. Defining Gender 
      Much more complex, not only because of the divergence in terminology, but also because 
of the underlying theories is the definition of gender. The following largely represents an 
elucidation of the understanding of gender in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fifth Edition and the social constructionist perspective that underlies it.   
      Sex or sexual refers to the biological indicators of male or female, including 
chromosomes, gonads, and genitalia.17 However, it is precisely because of the intersex condition 
that the need arose for another term to denote the lived experience of a person as a man or 
woman.18 John Money is the first to use the term gender to highlight such a difference.19 Gender 
denotes the lived role of an individual as a boy or girl, man or woman.20 The American 
Psychological Association defines gender as a social construct that one attributes to male and 
female individuals.21 One’s natal gender—the gender assigned at birth—may not constitute one’s 
gender identity.22 One may, therefore, reassign one’s gender. Gender identity, though often in 
coordination with traditional masculine and feminine roles, may constitute neither, in which case 
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one identifies as non-binary.23 Transgender refers to those who “transiently or persistently 
identify with a gender different from their natal gender.”24 Transsexual, on the other hand, refers 
to those who have undergone a social transition from male to female, or female to male, that may 
include somatic transition with cross-sex hormone treatment and/or sex reassignment surgery.25     
       Sociologist, Linda L. Lindsey, argues that society and culture largely construct gender 
roles.26 In “Gender Identity,” Lawrence S. Mayer and Paul R. McHugh27 attribute the concept of 
gender as a social construct to feminist writers such as Simon de Bouvoir,28 Ann Oakley,29 
Suzaane J. Kessler and Wendy McKenna,30 Gayle Rubin,31 and Judith Butler.32 In “On the 
Construction of Gender, Sex and Sexualities,” Jeanne Marecek et al., hold that knowledge is a 
collaborative product of society.33 Merecek et al. indicate that social constructionists do not 
mean to say that gender, sex, and sexuality are inherently built by society as opposed to biology, 
environment, or innate, but that society constructs the terms and concepts they represent.34 
Moreover, these linguistic constructs influence how one understands gender and sex.35 Social 
constructionists are interested in processes; for example, how terms change in meaning over 
time.36 Judith Butler, for instance, understands gender according to a performativity theory of 
doing.37 In other words, gender is not being, but doing. In addition, they do not understand the 
human person as distinct from society, insofar as both are mutually dependent upon each other.38 
Consequently, social constructionists understand gender, not as a personality trait, but as a social 
process.39 Additionally, they understand the concepts and terms that reflect biology and sex and 
sexual to be social constructs as well, which also falls under the purview of social processes.40 
Marecek et al. dedicate the remainder of the paper to demonstrating the relativism of both 
biology and gender.41 
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       According to such a constructionist understanding of sex, sexuality, and gender, the 
concept of transexualism arises, which not only implies the possibility of changing one’s gender 
in a binary sense, but in a non-binary sense as well.42 As Margaret H. McCarthy indicates in 
“Gender Ideology and the Humanum,” many contemporary theorists attempt to raze any notion 
that gender is attributable to sex or the body.43 Inherent in the constructionists view is the notion 
of a disembodied will and the dictatorship of relativism.44 Although Merecek et al. deny that they 
are asserting that gender, sex, etc. is socially constructed as opposed to being nature-determined, 
in practice, this is what social constructionism does.45 Such a relativistic disposition not only 
presumes that the authentic person is the soul, but that the body is a tabula rasa. Both 
anthropological theories contrast with the Catholic understanding of the human person and have 
origins in Enlightenment philosophy as I demonstrate in the next subsection.       
c. Gender Dysphoria 
      Here, I follow the development of the clinical understanding of gender dysphoria as 
relevant diagnostic texts articulate. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fourth Edition identifies gender dysphoria as a disorder concerning identity,46 whereas 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, no longer views the 
condition as such.47 Rather, it identifies the clinical problem with the experience of dysphoria, 
that is, the distressing experience of identifying as transgender, which one may presumably 
resolve by changing the individual’s sex.48 It no longer considers the transgender condition 
pathological.49 The respective approaches inform the increasing affinity for sex reassignment 
therapies.     
       According to Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, 
gender identity disorders “are characterized by strong and persistent cross-gender identification 
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accompanied by persistent discomfort with one’s assigned sex.”50 The name for the condition 
suggests that the pathology consists in having the experience of a gender different from one’s 
natal birth. Accordingly, one may not have an intersex condition, increasingly called a disorder 
of sexual development in the literature (Criteria C).51 At the same time, one must have a 
persistent discomfort with one’s natal sex or the gender role assigned to it (Criteria B), and a 
strong identification with the opposite gender (Criteria A).52 In other words, one must not only 
experience discomfort with one’s given gender, but one must identify with the opposite gender.  
Finally, there must be evident distress or impairment of social, occupational, or other areas of life 
(Criteria D).53   
      The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, in changing 
the name to gender dysphoria removes the pathology from the incongruent experience of having 
a gender unique to one’s natal sex and places it on the distress that such an experience causes. By 
de-pathologizing the transgender experience, they open the door to transsexual therapies. Alice 
Dreger, in “Why Gender Dysphoria Should No Longer Be Considered a Medical Disorder,” 
highlights the intentional motivation behind this change of approach.54 It further delineates 
criteria for diagnosis in two subgroups based on age—children and adolescents and adults.55 It 
defines gender dysphoria more concretely for children, having more criteria that must be met (six 
instead of two).56 In both cases, the patient must experience the incongruence for at least six 
months.57 Children must present with either a strong desire to be the opposite gender or the 
insistence of being the opposite gender.58 Moreover, they must present with five more distinct 
behavioral patterns, such as cross-dressing, a strong preference for: playing the opposite gender 
role in make-believe, opposite gender toys, opposite gender playmates, rejection of same-sex 
playmates, a strong dislike of one’s sexual anatomy, and strong desire for primary/secondary 
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sexual characteristics that match one’s experienced gender.59 Finally, this experience must 
impair the child’s functioning socially or in school, for instance.60   
     In adolescents and adults, patients present with marked incongruence between one’s 
experienced gender and the assigned gender, with a strong desire to be rid of primary and 
secondary sex characteristics of one’s natal gender and a strong desire to have the primary and 
secondary sex characteristics of the opposite gender.61 In addition, there may be a strong desire 
to be treated as opposite of one’s natal gender and a conviction that one has the typical feelings 
or reactions of the other gender.62 As with children, the experience of dysphoria must interfere 
with one’s social, occupational, or other areas of one’s life.63   
      Prevalence varies, but overall, more natal males experience gender dysphoria than natal 
females.64 Rates of persistence from childhood to adolescence or adulthood vary between 2.2% 
and 30%.65 Until 1923, when Magnus Hirschfeld argues to the contrary,66 clinicians did not 
distinguish gender dysphoria from homosexuality.67 There is, however, a strong correlation 
between gender dysphoria and same sex attraction. Sexual attraction among individuals varies, 
especially in men, however, most experience sexual attraction to one’s natal sex.68 Natal males 
who present later in life with gender dysphoria tend to be attracted to natal females.69 Differential 
diagnoses include nonconformity to gender roles, transvestic disorder, body dysmorphic 
disorder, psychotic disorders including schizophrenia, and other clinical presentations.70 
Comorbidities include emotional and behavioral problems most commonly anxiety, disruptive 
impulsive control, and depression.71   
d. Sex Reassignment Therapies 
     Expert opinions diverge on appropriate treatment for gender dysphoria. Some encourage 
the pursuit of counseling that helps one identify with one’s natal sex.72 Others encourage people 
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struggling with gender dysphoria to change the body to match the so-called inside. The latter 
advocate the use of hormone replacement therapies and sex reassignment surgeries to facilitate 
the transition.73 There are multiple types of sex reassignment surgery. These include male-to-
female and female-to-male operations that consist of genital reconstruction, breast augmentation, 
chest reconstruction, and hysterectomy. In addition, less invasive procedures include facial 
feminization surgery, vocal cord surgery, and Adam’s apple shaving. Some delineate between 
top or bottom procedures. Top sex reassignment surgeries refer to procedures that address the 
secondary sexual characteristics from the chest up to the face, while bottom sex reassignment 
surgeries refer to procedures that change the genitals.  
      This subsection addresses the complex definitions of sex, gender, gender dysphoria, and 
possible treatments. The following subsection analyzes three categories which the Catholic 
Church uses to preclude sex reassignment therapies.   
ii. Objections to Sex Reassignment Therapies 
      On December 12, 2016, the Committee on Doctrine of the United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops sent a memorandum to bishops addressing the rapid increase in people 
identifying as transgender.74 The committee highlights its concern that the Affordable Care Act 
recognizes gender identity as a protected category for antidiscrimination and the implications 
that this may have for Catholic Healthcare Services.75 The committee objects to sex reassignment 
therapies on three grounds: medical, philosophical, and theological.76  This subsection 
illuminates these three categories.    
a. Medical  
       To be sure, researchers in the field face many challenges when it comes to data for 
gender dysphoria patients and outcomes of procedures. In part, this is due to the relatively small 
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number of individuals presenting with gender dysphoria (0.005% to 0.014% in adult males and 
0.002% to 0.003% in adult females).77 But it may also be due to limited responses to surveys and 
poor therapeutic outcomes.78 Lawrence S. Mayer and Paul R. McHugh in “Gender Identity” 
examine scientific research and find little to no evidence that medical procedures to change 
gender have any psychological benefit.79 Moreover, in spite of the predominant view that gender 
identity originates at birth, they find no scientific evidence to support this belief.80  
      Mayer and McHugh offer two well-documented cases that contradict the plasticity of 
gender that social constructionists advocate.81 First, John Money’s most famous patient is David 
Reimer.82 After a botched circumcision, physicians used both surgical and hormonal intervention 
attempting to raise Reimer as a girl.83 In spite of attempts to conceal the truth, Reimer self-
identified as a boy.84    
     Second, Mayer and McHugh offer a follow up study by William G. Reiner and John P. 
Gearhart of 16 genetic males with cloacal exstrophy—deformed bladders and genitalia—which 
underwent surgical procedures to construct female genitalia and were to be raised as girls.85 
According to the article, two subjects were raised as male, 8 of the 14 others self-identified as 
male during the course of the study, five persistently declared themselves female and one refused 
to respond.86 In addition, all showed moderate-to-marked male-typical behavior.87   
      Mayer and McHugh argue that the abovementioned findings indicate that biological sex 
is clear, binary, and stable from almost all humans.88 Moreover, exceptions to sex-typical 
behavior do not contradict this biological reality, nor can surgery or social conditioning change 
it.89 Mayer, speaking on behalf of Johns Hopkins Psychiatry Department, concludes that human 
sexual identity is mostly built into one’s constitution by both genetics and embryogenesis.90 
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      Even if gender lacks the plasticity that constructionists defend, perhaps the incongruence 
lies in biology itself. For example, Robert Sapolsky suggests a neurobiological derivation for 
cross-gender identification.91 He suggests that people with cross-gender identification have a 
brain that is opposite their biological sex.92 Other researchers presume a similar line of thinking 
as they develop experiments to confirm biological differences between transgender and cis-
gender brains including Nancy Segal,93 Michael Bostwick and Kari A. Martin,94 Giuseppina 
Rametti et al.,95 Emiliano Santarnecchi,96 Hsaio-Lun Ku et al.,97 and Hans Berglund et al.98 
      Mayer and McHugh find the above-mentioned studies inconclusive and mixed.99 Even if 
studies could demonstrate conclusively that neurological differences exist in cross-gender 
individuals, this does not necessarily imply that these differences are biological or innate; rather, 
one could just as easily implicate environment or psychology.100 Accordingly, the only way to 
unequivocally establish biological causality is to “conduct prospective, longitudinal, preferably 
randomly sampled and population-based studies.”101 Unfortunately, to attain statistical 
significance, many of these studies would need to be larger than is realistically possible to 
achieve.102 To the contrary of the above-mentioned studies and a constructionist understanding 
of gender, Meyer and McHugh show that scientific evidence overwhelmingly supports the 
position that biological development and sex corresponds with gender identity.103 Consequently, 
research ought to look for social and psychological origins for cross-gender identification.104  
      Paul W. Hruz, in Experimental Approaches to Alleviating Gender Dysphoria in Children, 
highlights that current research indicates that gender dysphoria is a multifactorial condition with 
genetic and environmental origins.105 He faults the rapid transition to non-psychiatric 
interventions for gender dysphoria to the strong ideological agenda that redefines the meaning 
and purpose of human sexuality.106 In addition, he attributes the rise in children presenting with 
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gender dysphoria to social affirmation. His article also raises challenges that research and 
treatment for gender dysphoria faces. Insofar as interventions supportive of gender transition 
contrast with Catholic anthropology, doing so, even for research purposes, may constitute 
proximate material cooperation with evil.107 In addition, Hruz underlines that children and 
adolescents do not have the maturity to give informed consent to procedures that have lifelong 
consequences.108 For Hruz, the high rate of spontaneous remission supports a cautious 
psychological approach that is antithetical to prevailing medical practice.109 Positively, he 
contends that Catholic hospitals stand in a unique position to occupy the void of reason, by 
treating patients in a manner consistent with their dignity and integrity.110  
      Body dysmorphic disorder is similar to gender dysphoria with some pronounced 
differences.111 Suffers obsess or fixate on an aspect of one’s body that one believes to be 
disproportionate with the rest of the body.112 In body dysmorphic disorder individuals exhibit 
preoccupation with physical appearance not attributable to concern with body fat or weight.113 
This may involve fixation over a body part, such as one’s nose, hairline, or genitalia, or it may 
pertain to one’s perception of musculature.114 As with gender dysphoria, individuals experience 
social anxiety and functional impairment.115 Comorbidities include anxiety, depression, and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder.116 They often seek cosmetic surgery, but experience 
dissatisfaction with results.117 They are high risk for suicide, especially in adolescents.118   
      In “A New Way to Be Mad,” Carl Elliott explores the phenomenon of patients presenting 
with an obsessive desire to live as an amputee, which John Money calls apotemnophilia and 
relates to gender dysphoria.119 Apotemnophilia is distinct from acrotomophilia, which is a sexual 
attraction to amputees. Elliott highlights the similarity between gender dysphoria regarding 
 
 319 
identity and selfhood.120 Suffers describe themselves as amputees.121 He speculates that cultural 
fixation on self explains why so many describe desires using reference to self and identity.122   
      Elliott argues that apotemnophilia is more like gender dysphoria, because suffers tie 
amputation more closely to their identity than in body dysmorphic disorder, where the individual 
simply believes that an aspect of one’s body is disproportionate.123 He argues that just as culture 
creates apotemnophilia so it creates the transsexual by introducing the terminology and offering 
sex reassignment surgery as a solution.124 Ian Hacking uses the phrase semantic hacking to 
describe this phenomenon.125 Elliott points to the less than controversial relationship between 
psychiatry and surgery throughout its history including clitoridectomies for excessive 
masturbation and frontal lobotomies, as evidence for questioning the use of sex reassignment 
surgery as a remedy for gender dysphoria or amputations as a cure for apotemnophilia.126   
b. Philosophical 
There are a number of philosophical tendencies that predominate in the ideology of 
gender, including, but not limited to: anthropological dualism, physicalistic determinism, and 
existential voluntarism. This subsubsection elucidates these tendencies and their disagreement 
with Christian anthropology.   
      Advocates of the ideology of gender presume an anthropology that relegates sexuality to 
choice, at best, largely rooted in anthropological dualism that originates in Rene Descartes’ 
Meditations on First Philosophy.127 Anthropological dualism emphasizes the separation between 
the body and the soul and the superiority of the latter, which Martin Rhonheimer calls 
spiritualism.128 Although historically present in various heterodox doctrines such as Gnosticism 
and Manichaeism, it is especially pronounced in the Rationalism.129 Descartes advocates radical 
dualism whereby two unique substances exist, yet abide in a tenuous relationship.130   
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       Descartes methodically questions everything from his sense perception to his own 
existence and even the existence of God.131 He ultimately concludes that the only thing certain is 
“Cogito, ergo sum.”132 This dictum becomes the subjective foundation for all knowledge and 
being.133 In this process, he divorces the spiritual from the corporeal establishing two mutually 
opposing substances.134 The mind becomes the sole principle of truth and being, whereas, he 
relegates the body to the unintelligible.135 Since the mind or soul exists independently of the 
body, Descartes conceives of the human person merely as the soul, trapped, so-to-speak, within 
the body.136  Hence he rejects Boethius’s definition of the human person as a rational animal.137   
      Similarly, Rhonheimer attributes such an anthropological dualism to Karl Rahner’s 
definition of the human person as a spirit in the world.138 Rather, Rhonheimer, following 
Aquinas insists that the human person constitutes a substantial unity of body-soul composite.139 
The soul is not the human person; rather, the human person is a composite of these two sub-
personal entities.140 The body with its natural inclinations and desires contribute more than just 
neutrally to morality.   
      Concomitant to the development of continental rationalism is the expansion of British 
Empiricism, with its emphasis on knowledge derived from physical evidence.141 Empiricism, 
which originates with Francis Bacon, corresponds with the Scientific Revolution that emphasizes 
experimentation, induction, and material and efficient causality over formal and final 
causality.142 Science describes and predicts interactions between physical objects, which become 
the basis for the laws of physics.143 The nature of matter itself and its inherent purpose are of 
little consequence. Not only is sense knowledge of primary importance, it becomes the sole 
source of truth. The universal laws of physics govern not only the inanimate objects of the world, 
but also the more complex animate beings, which constitute merely a complex conglomeration of 
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the former. While Rationalism emphasizes the division between the body and the soul, the 
superiority of the soul, and the denigration of the body, Empiricism reduces the body to the 
interaction between its constitutive parts. For both, the body is only a slightly more complex 
combination of parts than a cotton gin, which the laws of physics govern. Hence, on the one 
hand, the body is undifferentiated matter and on the other, physicalistic or biological 
mechanisms determine it.   
      However, the Empiricist David Hume calls into question even the apparent cause-effect 
relationships between material bodies, insisting that they too originate from sense experience, 
and are therefore, a posteriori, not a priori.144 In other words, the laws of physics, for Hume, 
constitute synthetic rather than analytic propositions. Put another way, the laws of physics 
depend on sense experience for their confirmation and formulation and are not self-evidently true 
merely according to the formulation of the terms as if analytic.     
      Immanuel Kant further severs the divide between the mind—noumenon—and the 
external world or thing-in-itself—phenomenon—by responding to Hume in his Critique of Pure 
Reason.145 Kant argues that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible through reason.146 Unlike 
the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley,147 which denies the existence of the material world external 
to that of ideas, or the problematic idealism of Descartes, which doubts the existence of an 
external world, Kant knows the world through a transcendental idealism, which uses sense 
experience and reason to formulate the synthetic a priori.148    
      Although Kant attempts to resolve the anthropological, dualistic divide that Rationalism 
and Empiricism creates, he only succeeds in solidifying it in his metaphysics. In Kant’s ethics, 
the divide is between the person and action, since the right action depends on a good will 
configured by the duty to an externally formulated moral law.149 Rhonheimer, in The Perspective 
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of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics criticizes Kant’s ethics 
because it takes it away from the first-person perspective.150 In “Karol Wojtyla, Sex 
Reassignment Surgery, and the Body-Soul Union,” Jacob Harrison indicates that Wojtyla 
dislikes the evacuation of bodily, human experience from morality in Kant’s ethics.151 Wojtyla 
finds a synthesis for this division between bodily human experience and duty in Aquinas.152   
      In addition to being dualistic and deterministic, the ideology of gender builds on an 
existential voluntarism. The problematic idealism of Descartes renders the body insignificant, at 
best, and deceptive or burdensome, at worst. Since the body lacks meaning, it becomes the role 
of the mind to give it meaning and definition. Consequently, constructionists utilize what I call 
an existential voluntarism to define the person and the body. It is existential insofar as the 
individual gives definition to the body, just as in contemporary existentialism the individual 
defines his or her purpose for existing.153 It is voluntaristic insofar as such an act presumes 
absolute freedom. Theological voluntarism, which emphasizes the omnipotent will of God over 
the omniscient intellect, originates with Duns Scotus.154 In Schopenhauer155 and Nietzsche156 the 
will provides the content of intelligibility. Speaking to this tendency, John Paul II, in Veritatis 
Splender says, “a freedom which claims to be absolute ends up treating the human body as a raw 
datum, devoid of any meaning and moral values until freedom has shaped it in accordance with 
its design.”157 Not only is the body relative, but the ethics that govern the body are relative too. 
Each individual is free to ascribe meaning to the unintelligible body. It is in this philosophical 
milieu that Bruce Jenner tells Diane Sawyer that he feels like a woman trapped in a man’s 
body.158   
      In Amoris Laetitia Pope Francis, denies the omnipotent freedom which the ideology of 
gender presumes insisting that as creatures humans must receive creation as a gift.159 Francis 
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challenges the faithful to help young people accept their bodies as created—male and female.160 
In a General Audience on Man and Woman, Francis speculates that people attempt to cancel out 
sexual difference because they do not know how to confront it.161 However, he warns that 
removing difference only creates problems.162 Instead, he recommends listening to others as 
means to understanding the other.163  
c. Theological 
      While Descartes builds his philosophy on doubt, Christian anthropology builds on a 
foundation of trust. It presumes ontological and epistemic realism; namely, that the human 
person, beginning with the bodily senses, accurately perceives the world. Implicitly, this means 
that God is trustworthy. Because God creates according to an intelligible and immutable order, 
humans are able to engage with the world and even perceive God’s handiwork in creation.  
     Furthermore, Christian anthropology is holistic; the human person is not merely a soul 
trapped in a body. Following the proceedings of the Fifth Lateran Council, John Paul II asserts 
that for the human person, “the rational soul is per se et essentialiter the form of the body.”164 
The human person is not merely the soul; rather, the human person constitutes the substantial 
unity of body and soul.165 The unity between the body and the soul is so strong that the very 
definition and existence of the human person depends on it. Indeed, Aquinas holds that in 
death—the separation of the body from the soul—the human person dies.166 In an address to the 
18th International Congress of the Transplant Society, John Paul II defines death of the person as 
a single event, which consists of the total disintegration of the unitary and integrated whole that 
is the personal self.167  
      John Paul II addresses human sexuality in his Theology of the Body, which is largely an 
extended theological commentary on Scripture passages that form the foundation for Christian 
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theological anthropology beginning with Genesis 1-3.168 Far from a literalist account of how God 
creates the world, Genesis 1-3 is a theological explication of the human condition.169 God creates 
everything from nothing. Humans, however, are unique in that God creates them in His own 
image and likeness.170 God gives humans stewardship over the rest of creation.171 God also 
creates humans, male and female.172 It is precisely in this difference between male and female, 
which manifests a difference in the human person, that it is possible for humans to mirror the 
communion of persons in the Triune God.173 Concretely, this is actualized in the marital act, 
which is also the means for fulfilling the command to be fruitful and multiply.174   
      In chapter 5 of his book, Sex and Virtue, John S. Grabowski highlights the challenges that 
sexual difference poses for an adequate philosophy of human nature.175 Equality and difference 
are two important Scriptural features that one must preserve.176 Grabowski distinguishes between 
essentialists and constructionists.177 This is analogous to the divide between biology or nature 
and environment or nurture. Essentialists point to biological difference and emphasize that sex is 
part of nature.178 As the above articulation demonstrates, constructionists argue that one largely 
constructs gender and sexuality through culture and society.179 Extreme essentialism tends 
toward determinism, which clashes with human freedom, while extreme constructivism—
reflective of a dualistic separation of the person from the body—denies the integral impact the 
body has on the human person.180   
      Grabowski holds that human sexuality is not a difference of essence, since such a 
difference implies a difference of natures. If natures are different, then equality is also lost. 
Neither does he argue that human sexuality is merely a cultural construct. Rather, he argues that 
human sexuality is based on the person. Just as the relations between persons in the Trinity 
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account for the respective persons therein, so relations give definition to human persons. Of 
course, for humans, the capacity for communion is reflected in the body by sexual difference.   
      Elliott Bedford and Jason Eberl, in “Is the Soul Sexed? Anthropology, Transgenderism, 
and Disorders of Sex Development,” hold that sexual difference transcends even the level of the 
body to the soul as well.181 They contend that strictly speaking, the soul is not sexed since it is 
immaterial; however, insofar as it connects from the moment of creation with a sexed body it 
constitutes an inseparable accidental quality of the human being.182 Therefore, they hold that the 
soul is sexed.183 Edward Furton, in “The Soul Is Not Sexed,” argues that Bedford and Eberl’s 
perspective not only diverges from traditional Thomistic anthropology, but that it also introduces 
undesirable possibilities, such as, the possibility that God places the wrong soul in the wrong 
body.184 In addition, according to such a formulation, it runs aground of dualistic tendencies 
insofar as it connects sexual difference to the soul.   
      Bedford and Eberl respond to Furton’s critique in “Actual Human Persons Are Sexed, 
Unified Beings,” asserting that the soul in abstract—logically without reference to the body—is 
not sexed, however, in accord with Aquinas, just as the soul is individuated after creation by its 
connection to the body, so the soul is sexed, so-to-speak, after its connection to the body.185 
Therefore, insofar as the soul and the body do not exist ontologically or temporally before each 
other and the so-called sexing of the soul takes place precisely because of its connection to a 
sexed body, it is impossible for God to put the wrong soul in the wrong body.186 In particular, 
Bedford and Eberl are concerned about the individuation and sex of the soul during the time after 
death—when the soul is separated from the body—and before the resurrection.187 Although the 
human person dies, they contend that the inseparable, accidental quality of sex that the body 
confers on the soul abides.188 By asserting that the sexing of the soul is not an essential 
 
 326 
characteristic of the soul, he successfully avoids Furton’s critique that God or some other entity 
could mistakenly place the sexed soul in the wrong body.   
      In addition to arguing that the soul is sexed by the body, so-to-speak, they assert that 
intersex conditions and disorders of sexual development do not pose issues regarding ontology, 
but merely epistemology.189 In other words, while intersex conditions may render it difficult for 
one to determine one’s biological sex, it does not mean that one cannot determine which binary 
sex one belongs to ontologically or biologically. In fact, as the first subsubsection in the previous 
subsection demonstrates, genetic determination of biological sex does support such a view.    
      Consequently, the sexual body influences the human person and contributes to one’s 
fulfillment.190 In other words, every human person is a sexual human person, which also relates 
to the human vocation of love.191 For Grabowski, and John Paul II, human persons are unique 
precisely because they are created in the image and likeness of God. In Mulieris Dignitatem, 
John Paul II explains that having been endowed with a rational intellect and a free will, humans 
have the capacity to love in their nature, which entails the capacity for relationship.192 They are 
able to relate to God and one another. Humans relate to one another as a community of 
persons.193 But the primary form of human relations is the communion of persons physically 
manifest by the marital act, whereby husband and wife become one flesh.194 This is possible 
precisely because of the physical differences between the sexes, which also manifests the 
inherent complementarity and speaks to the longing for communion that every person 
experiences.195  
      Analogously, just as the eternal love between the Father and the Son engenders the 
spiration of the Holy Spirit, so the communion of persons manifest in the marital act engenders 
human life by giving rise to offspring. For this reason, marriage and the family constitute a 
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primordial cell for larger communities.196 Whenever a husband and a wife engender a child 
through the marital act, they are cooperating in the sacred act of creation of a new human 
person.197 While the mother and father contribute the biological seeds for creation, God creates 
the human soul.198   
      God does not create arbitrarily; rather each individual has a particular calling or vocation 
that has eternal implications. Charity is the form of all vocations.199 In other words, God calls 
everyone to make a sincere gift of oneself for the sake of others.200 This form of love is self-
sacrificial, in that it considers the wellbeing of the other before oneself. It constitutes the agape 
love, which Christ demonstrates by his death on the Cross.201 While most are called to the 
married life, some are called to a vocation of charity that entails celibacy.202 Regardless, one’s 
sexuality is foundational for forging one’s life of charity. Put another way, everyone lives out his 
or her vocation through his or her sexuality.203 In the married life this entails the marital act, 
while in celibate vocations it does not.   
       While society focuses on conjugal relations as the ultimate expression of one’s sexuality, 
for the Church, sexuality has a deeper meaning. John Paul II argues for a spousal meaning of the 
body, which corresponds to the masculinity and femininity of the human person.204 Insofar as 
sexuality characterizes the human person it also forms how one lives out one’s vocation to 
Christian charity.205 Every man has a vocation to fatherhood, while every woman has a vocation 
to motherhood.206 This is not restricted to mere physical parenthood.207 Indeed, some are called 
to spiritual fatherhood or motherhood, as is the case with priests and religious.208 Essentially, a 
woman’s femininity shapes how she loves just as a man’s masculinity shapes how he loves.  
      This subsection demonstrates the incompatibility of the ideology of gender, which 
underlies arguments in favor of sex reassignment therapies, on the basis of three categories: 
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medical, philosophical, and theological. The following subsection considers sex reassignment 
surgery in light of the Principle of Totality and Double Effect.  
iii. Totality and Double Effect 
      This subsection shows that the Principle of Totality and the Principle of Double Effect do 
not justify sex reassignment surgery in patients with gender dysphoria, especially in light of the 
above-discussed implications for anthropology.    
a. The Principle of Totality and Integrity  
     In general, respect for the human person precludes the mutilation of one’s body. 
Whenever something causes harm to even the smallest part of one’s body, it harms the whole 
person. Theologians argue that the human body belongs to God. As such, no one is 
unequivocally free to harm oneself or another. However, circumstances arise when it is 
necessary to perform operations that harm the body but benefits the whole person. The Principle 
of Totality and Integrity justifies such acts.209 The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, insists that everyone has a 
right and duty to protect and preserve the body and its functional integrity; however, one may 
sacrifice the latter to maintain the health or life of the person, if no other permissible means 
exists.210 The following constitutes an articulation of the Principle of Totality as Aquinas and 
Pius XII articulate it and theologians apply it to sex reassignment surgery.  
      In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas addresses circumstances that may warrant maiming 
the body.211 He argues that removing a healthy member of a person’s body does harm to the 
whole person, and therefore, is unlawful.212 However, one may lawfully remove a diseased body 
part, if doing so benefits the whole person.213 This line of reasoning justifies the amputation of 
diseased limbs. This constitutes a rudimentary form of the Principle of Totality.   
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      In 1735, Claudius Amyand performed the first successful appendectomy on an 11-year-
old boy.214 While Aquinas’s articulation justifies the removal of diseased limbs or organs, it does 
not yet address circumstances whereby one may need to surgically damage healthy tissue to get 
to and extract diseased organs or remove healthy organs that exacerbate medical conditions. Pius 
XII develops the Principle of Totality in an “Address to the Delegates at the 26 th Congress of 
Urology,” that covers such circumstances.215 Although it renders the patient sterile, Pius XII 
argues that one may remove a prostate cancer-sufferer’s testicles (bilateral orchiectomy), since 
male hormones—that the testicles produce—speed the growth of prostate cancer.216   
      He offers three conditions that must be met to justify the removal of a healthy organ that 
exacerbates another condition.217 First, the continuing function of the organ in question must 
cause serious damage or constitute a threat.218 Second, the only way to avoid this damage or 
threat is to mutilate (remove) this organ, and that the effectiveness of doing so it well assured.219 
Finally, the positive effect of removing the organ must outweigh any negative effects.220   
      Becket Gremmels argues in “Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Catholic Moral 
Tradition: Insight from Pope Pius XII on the Principle of Totality,” that one struggling with 
gender dysphoria may meet the three criteria for the Principle of Totality and Integrity that Pius 
XII proposes to justify sex reassignment surgery. 221 First, he acknowledges that theologians 
traditionally argue against sex reassignment surgery because it renders the patient sterile.222 
Gremmels insists that for one struggling with gender dysphoria, his or her genitalia contribute to 
and exacerbate gender dysphoria, thereby meeting the first criteria and the first part of the second 
criteria.223 However, Gremmels is unsure if sex reassignment surgery meets the second criteria—
well-assured effectiveness—and the third criterion.224   
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      Gremmels argues that although the Principle of Totality normally refers to parts of the 
body for the sake of the whole, one may envision sacrificing body parts for the sake of other 
parts of the person.225 To explain, he introduces a Cartesian, dualistic understanding of the 
human person.226 In “The Principle of Totality Does Not Justify Sex Reassignment Surgery,” I 
explain the incongruence between the Cartesian, dualistic understanding of the human person 
and the integral understanding of the human person as body-soul unity.227 Similarly, John F. 
Brehany, in “Pope Pius XII and Justifications for Sex Reassignment Surgery,” indicates that the 
first criteria could never be met since a real disjunction between the body and the soul cannot 
exist.228   
      Brehany insists that Natural Law limits the scope of application for the Principle of 
Totality.229 He refers to a previous statement by Pius XII regarding immanent teleology of 
human nature and a hierarchy of values, which he argues contextualizes and limits the use of the 
Principle of Totality.230 Brehany observes that Pius XII offers two instances that fail to respect 
the hierarchy and teleology due to Natural Law: one, destroying one’s freedom to relieve a 
psychological disorder, and two, “overcoming sexual repression through immoral behavior,” 
both of which sex reassignment surgery attempts to do.231 E. Christian Brugger, in “Catholic 
Hospitals and Sex Reassignment Surgery: A Reply to Bayley and Gremmels,” argues that this 
same statement by Pius XII places a duty upon health care workers to affirm each person in the 
sex that nature determines.232 Finally, Brehany understands Pius XII’s third criterion for the 
Principle of Totality to only apply in circumstances that constitute life and death, which gender 





b. The Principle of Double Effect  
      Carol Bayley, in “Transgender Persons and Catholic Healthcare,” argues that the 
Principle of Double Effect justifies the use of sex reassignment surgery in persons with gender 
dysphoria.234  This subsubsection articulates the Principle of Double Effect and demonstrates 
how in the context of Catholic anthropology sex reassignment surgery is not morally permissible. 
First, I elucidate the Principle of Double Effect. Second, I summarize Bayley’s argument. Third, 
I pinpoint the Moral Object of the Act for sex reassignment surgery.   
      Like the Principle of Totality, Aquinas is the first to introduce Double-Effect Reasoning 
in the Summa Theologica.235 In response to the question of killing in self-defense, Aquinas 
observes that some actions have a good and a bad effect, one intended and the other 
unintended.236 For example, in self-defense, one may intend to save one’s life by an action that 
has an unintended effect of killing an assailant.237 Self-defense, however, is not a veil for an 
immoral intention. Aquinas agrees with Augustine that one should never intend to kill another 
person, even for a good ulterior motive—saving one’s life.238 Consequently, Aquinas insists that 
one’s defensive act must be proportionate to the assailant’s attack.239   
      T. A. Cavanaugh, in Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil, offers a 
contemporary formulation of the Principle of Double Effect.240 First, the act in question must be 
good in itself, or at least indifferent.241 In other words, the Moral Object must be good or neutral. 
Second, the agent must intend the good effect, and not the bad effect.242 In Thomistic terms, the 
bad effect must be praeter intentionem—beside the good effect.243 Cavanaugh argues that 
foreseen is the best way to describe the will’s relationship to the bad effect.244   
      Third, the bad effect must not cause the good effect.245 This third criterion arises from a 
casuistic approach to ethics, that is, a third-person approach.246 During the manualist period of 
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ethics, that is, when instructors taught ethics from manuals, ethicists focus on the perspective of 
the outside observer, as opposed to the first-person perspective.247 From the perspective of the 
acting person one may reword this third criterion as no good end justifies an evil means (Moral 
Object).248 Fourth, there must be a proportionately grave reason for performing the act with such 
a negative consequence.249 This corresponds to Aquinas’s concept of using proportionate means 
to repel an attack, for instance.250 One corollary to the fourth criterion is that no legitimate 
alternative may exist.251  
      Bayley argues that one may justify sex reassignment surgery for patients presenting with 
gender dysphoria. First, in accord with the first criterion of Double Effect, she insists that sex 
reassignment surgery is morally neutral.252 Second, Bayley asserts that the good effect is that the 
inside experience matches the outside of the person.253 The sterilization does not cause the good 
effect, but merely constitutes an unintended, yet foreseen consequence of correcting a birth 
defect.254 Although not stated explicitly, presumably sex reassignment surgery is not only 
proportionate to the pathology, but the only legitimate alternative. 
     Bayley’s line of reasoning contends that transgenderism is analogous to disorders of 
sexual development.255 She holds that hormonal delivery and brain structure influence gender 
dysphoria.256 Consequently, since physicians are willing to utilize the whole gamut of procedures 
to correct anomalies associated with mastectomies or so-called bottom correcting surgeries on 
patients recovering from cancer or disorders of sexual development, respectively, then they 
ought to perform them on patients with the pathology of gender dysphoria.257The problem with 
this line of reasoning lies in the faulty anthropology, which Bayley utilizes to formulate her 
argument. Bedford and Eberl argue that there is an essential difference between procedures that 
treat disorders of sexual development and sex reassignment surgery, which reflects an 
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anthropological difference.258 Accordingly, disorders of sexual development do not challenge the 
binary sexual complementarity, but only make sense in the context of such a binary milieu.259   
      As the above section demonstrates, advocates for sex reassignment surgery hold three 
anthropological positions that are contrary to Catholic anthropology: Cartesian dualism, 
materialistic determinism, and existential voluntarism. Bayley, holds that the internal sex of the 
person may differ from one’s natal sex.260 Bedford and Eberl refer to this as the subconscious sex 
or the sex of the mind.261 Cartesian dualism is inherent in this position, because it presumes a 
dichotomous relationship between one’s internal experience and the external body. In addition, 
advocates hold the mutually exclusive positions that culture and society construct gender and 
that biology determines it.262 Presumably, if biology determines the subconscious sex of the 
mind, then the transgender experience merely constitutes a birth defect that one ought to correct 
with sex reassignment surgery.263 Contrarywise, if gender is merely constitutive of social or 
cultural construction, then it does not depend on biology at all; rather, one is free to change one’s 
biology to accord with one’s socially-constructed subconscious sex, which reflects existential 
voluntarism. As the above demonstrates, advocates of gender ideology use both arguments to 
justify sex reassignment surgery. Both contradictory positions cannot be correct; however, both 
can be wrong.  
      Bayley intimates that sex reassignment surgery is no different than a surgical procedure 
in patients with disorders of sexual development and therefore, the act itself is neutral.264 The 
action itself refers to the Moral Object, which constitutes one of the three criteria that determine 
the morality of the act according to the Catechism of the Catholic Church: object, end, and 
circumstances.265 For Beford and Eberl, the difference between therapies to treat disorders of 
sexual development and sex reassignment surgery not only reflects a difference in anthropology, 
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but also a difference in the Moral Object.266 The following elucidates the Moral Object, in 
general, and in particular, for sex reassignment surgery.   
      For Aquinas, all actions have ends.267 Properly speaking, human actions proceed from a 
deliberate will, that is, reason configures an action such that the will chooses it as a good end.268 
What is last on the order of execution is first on the order of intention; therefore, actions begin 
with intention.269 In other words, whenever one sets out to do something, one has a purpose in 
mind for doing it. The purpose is what Aquinas identifies as the intention or end of the act—the 
second of the three above-mentioned criteria that determine the morality of an act.270   
       In contrast, the Moral Object constitutes a means chosen for an end, which constitutes an 
action.271 Insofar as the Moral Object is an action, which the will chooses and executes, Aquinas 
distinguishes between the internal and external act; the former concerns intention/end, while the 
latter concerns choice/Moral Object.272 Concerning the exterior act, Aquinas insists that materia 
circa quam identifies the Moral Object which reason configures and presents to the will as an 
object of choice.273 The external act, materia ex qua, on the other hand, identifies the physical act 
itself, devoid of intention.274 Because the Moral Object has intentional content, Aquinas uses 
proximate end to distinguish the Moral Object from the ulterior end.275  
      Ethicists get into trouble when they equate the Moral Object with either the physical act 
devoid of intentional content, that is, the external act materia ex qua, or when they equate it with 
the intention, that is, the purpose of the act. Both tendencies occur when one approaches moral 
decision making from a third-person perspective, rather than a first-person perspective. 
Manualists, for example, tend to equate the Moral Object with merely the physical act itself. By 
way of illustration, manualists define the sin of contraception as coitus interruptus.276    
Conversely, proportionalists such as Peter Knauer, equate the Moral Object with intention.277 
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Knauer establishes proportionalism in opposition to the manualists, but he retains the 
physicalistic methodology, defining moral evil as the causing of evil in the world.278 Both 
commit the Naturalistic Fallacy. They assume that the moral order derives from the natural 
order.279 To avoid this ethical pitfall, one must maintain the first-person perspective of ethics, not 
defining moral evil in purely physical terms. Consequently, Gremmels moral intuition is correct 
to reject an ethical objection against sex reassignment surgery merely because it results in the 
physical condition of sterilization.280   
       In accord with the above-mentioned philosophical theories, Bedford and Eberl determine 
that the immediate (or proximate) end, that is, the Moral Object in question, sex reassignment 
surgery for patients experiencing gender dysphoria is bodily or personal integration.281 Insofar as 
Catholic theological anthropology denies such a dualistic understanding of the body-soul 
composite of the human person, such a presumptive Moral Object is immoral.282 At the same 
time, they reject a reductive materialistic concept that presumes a divide between the sex of the 
mind and the sex of the body.283   
      Therefore, strictly speaking, sex reassignment surgery is not immoral because of the 
physical consequence of sterility which it unequivocally induces, but because it presumes to 
correct a problem that cannot exist—an internal sexual identity that diverges from one’s so-
called external sex. Of course, as Brugger suggests, such a line of reasoning not only calls into 
question sex reassignment surgery, but any therapies that collude with the patient in such a way 
that one presumes to alter another’s biological sex so as to accord with one’s internal gender.284 
In a culture where action—especially physical intervention—seems to outweigh apparent 
inactivity, the appropriate response to gender dysphoria is accompaniment, which the Ethicists of 
The National Catholic Bioethics Center advise.285 By accompanying individuals suffering with 
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gender dysphoria one not only avoids causing irreparable harm, but also aides them in achieving 
authentic human flourishing. 
      This section reveals that a Thomistic understanding of the Moral Object steeped in the 
context of Catholic anthropology, prohibits an argument in favor of sex reassignment surgery for 
patients presenting with gender dysphoria either with recourse to either the Principle of Totality 
or Double Effect. The following section examines the use of contraceptives for non-
contraceptive benefits.  
6B. Non-Contraceptive Benefits of Contraceptives 
      This section analyzes the clinical mechanism of several contraceptive methods focusing 
on intrauterine devices and implants, because of the complexity of their physiological 
mechanism of action and the longevity of their use. Second, I articulate a Thomistic 
understanding of the Moral Object so as to distinguish utilizing a contraceptive medication as a 
contraceptive versus using it for its non-contraceptive benefits. Third, in light of the negative 
side effects, including potential abortifacient activity, I use the Principle of Double Effect to 
further analyze and justify the potential use of contraceptive medications for non-contraceptive 
benefits.  
i. Clinical Analysis  
      This subsection analyzes the clinical use of intrauterine devices as a contraceptive. Then, 
it explores the use of implants as contraceptives. Finally, it considers the non-contraceptive 
benefits of both.   
a. Intrauterine Devices as a Contraceptive 
      According to Marc A. Fritz and Leon Speroff, historically, the first intrauterine devices 
are stem pessaries, that is, small button-like structures with stems that cover the opening of the 
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cervix.286 Carl Hollweg is the first physician to patent such a device, which he originally 
intended to support the uterus, not, however, to act as a contraceptive.287 According to Lazar 
Margulies in “History of Intrauterine Devices,” Richard Richter is the first physician to patent an 
intrauterine device as a contraceptive, utilizing silkworm, catgut, and a wire that extends through 
the cervix.288 Karl Pust replaces the wire with a catgut string.289 In the late 1920s, Ernest 
Graefenberg experiments with metallic rings of various alloys of gold, silver, copper, nickel, and 
zinc.290 Great Britain, Canada, and Australia use these early intrauterine devices, while the 
United States and continental Europe largely reject them because of high rates of expulsion and 
infection.291   
      In 1960, Margulies develops the first plastic intrauterine device called Margulies Coil.292 
The turgid plastic tail proves precarious for sexual partners. In response, Jack Lippes offers the 
first intrauterine device with a filament thread at the first international conference on intrauterine 
devices in 1962.293 In subsequent years entrepreneurs develop alternate devises, which lead to 
wide utilization during the 1960s and 1970s. However, the Dalkon Shield proves dangerous 
because its multifilament plastic-covered tail transmits bacteria giving rise to many cases of 
pelvic inflammatory disease.294 Subsequent lawsuits and negative publicity—from the lawsuits 
and allegations that intrauterine devices cause infertility—lead to a bad rap for all intrauterine 
devices and their use diminishes during the 1980s and 1990s.295 In 2009, only 2% of women who 
use contraceptives in the United States choose an intrauterine device.296   
     In the late 1960s, Jaime A. Zipper and Howard J. Tatum develop the first intrauterine 
device that uses copper.297 Although there is no consensus, Fritz and Speroff hold that copper 
prevents implantation of a fertilized ovum.298 Daniel R. Mishell in “Intrauterine Devices,” argues 
that copper-bearing intrauterine devices disrupt the ability of sperm to survive and move into the 
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fallopian tubes.299 Mishell holds that the low number of ectopic pregnancies indicates that 
fertilization rarely occurs.300 The ESHRE Capri Workshop Group in “Intrauterine Devices and 
Intrauterine Systems,” argues that since insertion of a copper intrauterine device in early luteal 
phase is highly effective as an emergency contraceptive, it must perform some post-fertilization 
action, producing an embryotoxic environment.301 In the United States, TCu-380A, also called 
ParaGard represents the copper intrauterine device still in use today.302 While it is only approved 
to prevent pregnancy for 10 years, wearing it for 20 years carries a small risk for pregnancy.303 
      The levonorgestrel-releasing intrauterine system, marketed as Mirena® and manufactured 
by Schering-Oy,304 has been available in Europe since 1990 and the United States since 2000.305 
This device prevents pregnancy for at least 5 years by releasing 20μg of levonorgestrel per day, 
in the first year, and 11μg by the end of the fifth year.306 Similar to copper intrauterine devices, it 
induces an immunological response as a foreign body causing the endometrium to release 
leukocytes and prostaglandins.307 In addition, the levonorgestrel thickens the cervical mucus 
preventing the transport of sperm through the cervical canal.308 As Mishell, indicates both copper 
intrauterine devices and levonorgestrel-releasing intrauterine systems induce an inflammatory 
response, which causes leukocytes to phagocytize the sperm.309 In addition, levonorgestrel-
releasing intrauterine systems act as abortifacients by thinning the endometrium, preventing 
implantation should fertilization occur.310   
b. Long-Acting Contraceptives 
     There are two unique, long-acting contraceptives available for market in the United 
States: implants and depot-medroxyprogesterone (Depo-Provera).311 As with intrauterine 
devices, the advantage for long-acting contraceptives is that they do not require a high degree of 
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user compliance in order to get a high degree of contraceptive efficiency. This subsubsection 
discusses the history and mechanism of these two contraceptives.   
      The Population Council develops the first implant, which they market as Norplant and 
receives approval for use in Finland in 1983.312 The United States Food and Drug Administration 
approves it for use in the US in 1991; however, because of profit and liability disputes, the 
United States market withdrawals it in 2002.313 Norplant consists of six small capsules 
containing levonorgestrel, which leaches 39μg into the body per day elevating plasma 
progesterone levels providing at least five years of pregnancy prevention.314 Norplant’s primary 
mechanism of action is anovulation.315 In addition, the elevated levels of progesterone impair 
sperm ascent to the fallopian tubes.316 It also appears to inhibit endometrial development, thereby 
preventing implantation, should fertilization occur.317 However, Sheldon et al. argue that it is 
very unlikely that fertilization occurs, since they did not observe elevations in human chorionic 
gonadotropin, which the trophoblast produces in order to maintain the function of the corpus 
luteum, for which survival of the pregnancy depends.318   
       There are two United States Food and Drug Administration-approved contraceptive 
implants in the United States: Implanon and Jadelle.319 The United States Food and Drug 
Administration approves Organon-manufactured Implanon in July 18, 2006.320 Implanon is an 
etonogestrel 65mg single-rod implant that a physician implants under skin of the woman’s 
underarm.321 It constitutes a slow-release progestin that last for at least three years.322 Note that 
progestin refers to synthetic progesterone analogues.323 Jadelle, United States Food and Drug 
Administration-approved in 1996, similar to Implanon, consists of two thin rods each containing 
75mg of levonorgestrel, wrapped in steroid-permeable silastic tubing.324 Fritz and Speroff say 
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that implants are a good method of contraceptive for women of reproductive age that are 
sexually active and want to stave off pregnancy for 2 to 3 years.325   
      There are three primary mechanisms for implants. First, progestin suppresses luteinizing 
hormone at both the pituitary and hypothalamus, which is necessary to induce ovulation.326 In 
some women ovulation does occur toward the end of five years, but the luteal is insufficient.327 
In addition, progestin affects cervical mucus causing it to thicken and decrease, which inhibits 
sperm penetration.328 Finally, progestin suppresses the estradiol-induced cyclic maturation of the 
endometrium.329 Consequently, if fertilization does occur—of which there is no evidence—
implantation will not ensue.330 
      The last contraceptive to consider is depot-methroxyprogesterone acetate marketed as 
Depo-Provera. Historically, Searle and Upjohn simultaneously discover depot-
methroxyprogesterone acetate in 1956.331 The United States Food and Drug Administration first 
approves Upjohn’s medroxyprogesterone acetate, the active ingredient in Depo-Provera, in 1959 
to treat amenorrhea—the absence of menstruation—irregular uterine bleeding and 
miscarriages.332 In 1960, the United States Food and Drug Administration approves Depo-
Provera to treat endometriosis—the growth of endometrial tissue outside the uterus.333 In 1974, 
the United States Food and Drug Administration rescinds its approval of Depo-Provera for 
treating miscarriages and endometriosis.334 In 1972, the United States Food and Drug 
Administration approves it for treating inoperable and metastatic endometrial and renal cancer.335 
Although the United States Food and Drug Administration notes the effectiveness of 150mg 
injections at preventing pregnancy, it repetitively questions its safety because of two long-term 
animal studies in which beagles develop breast cancer and monkeys develop endometrial 
cancer.336 In Contraceptive Risk: The FDA, Depo-Provera, and The Politics of Experimental 
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Medicine, William Green follows, in detail, the chronological development of the United States 
Food and Drug Administration’s eventual approval of Depo-Provera in 1992.337   
       The current prescribed dosage remains a 150mg injection every three months.338 The 
mechanism is slightly different from the abovementioned implants insofar as the progestin level 
are high enough to completely block luteinizing hormone surges, thereby completely preventing 
ovulation.339 In addition, the cervical mucus thickens and the endometrium changes.340 Depot-
methroxyprogesterone acetate does not inhibit follicular stimulating hormone, so follicular 
growth continues, consequently, estrogen levels remain normal.341   
c. Non-Contraceptive Benefits of Contraceptives 
     Each of the abovementioned contraceptive methods has both positive and negative side 
effects. Some argue that the negative side effects suffice for a wholesale rejection of these 
methods for any beneficial use. This subsubsection highlights the clinical side effects of each of 
the abovementioned methods, focusing especially on the positive. In particular, it focuses on the 
use of these medications to treat amenorrhea and pain associated with endometriosis.   
      In his medical glossary in Contraceptive Risk: The FDA, Depo-Provera, and the Politics 
of Experimental Medicine, William Green defines endometriosis as a painful condition in which 
the tissue that lines the inside of the uterus grows outside of it.342 Like ordinary endometrial 
tissue, it thickens, breaks down, and bleeds with each menstrual cycle; with nowhere to go, it 
irritates surrounding tissue and eventually gives rise to cysts.343 Although there is no generally 
accepted explanation for the pathogenesis of endometriosis there are several working theories. 
John Sampson, the first gynecologist to use the term to describe cysts associated with 
endometriosis,344 develops the first theory to explain its pathogenesis called retrograde 
menstruation and implantation.345 Essentially, he argues that during menstruation endometrial 
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tissue transfers through the Fallopian tubes into the peritoneal cavity, where it implants on pelvic 
organs.346 The coelomic metaplasia theory holds that coelomic epithelial cells in the peritoneum 
and the pleura that differentiate into mesothelial cells experience spontaneous metaplastic 
change.347 The induction theory holds that such change occurs because of exposure to menstrual 
effluent.348 Although other theories exist, these constitute the most obvious explanations.   
      Immunologically, ectopic endometrial cells in women with endometriosis are less 
vulnerable to macrophages-mediated immune surveillance and clearance.349 In addition, 
endometrial cells are resistant to apoptosis—gene-regulated programed cell death.350 Estrogen 
overproduction occurs in endometriotic—ectopic endometrial cells—stromal cells—cells 
pertaining to connective tissue—because of the presence of steroidogenic factor 1, which 
combines to induce the expression of steroidogenic acute regulatory protein and CYP19A1.351 
Women with endometriosis also seem to have resistance to progesterone,352 which may be 
attributable to progesterone receptor deficiency in endometrial and endometriotic stromal 
cells.353 Progesterone activates the retinoic acid pathway in normal endometrial stromal cells, 
which gives rise to differentiation and apoptosis.354    
      Treatment for endometriosis depends largely on the extent of the disease and severity of 
symptoms.355 Physicians treat more severe cases with surgery.356 Medical treatment consists of 
estrogen-progestin contraceptives, progestin, gonadotropin-releasing hormone agonists, danazol, 
and aromatase inhibitors.357 All of these treatments inhibit fertility insofar as they prevent 
ovulation.358 Estrogen-progestin contraceptives mimic the hormonal environment of pregnancy 
and may improve apoptosis in eutopic endometrial tissue.359 At the same time, estrogen has been 
shown to activate endometrial growth, exacerbating the condition and symptoms.360 Moreover, 
the withdrawal of estrogen reverses endometrial cell viability.361 Joon Song holds that estrogen 
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acts as a survival factor inhibiting apoptosis.362 Progesterone, on the other hand, induces 
apoptosis.363 Hence many physicians find progestin-releasing contraceptives particularly 
effective for treating endometriosis, which includes all of the methods in the first 
subsubsection.364 Unfortunately, in women with endometriosis, the endometrial and 
endometriotic cells are more sensitive to estrogen and resistant to progesterone, limiting the 
effectiveness of progestin-releasing contraceptives for treating endometriosis and its 
symptoms.365   
       Gonadotropin-releasing hormone agonists induce pseudomenopause preventing the 
ovaries from receiving gonadotropin stimulation, thereby depriving the body of estrogen support 
and inducing amenorrhea—the absence of menstruation, which prevents further seeding in the 
peritoneal.366 Unfortunately, gonadotropin-releasing hormone causes significant decrease in bone 
density in patients with endometriosis.367 Danazol, the first drug United States Food and Drug 
Administration approved specifically to treat endometriosis prevents the luteinizing hormone 
surge; therefore, inducing a state of indefinite anovulation.368 Unfortunately, the many 
androgenic and hypoestrogenic side effects limit its utility.369 Finally, Aromatase inhibitors have 
had very limited outcomes, but warrant further research, especially in combination with other 
medications.370 
       Another common condition that affects women is abnormal uterine bleeding sometimes 
called menorrhagia, which may be associated with any number of underlying conditions 
including: pregnancy, anovulation, uterine pathology, or coagulopathies.371 Bleeding is common 
with menses, that is, menstruation, which is part of the normal ovarian cycle. During the 
follicular phase, estrogen levels rise in an exponential fashion causing the functional layer of the 
endometrium to grow.372 After ovulation—the release of a mature ovum—the remaining corpus 
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luteum continues to produce estrogen, but also begins producing progesterone.373 Both hormones 
rise with the maturation of the corpus luteum, causing further development of the endometrium 
in anticipation of implantation should fertilization occur.   
      If fertilization does not occur, then the corpus luteum spontaneously dies in apoptosis, 
causing levels of both estrogen and progesterone to fall.374 The steady decrease in these 
hormones induces an inflammatory response, whereby lysosomes release enzymes into the 
cytoplasm of epithelial, stromal, and endothelial cells of the endometrium and the intercellular 
spaces, which, in turn, digest these cells and their constituents.375 The enzymatic activity on the 
endometrium eventually reaches the subsurface capillaries and veins causing interstitial 
hemorrhaging, the components of which escape into the endometrial cavity.376 Vasoconstrictors 
halt menstrual bleeding in the exposed spiral arterioles of the basal layer endometrium.377 Once 
re-epithelialization concludes bleeding halts completely.378   
      Since the presence or absence of estrogen and progesterone has such an important role in 
regulating menstruation, these hormones are also instrumental in helping to reduce bleeding in 
women with heavy bleeding during menses. At the same time, the exogenous addition or 
subtraction of estrogen and progesterone (or progestin) can cause breakthrough bleeding—
bleeding before menses—or estrogen/progestogen withdrawal bleeding—primarily due to the 
disproportionate presence of these hormones.379 In spite of this risk, estrogen-progestin 
contraceptive and levonorgestrel-releasing intrauterine system are common medicinal treatments 
for heavy menstrual bleeding, since the progestin, the dominant hormone, inhibits menses.380   
      In addition, these medications are effective at preventing anovulatory bleeding. 
Anovulation amounts to a perpetual state of follicular phase, since ovulation does not occur.381 
Consequently, the body only releases estrogen, which causes the endometrium to grow without 
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the limiting effect of progesterone. The endometrium lacks sufficient stromal support cells 
giving rise to focal breakdowns that bleed.382 For women with anovulatory bleeding, the addition 
of exogenous progestin restores the natural mechanism whereby the endometrium sheds through 
regular menses.383   
      This subsection demonstrates that the physiological mechanisms of contraceptives have 
positive effects on endometriosis and heavy bleeding. The following subsection delineates the 
Moral Object of using contraceptives for non-contraceptive benefits. 
ii. Object 
      This subsection analyzes the development of the Catholic Church’s teaching concerning 
the use of contraceptives as a means of birth control, especially focusing on identifying its Moral 
Object. Then, it identifies the Moral Object of utilizing the abovementioned contraceptive 
methods for their non-contraceptive benefits.   
a. Contraception, Casti Cannubii, and the Manualist 
      In Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists, 
John T. Noonan, Jr. meticulously follows the precarious relationship between the Catholic 
Church and contraception.384 Noonan correlates the sharp decline in birth rate in Catholic France 
during the nineteenth century to the increased use of contraception.385 He attributes the 
acceptability of contraception to the rationalist malaise that sets in after the Revolution.386 In 
direct opposition to Catholic teaching, the anti-clerical French embrace the individualistic and 
radical ideals of rationalism, which instigates the Revolution. Consequently, they embrace the 
concept that the human body is merely a machine, the parts of which one may manipulate to 
achieve one’s ends.387 Noonan adds that the prospect of economic success also motivates the 
French working class to diminish their obligations, by reducing the number of progeny.388 
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Noonan concludes that the initial motivation for the spread of contraception is irreligious, 
calculating, and egoistic.389 
      Noonan stresses that moral theology was at a nadir during the nineteenth century, 
essentially amounting to seminary courses based on manuals, such as Jean Pierre Gury’s 
Compendium of Moral Theology.390 In contrast to the rigidity of French Jansenism, Alphonsus 
Liguori’s approach is more tolerant and guides Rome’s initial response to contraceptive acts, 
which until the 1900s is indistinguishable from onanism or coitus interruptus.391 During the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the use of contraception spreads as a social reform and 
gains acceptance from medical, scientific, and religious authorities.392 At the Lambeth 
Conference of 1930, Anglican bishops adopt a resolution that permits couples to use 
contraceptive methods where they deem it morally expedient to avoid pregnancy.393   
      On December 31, 1930, Pope Pius XI responds with his encyclical Casti Connubii.394 
Noonan describes this as an excellent distillation of past doctrinal statements.395 After 
recapitulating the goods of marriage according to the Augustinian triad—offspring, fidelity, and 
sacrament396—Pius XI reaffirms the necessity of growth in chastity with recourse to God’s 
grace; rather than, circumventing such efforts by means of biology.397 Thus, Pius XI builds his 
argument against contraception on two pillars: Natural Law and growth in chastity.   
      After enumerating several of the reasons couples give for avoiding children, Pius XI 
argues that no reason justifies acts that are intrinsically contrary to nature, namely, anything 
which frustrates the natural power for begetting children.398 He, with recourse to Augustine and 
Scripture—recalling Onan—solemnly defends the Catholic Church’s position that any frustration 
of the natural power of matrimony to generate life not only offends God, but also nature.399 
Moreover, he chastises confessors who lead penitents into sin by approving of such acts, either 
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by silence or in words.400 For him, the chief obstacle to couples fulfilling the law of matrimony is 
unbridled lust that one can only overcome by subjecting oneself to God.401 Recourse to biology 
and science to curb one’s carnal desires cannot establish chastity.402 Pius XI recommends humble 
reflection on the sound wisdom of Church teaching concerning marriage, a steadfast 
determination of will to observe God’s sacred law, and recourse to the grace of the sacrament.403 
      Until Paul VI publishes Humanae Vitae, Casti Cannubii constitutes the Church’s most 
solemn pronouncement on contraception.404 Much of the debate following Casti Cannubii 
centers on the meaning of Natural Law, since this constitutes the foundation of Pius XI’s 
philosophical objection. Pius XI focuses on physical acts that interfere with or frustrate the 
generative potential of the marital act. At the same time, Pius XI’s words in Casti Cannubii 
implicitly permit couples desiring to postpone or space children to reserve the marital act for 
times of natural infertility, 405 even if this is not what he originally intends.406 Of course, so-
called rhythm methods lack the reliability of barrier methods at the time. Since so much of the 
debate focuses on the physical frustration of the act, when birth control pills arise in the 1950s, 
moral theologians lack unanimity in their response. In fact, one of the pioneer physicians 
utilizing progesterone, John Rock, insists that it conforms well to the theological expectations of 
Catholic morality.407 In 1958, Louis Janssens writes “L’inhibition de l’ovulation, est-elle 
moralement licite?,” in which he argues in favor of women taking progesterone to inhibit 
ovulation.408 Progesterone appeals to Janssens because it only temporarily prevents ovulation and 
does not kill any eggs.409   
       For Thomas Petri, much of the opposition after Casti Cannubii centers on objections to 
the methodology of moral theology, which overly focuses on physical action and strict obedience 
to the law.410 These characteristics of the manualist approach, Petri, in accord with Servais 
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Pinckaers,411 John Mahoney,412 John A Gallagher,413 and Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen 
Toulmin,414 attributes more to the nominalism of William of Ockham, than to Thomas 
Aquinas.415 Ockham’s nominalism begins with the denial that universal forms exist 
independently of human reason.416 Regarding morality, Ockham emphasizes freedom of 
indifference over inclinations.417 For him, freedom constitutes one’s ability to choose actions 
without persuasion from inclinations.418 Consequently, the sole cause of human action is self-
determination.419 Moreover, just as no universal forms exist independently of the human mind, 
so moral truths depend exclusively on divine command.420 Hence, the morality of the manuals 
emphasizes divine command and mere physical adherence to laws.   
b. Proportionalistic Reformulation of the Moral Object 
      In turn, so-called proportionalists such as Louis Janssens attempt to retrieve the authentic 
teaching of Aquinas to counter the impersonal and physicalistic inclinations of the manualist 
tradition. In “Ontic Evil and Moral Evil,” Janssens attributes his distinction between ontic evil—
physical evil—and moral evil—the intending of physical evil in the world—to Aquinas.421 
According to Janssens’s interpretation of Aquinas, there is a distinction between the means and 
the end of an action. The means corresponds to the external action or the material element of an 
act.422 Alternatively, the end corresponds to the internal act of the will, which constitutes the 
formal act.423 Just as Knauer uses his interpretation of Aquinas’s proportion criterion for Double 
Effect to explain how a commensurate reason may justify one choosing a means that causes 
physical evil in the world,424 so Janssens argues that so long as the ends justify the means one 
may indeed choose to cause ontic evil.425   
      More precisely, the debita proportio must suffice to justify the means chosen.426 Put 
another way, Janssens argues that there must be no intrinsic contradiction between the means and 
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the end.427 To illustrate, he uses the example of stealing. If one chooses to steal something from 
another person as a means to affirming one’s right to ownership, the means do not justify the end 
since one attempts to affirm the value of one’s own ownership at the cost of one’s neighbor’s 
ownership.428 In this case, one is using a means that constituted as a value, contradicts the value 
that one affirms as one’s end. Janssens applies this line of reasoning to responsible parenthood. 
He argues that parents who know they do not have sufficient resources to raise more children sin 
by engaging in the marital act during the fertile periods.429 Therefore, insofar as both the so-
called rhythm method and contraception do not obstruct conjugal love or responsible parenthood, 
they constitute acceptable means of achieving responsible parenthood.430   
c. Keeping the Object of the Act in the Genus Naturae 
      For Rhonheimer and John Finnis, maintaining the distinction between the moral order 
and the natural order is essential for any authentic ethical methodology and failure to do so 
constitutes the Naturalistic Fallacy.431 Hume first articulates the un-derivability of the moral 
order from the natural order by asserting that one cannot derive ought-statements from is-
statements.432 Put another way, there is an irreducible difference between practical and 
speculative reason. For Aquinas, the same intellect acts by extension in practical knowing.433 
Although practical knowing of the self-evident principles of the Natural Law depends one first 
knowing being speculatively,434 contrary to what Ralph McInerny says in Aquinas on Human 
Action: A Theory of Practice,435 this does not mean the former derives from the latter. Indeed, 
the formulations of practical syllogisms versus speculative syllogisms demonstrate this.436   
      At the same time, this does not mean that one must sacrifice objectivity or universality in 
Natural Law.437 Finnis, in Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth, contends that 
exceptionless moral norms do exist.438 Ethicists call them intrinsically evil acts and formulate 
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them as prohibitions. In Humanae Vitae, Pope Paul VI argues that contraception is an 
intrinsically evil act.439 An intrinsically evil act constitutes an act whose Moral Object is 
immoral, that is, contrary to reason.440 Intrinsically evil acts bear undue matter (indebitam 
materiam).441 Unfortunately, as the above discussion demonstrates, manualism, under the 
influence of nominalism, falls into the Naturalistic Fallacy insofar as it focuses on external 
physical acts being in or out of conformity with the divine law, regardless of intent. John Paul II, 
in Veritatis Splendor, insists that insofar as these acts are inherently contrary to reason, there is 
no exception to their prohibition.442 No amount of good intention or plight of circumstances 
justifies one deliberately choosing such an act. Janssens, however, argues that intrinsically evil 
acts do not exist; sufficient intention can justify any means.443 While John Paul II’s argument 
constitutes the traditional position of the Catholic Church against contraception, its methodology 
is unique. 
      By refocusing the discussion of ethics on intention, proportionalists attempt to correct the 
defective approach of the manualists; however, according to Rhonheimer, they fall victim to the 
same Naturalistic Fallacy they rebuke.444 Just as the manualists mistakenly identify the Moral 
Object as the physical content of an act, so proportionalists do the same. For Knauer, as well as 
Janssens, the Moral Object constitutes the causing of physical good or evil in the world.445 In 
method, this is no different than the manualist’s external conformity to divine law.   
      Janssens, Knauer, and Richard McCormick’s446 Moral Object diverges from Aquinas. 
Rhonheimer accuses McCormick of expanding the notion of the object by placing the sole source 
of intentional content in the remote end.447 Like McCormick, Janssens understands the external 
act, which he and Aquinas equate with the Moral Object to be a material entity—completely 
devoid of voluntariness.448 In one respect this is true. For example, Janssens understands the act 
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commanded by the will—the external act—to be the physical act.449 This agrees with what 
Aquinas says concerning the external act in On Evil.450   
      However, Aquinas also attributes intentional content to the external act, independent of 
the remote end, what Rhonheimer calls intentional basic action.451 Thus, the external act is part 
of the moral order.452 Regarding the will commanding (imperium) an act, Finnis insists that the 
intellect constitutes the primary active faculty insofar as before one commands an action through 
the will, one discerns and chooses a particular course of action as the means for achieving one’s 
end.453 Moreover, insofar as one’s chosen means contain an intelligible content, they have an 
aspect of an end, which is what Aquinas says multiple times regarding the Moral Object.454  
This, of course, is not to say that the will has nothing to do with commanding; rather, as 
Rhonheimer says that the will commands an act that reason configures.455   
       In “‘Materia ex qua’ and ‘Materia circa quam’ in Aquinas,” Duarte Sousa-Lara shows 
how Aquinas uses materia circa quam (matter concerning which) and materia ex qua (matter out 
of which) to distinguish important elements of a human act.456 Aquinas says that materia ex qua 
is not the Moral Object, but materia circa quam is the Moral Object. 457 In “Aquinas on Interior 
and Exterior Acts: Clarifying a Key Aspect of His Action Theory,” Sousa-Lara demonstrates that 
Aquinas uses this distinction to differentiate when Aquinas is speaking of the external act 
constitutive of the Moral Object versus the external act merely as the material, physical act 
alone.458 Materia circa quam denotes the inherent voluntariness of the external act, which 
constitutes it as the Moral Object (in the moral order).459 Materia ex qua connotes the external 
act prescinding from its voluntariness, thereby constituting it as part of the natural order.460   
      Sousa-Lara illustrates the distinction between materia circa quam and materia ex qua 
using the sexual act.461 The physical act of sexual intercourse—whether it is adultery, 
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fornication, or marital love—constitutes a single external act materia ex qua according to the 
natural order. 462 In the moral order, the materia circa quam differs insofar as adultery and 
fornication differ from marital love.463 So, the materia circa quam corresponds to the Moral 
Object in the moral order.  
d. The Object of Contraception 
      In Humanae Vitae, Paul VI reaffirms the Church’s prohibition of contraceptive acts, that 
is “any action which either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is specifically 
intended to prevent procreation.”464 Contrary to the opinion of most critics, Rhonheimer insists 
that Humanae Vitae is not merely a defense of Natural Law according to a naturalistic 
understanding.465 Rather, Paul VI’s argument conforms with a Thomistic articulation of Natural 
Law that constitutes the Moral Object in the moral order, precisely because it places its 
prohibition on the level of intention, not the physical or biological.466 On the order of intention, 
Rhonheimer defines the Moral Object of contraception. However, before doing so, he first 
explains the principle that it violates and then situates it within the framework of virtue and vice.   
      Rhonheimer, in accord with Aquinas, and John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor, insists that 
Natural Law is nothing but the light of reason aiding one in discernment of good and evil in 
action.467 One derives statements of Natural Law through speculative reflection on natural reason 
in action.468 Hence, ethicists often articulate the universal precepts of Natural Law as normative 
statements such as “do good and avoid evil.”469 However, the content of Natural Law is practical, 
thus in concrete action it takes the form of a command or precept.470 While Natural Law does not 
constitute a law of nature, it nonetheless works within the metaphysical and physical confines of 
nature, specifically human nature.471 Consequently, Paul VI explains how contraception violates 
the Inseparability Principle, which, in accord with human nature, holds that the unitive 
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significance of the marital act is inseparable from its procreative significance.472 However, the 
violation of this principle does not suffice for an ethical argument against contraception.473 
       Rhonheimer situates his definition of the Moral Object of contraception in the context of 
virtue.474 First, he explains that the Moral Object of marital love consists of loving bodily union, 
which as mutual self-giving is naturally open to procreation.475 Insofar as marital love involves 
self-donation, it presumes self-possession, which is constitutive of temperance regarding sexual 
inclination, that is, chastity.476 Indeed, for Paul VI, responsible parenthood is also an essential 
component of marital love.477 In fact, for Paul VI and Rhonheimer, procreative responsibility is a 
means to growth in chastity, because it entails periodic continence, which is an expression of 
love that maintains the inseparable connection between the procreative and unitive meaning.478   
      Against the backdrop of this understanding of the Moral Object of the marital act in 
reference to chastity, Rhonheimer explains that contraceptive acts eliminate the need to regulate 
sexual behavior through periodic continence by dismantling its procreative potential.479 It is a 
choice against chastity, since one contracepts to avoid procreative responsibility, which 
inherently entails the need for periodic continence. Consequently, Rhonheimer connects 
contraceptive intention to the vice of lust, since it circumvents a couple’s means to growth in 
chastity by eliminating the need for periodic continence.480 This formulation keeps Moral Object 
on the level of intention and in the moral order.  
e. The Object of Using Contraceptives for Non-Contraceptive Benefits 
      The above discussion demonstrates several key factors for determining the Moral Object. 
First, the Moral Object is in the moral order, not the natural order. Consequently, one cannot 
determine it merely by observing external, physical behavior. Just because a woman takes a 
contraceptive pill or has an intrauterine device, does not necessarily mean that she intends to 
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contracept. Without reducing the Moral Object to the remote end, one must enter the moral order 
to determine it. As a proximate end, the Moral Object has intentional content, that is, an inherent 
rationality that makes it a viable choice as a means to an end.   
      The above clinical analysis indicates that sufficient medical benefit exists to justify the 
use of any of the abovementioned contraceptives solely for the purpose of their non-
contraceptive benefits. Thus, just as one takes Tylenol or Advil for a headache, it is conceivable 
to formulate a practical syllogism that involves one choosing a contraceptive method for its non-
contraceptive benefit.481 Accordingly, one may begin with the practical premise: “1) I want to 
have good health.” Next, one may observe a theoretical truth that 2) “increasing progesterone 
reduces bleeding for women with heavy bleeding during menses.”482 Presuming that one 
experiences heavy menstrual bleeding, one may conclude: “3) it is good for me to choose a  
means to increase my exogenous progestin to reduce my bleeding.” One could make a similar 
argument regarding the benefits of progestin for endometriosis.  
     This subsection identifies the Moral Object of using contraception for its non-contraceptive 
benefits. The following subsection uses the Principle of Double Effect to further justify it.  
iii. The Principle of Double Effect  
     Because of the negative side effects of the above-mentioned contraceptive methods—
especially sterilization, one must pursue further ethical analysis to determine its moral 
permissibility. Simply determining that the Moral Object is licit does not necessarily justify its 
use for non-contraceptive benefits. The Principle of Double Effect justifies acts with bad effects.   
a. Thomistic Formulation of Double-Effect Reasoning 
      Aquinas, in the Summa Theologica, is the first to formulate criteria that eventually gives 
rise to the Principle of Double Effect.483 He devises these conditions concerning killing in self-
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defense. First, he observes that some actions have two effects, one good, and the other bad.484 
Moreover, one may not intend both effects.485 For example, in self-defense, one may 
unintentionally kill an assailant.486 Here, there are two effects: self-protection and death of the 
aggressor. One intends self-defense, not killing the assailant. Since one does not intend to kill the 
attacker, it is praeter intentionem—beside the intention of the agent.487   
      In contemporary formulations of Double Effect, the first two criteria concern intention. 
Joseph T. Mangan, in “An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect,” says that the 
first criterion is that the act itself must be good or indifferent.488 For Edward Furton and Albert S. 
Moraczewski in “Double Effect,” this first criterion excludes intrinsically evil acts, that is, any 
act that has an immoral object.489 The second criterion is that one must intend the good effect, 
and not the bad.490 While the first criterion addresses the proximate end, the second addresses the 
ulterior end. Not only must the means chosen be good, but the purpose for choosing it must be 
good as well.   
      Aquinas uses praeter intentionem to identify the unintended bad effect.491 Cavanaugh, 
explains that praeter intentionem conveys the notion of accidental in that it is outside the realm 
of intention, even though one may foresee it.492 Thus, knowing or foreseeing is not necessarily 
intending. The defender may foresee that one’s act of self-defense will inexorably kill the 
assailant. Similarly, a physician may foresee that removing a cancerous, gravid uterus results in 
the death of the child. Foreseeing the invariable consequences does not change intention: self-
defense or the preservation of a mother’s life by removing a cancerous organ. Insofar as the bad 
effect is praeter intentionem—foreseen, but unintended, it does not ethically preclude the act.   
      Aquinas does, however, introduce a proportionality criterion that may render an act 
unjust.493 To illustrate, he insists that one ought not to use more force than necessary to ward off 
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an assailant; otherwise, though one’s intention is good, the act may nonetheless be immoral.494  
Thus, in casuistic tradition, one must weigh the effects.495 Regarding self-defense, one uses 
deadly force only if the assailant attacks with deadly force. Concerning the removal of a 
cancerous, gravid uterus, one weighs the life of the mother in relationship to the life of the child.        
      Under the influence of nominalism, manualists add a fourth physicalistic criterion: the 
negative effect must not cause the good effect.496 With due regard for the role of the Moral 
Object as the proximate end, Furton and Moraczewski reword this criterion asserting that one 
may not choose an evil means for a good end.497 Put this way, one is just a restating the first 
principle, that the Moral Object must be good. Arguably, this redundancy is why Aquinas does 
not include it in his formulation of Double-Effect Reasoning.   
b. Intention  
      Using the Principle of Double Effect as an instrument of ethical analysis, I further 
elucidate intention concerning contraception for non-contraceptive benefits. Insofar as ethical 
decision-making takes place from the perspective of the acting person, one must discern one’s 
intention—as a proximate end and ulterior end—for using a contraceptive method.498 In the 
above analysis, I determine that the Moral Object of using contraceptive methods for non-
contraceptive benefits is not immoral. Ethically, choosing to use a contraceptive method for its 
contraceptive function is immoral according to its Moral Object—proximate end, because, as 
Rhonheimer indicates, it not only violates the Inseparability Principle, but also constitutes a 
choice to subvert one’s procreative responsibility to avoid periodic continence, a constitutive part 
of responsible parenthood and a means for growth in chastity, which as a virtue concerns marital 
love.499  Insofar as the Moral Object of contraception constitutes an intrinsically evil act, one 
must not vacillate. For example, one should not say, “I take progestin for heavy menstrual 
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bleeding, but I also like the contraceptive benefits.” In such a case, one clearly intends both, 
regarding the proximate end.   
     Concerning the second criterion, one’s intention as ulterior end of avoiding pregnancy 
may be bad or good.500 A couple may exclude or limit the number of children for selfish reasons, 
such as to have a luxurious lifestyle. Alternatively, for ethically sound reasons, a couple may 
discern that they cannot afford to have more children or that pregnancy is too risky for the 
mother.501 Even so, the Inseparability Principle demands that couples remain open to the 
possibility of transmitting life in the marital act, which one can do by observing periodic 
abstinence.502 Rhonheimer explains that periodic continence constitutes a form of birth control 
that remains open to the procreative significance of the marital act, even though one avoids its 
procreative function.503 What separates this from a contraceptive act, however, is intention; thus 
it is not merely a physical difference.504 The use of a contraceptive method includes the intention 
to render procreation impossible.505 The above demonstrates the immorality of such an act 
chosen as a proximate end, but one’s ulterior end also configures the morality of the act. Thus, 
one must also have a good intention, as ulterior motive.    
c. Proportionality and Abortifacient Risk 
       Next, one must use the proportionality criterion to weigh the non-contraceptive benefits 
against the negative contraceptive effect. In Difficult Moral Questions, Germain Grisez provides 
circumstances under which a physician may prescribe contraceptives for therapeutic reasons.506 
First, he highlights that for women who are sterile or fertile, but not engaging in the marital act, 
prescribing a contraceptive for non-contraceptive benefits is no more controversial, ethically, 
than prescribing any other medication.507 For fertile women engaging in the marital act, Grisez’s 
primary concern is the possible unfairness to an embryonic individual, should fertilization occur 
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after an unlikely breakthrough ovulation and the method acts as an abortifacient by preventing 
implantation.508   
      Mark Yavarone in “Do Anovulants and IUDs Kill Early Human Embryos?: A Question 
of Conscience,” indicates that part of the ambiguity of classifying a drug’s effect as an 
abortifacient depends on the divergent definition of pregnancy, which some argue only occurs 
after implantation.509 If true, Yavarone’s statistics concerning the number of unintended 
intrauterine device or oral contraceptive-induced abortions is alarming.510 In light of the 
abortifacient properties of contraceptive methods, Grisez insists that one must have significant 
benefit to outweigh the possible risk to a third person embryo.511   
      To remedy this, Grisez suggests that women who can estimate breakthrough ovulation 
could practice periodic abstinence to minimize the risk of an unintended abortion.512 At the same 
time, Grisez advises physicians not to prescribe contraceptive for non-contraceptive benefits, if 
withholding it does not constitute malpractice by omission.513 He even recommends surgery over 
using a contraceptive.514 This, however, is problematic because it may mean forgoing medically 
indicated treatment or choosing a more invasive procedure over a more conservative option. 
Ethically, this violates the principle of beneficence and non-maleficence.515 If one does not 
inform the patient this violates respect for autonomy as a form of paternalism.516  
      Regarding the question of levonorgestrel acting as an abortifacient, Edward J. Furton 
observes that some authors, such as Ron Hamel,517 have come to the conclusion that the debate is 
settled and it does not act in such a way.518 To the contrary, Furton indicates that it is not a 
settled question; evidence points in both directions.519 Thus, he cautiously counsels health care 
workers to follow Marie T. Hilliard’s recommendation to perform a blood test checking for the 
luteinizing hormone surge, which accompanies ovulation, before administering levonorgestrel as 
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an emergency contraceptive.520 According to Hilliard and Furton, only then does one have moral 
certitude—as opposed to absolute certitude—that fertilization will not occur and that the 
contraceptive does not act as an abortifacient.521 This stipulation concurs with the bishops’ 
directive regarding the administration of emergency contraceptive for rape victims, that 
appropriate testing rule out conception and that it “not interfere with the implantation of a 
fertilized ovum.”522   
      In 2009, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith publish Instruction Dignitas 
Personae on Certain Bioethical Questions, in which they insist that anyone—patient or 
clinician—who “seeks to prevent the implantation of an embryo which may possibly have been 
conceived and who therefore either requests or prescribes such a pharmaceutical, generally 
intends abortion.”523 Thus, Kathleen Mary Raviele in “Levonorgestrel in Cases of Rape: How 
Does It Work?” objects to the use of contraceptive methods such as levonorgestrel that may act 
as an abortifacient, preventing implantation, should conception occur.524  
      While there are similarities, using an emergency contraception, as a contraceptive is not 
the same as using contraception as a medication for non-contraceptive benefits. The difference 
centers on intention. Giving contraception to a rape victim is an act of defense, against 
conception. Following Hilliard and Furton’s advice, ensures with moral certitude that it is not a 
defense against implantation. Although the external act materia ex qua is the same—taking 
levonorgestrel—the external act differs regarding its materia circa quam, that is, its proximate 
end. As an emergency contraceptive it constitutes an act of defense against conception; however, 
once fertilization occurs, or for Hilliard and Furton, could occur, it becomes an act of defense 
against implantation, or an abortifacient.   
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      Regarding the use of contraception for non-contraceptive benefits, as long as one rules 
out intention as the proximate end and ulterior end, one in no way intends the medication to act 
as a contraceptive or an abortifacient. This may be easier said than done, however, because the 
very same physical mechanisms that the medication induces, which make it a good 
contraceptive, also make it a good remedy for endometriosis and heavy menstrual bleeding.525 
Thus, on the level of the external act materia ex qua, it is impossible to differentiate. Moreover, 
the better the drug is, as a contraceptive, the less likely breakthrough ovulation and fertilization 
will occur. Thus, theoretically, the better the medication is at preventing conception, the less 
likely unintended fertilization occurs.  
      It is important to remember that all medications have risks of side effects; sometimes 
these risks include death. Just as it is important for a patient to work with the physician to 
determine and weigh risks, so patients must do so regarding the unlikely and unintended risk of a 
contraceptive taken for non-contraceptive benefits, acting as an abortifacient. Leaving this to the 
deliberation of the conscience of the patient is not diminishing the seriousness of the side effect, 
nor is it relativizing the ethical significance of a medication’s potential risk. Rather, it is referring 
the decision to its proper place, the perspective of the acting person, concerning a side effect that 
is praeter intentionem.526 Thus, insofar as one does not seek to prevent implantation, one does 
not intend abortion.527  
      The fourth condition of the Principle of Double Effect insists that the negative side effect 
does not cause the positive effect.528 In intentional terms, one must not will the negative effect as 
a means to the good effect.529 As I indicate above, insofar as the physiological mechanism of 
action is the same, the external act materia ex qua is the same, but the intentionally, that is, the 
external act materia circa quam differs. Thus, so long as one clearly uses the medication for non-
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contraceptive benefits, one has a good proximate end and avoids any violation of the fourth 
criteria.   
      After articulating the physiological mechanisms of various contraceptive medications, 
both in terms of their contraceptive qualities and their non-contraceptive benefits, this section 
differentiates the Moral Object for each, respectively. Then, it uses the Principle of Double 
Effect to further justify the non-contraceptive benefits over the ethically negative side effects of 
contraceptives, including their potentially abortifacient qualities.  
     This chapter identifies the Moral Object of sex reassignment surgery and using 
contraceptives for non-contraceptive benefits and analyzes them further in light of the Principle 
of Double Effect. The following chapter concludes the dissertation.     
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CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION  
      This dissertation elucidates the moral methodology for Catholic health care ethics, 
focusing especially on the relationship between Natural Law, the Moral Object of an act, and the 
ethical Principles of Double Effect and Cooperation. Although Augustine and Thomas Aquinas 
introduce these concepts, Pope John Paul II not only identifies them as official teaching of the 
Catholic Church, he also provides the most systematic articulation of them in his encyclical 
Veritatis Splendor. This dissertation offers a methodological bridge between Veritatis Splendor 
and the United States bishops’ Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services, and then applies these concepts to emerging issues in health care ethics.  
      Chapter two explicates the concepts of Natural Law and the Moral Object that Aquinas 
first introduces in the Summa Theologica. Avoiding the Naturalistic Fallacy, which maintains 
that the moral genus derives from the natural genus, this chapter demonstrates the former’s 
unique origin. Moreover, defining the human person as a composite of body and soul, it dodges 
two dualistic vulnerabilities of the Naturalistic Fallacy: physicalism and spiritualism. In turn, this 
provides a conceptual framework for the Church’s prohibition on contraception. 
      Chapter three shows that a non-consequentialist understanding of Natural Law and the 
Moral Object is consistent with Aquinas’s articulation of Double Effect Reasoning. After 
discussing Aquinas’s use of Double Effect, this chapter further elucidates the interpretation of 
subsequent commentators that culminates in Jean Pierre Gury’s manualist formulation. In an 
effort to make moral theology more teachable, commentators externalize the Moral Object, 
identifying it as positing external causes. Peter Knauer uses Gury’s version of Double Effect to 
devise proportionalism, which contends that one may posit any cause to achieve a good end so 
long as one has commensurate reason. Insofar as Gury’s Double Effect and Knauer’s 
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proportionalism externalize the Moral Object, their theories fall victim to the same pitfalls of the 
Naturalistic Fallacy discussed in the second chapter.  
      The third chapter also contrasts non-consequentialist versions of Double Effect. First, it 
enunciates a defense of craniotomies by John Finnis, Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle. In 
accord with T. A. Cavanaugh’s critique, however, it demonstrates that they too narrowly define 
the Moral Object of craniotomy, such that it excludes an inexorable component, the direct killing 
of the child. This highlights that physical consequences influence the definition of the Moral 
Object, even if the latter is not constituted of the former. Finally, this chapter contrasts the Moral 
Objects of three distinct applications: euthanasia/terminal sedation, terror bombing/tactical 
bombing, and craniotomy/hysterectomy. It uses Cavanaugh’s distinction between intention and 
foreseen to further illuminate the Principle of Double Effect.   
      Chapter four is the procedural bridge between the theoretical chapters two and three and 
the applied chapters five and six. First, the chapter explains health care ethics consultations. 
Then, it explicates the process in the context of the core principles of health care ethics: 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.  
      Foreseeing organizations with conflicting missions working together, the second section 
illuminates the Principle of Cooperation, a related principle to Double Effect. This section 
follows the development of the United States Catholic Bishops’ response to sterilization and 
their articulation of Cooperation in succeeding editions of their Ethical and Religious Directives. 
The third edition follows the consequentialist methodology of conflating the Moral Object with 
the remote end. In addition, they permit mediate material cooperation, something that 
Cooperation traditionally forbids. However, in future editions, they correct these mistakes. 
Further analysis in this section reveals that such a conflation makes it difficult to explain why 
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certain moral absolutes are inviolable. Finally, this section explicates the Principle of 
Appropriation, a mirror principle to Cooperation that attempts to justify the use of or product of 
another’s immoral act. 
      Using the above discussion regarding Natural Law, the Moral Object, and the Principle of 
Double Effect, chapter five argues that given certain conditions one may legitimately choose a 
procedure that are physically sterilizing or contraceptive. When one keeps the Moral Object in 
the moral genus, one is no longer limited to defining the Moral Object of contraception or 
sterilization in purely physical terms. The first section shows that the significant increased risk of 
developing ovarian cancer in BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutation carriers justifies them choosing the 
physically sterilizing procedure of a bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy, so long as they choose it 
for its prophylactic benefits, not its sterilizing effect. Delimiting the Moral Object of 
contraception to the moral genus, Martin Rhonheimer defines it as a choice against chastity, 
insofar as one circumvents the need for periodic continence, a constitutive part of responsible 
parenthood that provides a means to growth in chastity. Accordingly, the Moral Object of a 
BRCA mutation carrier using a bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy is a choice to prevent cancer. 
Insofar as the negative effect of sterilization is beyond intention—either as remote end or 
proximate end—the Principle of Double Effect justifies one’s tolerance of it, especially in light 
of the life-threatening risk of developing ovarian cancer. 
      The second section discusses the use of the contraceptive levonorgestrel to prevent 
conception in victims of sexual assault. First, this section explicates the function of various 
contraceptives in the context of the menstrual-ovulatory cycle. Although certain contraceptives 
clearly have abortifacient properties, the literature remains inconclusive and heavily debated 
regarding levonorgestrel’s role at preventing pregnancy by forestalling ovulation. There is, 
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however, persuasive evidence that meloxicam does prevent ovulation. Presuming that one uses a 
means that acts as an effective contraceptive, rather than an abortifacient, this section 
demonstrates that a properly formulated Moral Object and a non-consequentialist understanding 
of Double Effect dissolves any need for recourse to the latter principle. Avoiding a physical 
definition of the Moral Object of using a contraceptive to prevent pregnancy in a victim of sexual 
assault, one may understand it as an act of self-defense. Although the physiological mechanism 
of action is the same, the Moral Object, defined according to the moral order, differs between an 
act of contraception or an act of self-defense. Moreover, since the use of contraceptive is an act 
of self-defense when a woman uses it to prevent conception after sexual assault, there is no 
negative side effect justify using the Principle of Double Effect. Only a definition of the Moral 
Object that fails to keep it in the moral order runs into the error of presuming the need to justify 
the physically conceived evil of avoiding conception.  
     The sixth chapter further explicates the use of Double Effect applying it to sex 
reassignment surgery and using contraception for non-contraceptive benefits. The first section 
considers the justification of Double Effect to justify sex reassignment surgery. First, it 
highlights the challenges of defining sex, gender, gender dysphoria, and sex reassignment 
therapies. Next, building on Natural Law, this section elucidates three grounds by which the 
Catholic Church objects to sex reassignment therapies: medical, philosophical, and theological. 
Finally, this section shows that although some theologians use the Principle of Totality or 
Double Effect to justify sex reassignment surgery, this is a non-sequitur, since Catholic 
anthropology precludes the dualistic understanding of the human person.  
      The second section analyzes the use of physically contraceptive means for their non-
contraceptive benefits. First, it examines the contraceptive function of intrauterine devices and 
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long-acting contraceptive. Next, it explores their non-contraceptive benefits specifically 
highlighting their treatment for endometriosis and menorrhagia. The next subsection traces the 
historical development of consequentialist methodology of the manualists and the proportionalist 
especially highlighting the influence of William of Ockham’s nominalism. The final subsection 
uses Double Effect to justify the negative effect of sterilization when using long-acting 
contraceptive methods. In particular, it emphasizes that Double Effect excludes intending 
sterilization both as a Moral Object or a remote end. This subsection illuminates the debate on 
the potential abortifacient properties of contraceptive, but contends that since this is beyond 
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